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FOREWORD
The papers included here, except for the editor’s
introduction, all come from the Strategic Studies Institute’s annual conference on Russia in May 2012.
In one way or another, they all point to the internal
pathologies that render Russian security a precarious
affair, at the best of times. As the editor suggests, the
very fact of this precariousness makes Russia an inherently unpredictable and even potentially dangerous actor, not necessarily because it will actively attack its neighbors, though we certainly cannot exclude
that possibility, but rather because it may come apart
trying to play the role of a great power in Eurasia or
elsewhere. As we all know, that outcome happened in
1917 and in 1989-91, with profound implications for
international security and U.S. interests.
The strategic point at issue here goes beyond
merely cataloguing Russia’s deficiencies, many of
which are well-known. These indicators should give
early warning to analysts within the Army, the U.S.
Government, and the broader society, if not abroad,
about the fundamental problems of instability that lie
at the foundation of Russian governance and security.
Precisely because Russia is so important an actor in so
many theaters and issue areas, any manifestation of
that inherent unpredictability and instability should
set alarm bells ringing. As we are now, according to
many analysts, in a “risk society,” it becomes incumbent upon us, if we are not to be unduly surprised,
to diversify our risks and to develop greater understanding of the potential challenges that those risks
could trigger.
For these reasons, these essays are a unique value.
That value is not because they are provocative, which
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they are, but, as noted earlier, because they function
as a kind of early warning to the U.S. Army and the
U.S. Government that future scenarios may well involve contingencies that we do not wish to imagine
at present but which we may be obliged to confront.
Therefore, we must think about preventing them from
growing into full-blown military contingencies while
we can. If that effort ensures and owes something to
these essays, then they will have served their purpose.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press

viii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN
PUTIN’S RUSSIA: WHAT DO THEY MEAN
FOR THE U.S. ARMY?
Stephen J. Blank
The five diverse chapters herein are papers presented at the Strategic Studies Institute’s (SSI) IV Annual Conference on Russia that took place in Carlisle,
PA, on May 15-16, 2012. They represent the first two
panels of that conference, which examined politics
and economics in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Despite
their diversity of assessments and the varied subjects
upon which they touch, the conclusions that they present are rather uniform in their pessimism concerning
current and future trends in Putin’s Russia. Readers
will encounter here an immobilized political system
that is essentially an archaic, neo-Tsarist, patrimonial,
insular, even criminalized system where there is no
rule of law, sanctity of contract, or guaranteed right
of property, not to mention the civil and human rights
we take for granted.
Moreover, the present leadership has already
shown that it will not hearken to increasing public
demands from below for reform. Instead, President
Putin, in his new term, has shown an increasing
willingness to engage in repression and actions that
cannot even be called cosmetic reforms. These repressions, show trials, and farcically staged exhibitions of
Putin’s masculinity, new laws that are essentially decrees passed by what was once called an aggressively
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obedient Duma, uncannily duplicate the same methods and procedures used by the Tsars after 1860 and
the Soviet regime under Brezhnev from 1964 to 1982
when, in the wake of the great reforms, Russian society began to awake and demand still more reforms,
and some brave souls even demanded revolution. The
ruling regimes after 1860 were never able or willing
to meet these demands and, for the most part, refused
to make the necessary adjustments and reforms to
survive and preserve Russia as a competitive great
power. Ultimately, due to their failure to adapt to the
requirements of a modernizing society and modernity
in general, not only in terms of domestic political or
economic progress, but also strategic competitiveness,
these regimes found themselves increasingly deprived
of internal legitimacy and authority and prone to enter into a series of wars, none of which they won, and
some that were catastrophic, that led to their ultimate
destruction in 1917 and again in 1991. Moreover, the
Tsarist and then the Brezhnev regimes responded in
much the same way as does the current government.
Essentially, they all resorted to show trials, police repressions, occasional murders, incarceration of dissidents, and mounting corruption, while the engine of
economic development and growth broke down. More
recently, the Duma, with its aggressively obedient
majority, is redefining the laws of treason that would
criminalize any dissent. In a sense, this calls to mind
Joseph Stalin’s 1950 formal reintroduction (in anticipation of another great purge) of capital punishment,
allegedly in response to the wishes of the Soviet intelligentsia. Or, they revive the earlier Stalinist practice
of the 1920s and 1930s of drafting draconian and seeping decrees and laws to criminalize any behavior that
the regime felt like attacking at any given moment.1
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These same ploys characterize the resemblance of the
current regime’s policies to classic Tsarist, Soviet, and
even Stalinist tactics and policies.2
Apart from the neopatrimonial and neo-Tsarist
political system, with some important accretions from
the Soviet period, we find an economy that also does
not work and is becoming ever less competitive. By
officials’ own admissions, Russia today depends far
too much on a cash crop (in this case, energy), again
a resemblance to the Tsarist system that depended on
agricultural exports and collapsed when they were either not possible, as in World War I, or when there was
a global decline in the price of wheat. But the economy
is inhibited not only by this structural backwardness,
but also by the burden of enormous corruption. Russia is probably by far the most corrupt economy of the
G203 and, in July 2010, the Association of Russian Attorneys for Human Rights issued a report saying that
about 50 percent of Russia’s $1.2 trillion gross domestic product (GDP) involves corrupt transactions.4 This
corruption has, if anything, worsened since then.
The pervasiveness and scale of such corruption affects the country’s defense spending, where at least
20 percent of annual defense spending (if not 40-50
percent) is routinely stolen, misappropriated, lost, or
just wasted.
According to the Russian Statistical Committee, the
volume of the shadow economy in Russia was 15% [of
GDP] in 2012, whereas in [the] 1990s it was 22-23% of
[the] (much smaller-SJB) overall economy. At the same
time the Ministry of Economic Development estimated
that the shadow economy contributed more than 50%
of the population’s income in 2011. The Federation of
Independent Trade Unions stated that more than half
of 2011 salaries paid in Russia were paid outside legal
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channels. Viktor Zubkov, than Deputy Prime Minister, said that about a trillion rubles were taken out of
Russia illegally in 2011 that corresponds to 4% of GDP
and represents almost half of all money taken out of
the country; it is almost equal the entire budget of the
MVD (this would amount approximately $70 billion
and the disparity with other reported figures show
that officialdom has no exact idea how much is leaving the country except for the fact that the sums are
enormous-SJB). Zubkov also estimated that about a
trillion rubles was laundered in Russia in 2011.5

As one would imagine, such corruption has several profound consequences. It adds to the widespread
preexisting disregard and contempt for the law and
the culture of due process that is equally pervasive
and reinforces arbitrary rule or what Russians call
Proizvol. Second, it renders the country inhospitable
to large-scale foreign and direct investment or even to
investment by wealthy Russians who routinely ship
money off shore before it comes back to Russia. Thus,
estimated capital outflows in 2011 amounted to $85
billion.6 Third, it demoralizes many potential younger
elites who are already voting with their feet and leaving Russia. Fourth, in the defense sphere, it corrupts
much of the country’s overall national security policy,
not least because it is clear that high officials are for
sale, even to foreign interests.7 Personal pecuniary interest, therefore, often trumps national interest, e.g., in
key areas like arms sales or in the energy market. As
a result, the temptation for these officials to engage in
what might be called black operations, like running
weapons to Iran, ultimately undermines the vital security interests of Russia itself.8 Fifth, it deprives the
economy of the capital needed for technological and
military recapitalization, investment, and moderniza-
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tion, and thus consigns the country and millions of its
citizens to greater poverty and incompetent or suboptimal goods and services than would otherwise be the
case. Thus, even as Putin et al., regularly state, in true
Soviet and Stalinist style, that the defense industrial
sector is the locomotive of technological progress, this
sector cannot meet the military’s needs, forcing Russia
to buy weapons abroad from France, Germany, Italy,
Finland, and even Israel. Worse yet, there are cases
where the armed forces have refused to accept weapons produced for them by that sector, e.g., the Pantsir
air defense system that Moscow also exports!9
Meanwhile, the state sector has grown voraciously
at the expense of the overall economy’s growth potential, a fact that is not surprising, given the opportunities for personal enrichment through corruption
with impunity. Thus, The Economist reported that during the past decade, the number of bureaucrats has
risen by 66 percent from 527,000 to 878,000. The cost
of maintaining this structure has risen to 20 percent
of GDP.10 Naturally, this phenomenon is accompanied
by ongoing decay of infrastructure. In the late Soviet
period, the government invested 31 percent of GDP;
however, in the last 10 years, it invested only 21.3
percent, compared to China’s 41 percent. Whereas the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) built 700
kilometers (km) of railways a year, the present government only built 60 km in 2009. Similarly, the total
length of paved roads in Russia in 2008 was less than
in 1997, a sure sign of governance failure and misallocation of resources. As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote:
Informed Russian observers are also increasingly
concerned that Russia’s reliance on capital inflow in
return for Russia’s oil and gas is breeding a decline in
the country’s capacity to sustain technological innova5

tion and industrial dynamism on the global competition for economic preeminence. The renewal of Russia’s industrial infrastructure, which in Soviet times
was being replaced at an annual rate of 8 percent, has
declined to 1-2 percent, in contrast to the 12 percent
of the developed world. No wonder that the World
Bank reported in 2005 that fuels, mining products, and
agriculture accounted for 74 percent of Russia’s total
exports, while manufactures accounted for 80 percent
of Russia’s total imports.11

Consequently, Russia has recovered more slowly
from the 2008 economic crisis than did the other BRIC
countries (Brazil, India, and China). Since foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia is a fraction of the total
for the other BRIC members, 4.1 percent for 2007, that
pace of recovery will probably not change anytime
soon. Reportedly about 20 years behind the developed
countries in industrial technology, Russia develops 20
times fewer innovative technologies than does China
and devotes considerably less money to research and
development than China does.
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China, when visiting
Russia in 2007, noted with satisfaction that ChineseRussian trade in machinery products reached an annual level of $6.33 Billion. Out of politeness, however,
he refrained from adding that $6.1 Billion of that sum
involved Chinese machinery exports to Russia, leaving only $230 million of Russian machinery exports
to China. Making matters worse, projections by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the year 2020 envisage not only China’s gross
domestic product as approximately four times larger
that Russia’s, but with India ahead of Russia as well.12
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But the papers do not stop here. As Harley Balzer points out in Chapter 4, Russia’s epistemic communities, i.e., communities of people who work with
their minds like scientists, professionals, etc., remain
trapped in a mentality that precludes learning from
others and doing things differently than they have
done for years, if not decades. This insular, corrupt,
and self-perpetuating approach to research, development, science, technology, and education is a powerful factor in reinforcing the fetters that bind Russia
and hold the country back. As Judy Holiday memorably stated in the movie, Born Yesterday, “This country
and the institutions that govern it belong to the people
who inhibit it.” The insular, chauvinistic political system (ours is better, or in Russian, nashe luchshe) reinforces this proclivity to believe that there is no other
way to do things other than what has always been
done before, that Russia is uniquely endowed with a
superior cultural-religious heritage, etc. Furthermore,
these trends, as manifested in socio-political and economic action, only reinforce the tendency to repeat the
same mistakes of the past in the misconceived notion
that doing the same thing without meaningful reform
will yield the desired results, if we only do it better
this time. These pathologies, for that is what they represent, are no less present in the defense and defense
spending sphere, as Stephen Blank demonstrates and
as noted previously. Indeed, the huge spending increases on procurement allocated till 2020 are one reason why Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin broke with
the government and warned about its policies.
The defense and security implications of this dysfunctional and archaic system are equally negative.
Currently, there is a huge defense buildup that aims to
spend $716 billion between now and 2020 to make the
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Russian armed forces a competitive high-tech armed
force, with 70 percent of its weapons being modern
(whatever that category means to Moscow). Yet this
system already has shown repeatedly that it cannot
deliver the goods and that the attempt to remilitarize
at this relatively breakneck speed (relative to other
comparable powers) is failing to produce the weapons
Moscow wants. Consequently, it is clear not only that
nuclear weapons will remain the mainstay of Russian
military might through 2020, but it is also equally likely, from the current vantage point, that this nuclear
preeminence will remain well into the decade 2020-30
as well. This means that, for a whole range of contingencies, Moscow will have to rely more than any other
comparable power on nuclear threats and deterrence,
and deterrence presupposes a hostile relationship
with the targets of that strategy. Apart from issues of
democracy promotion and regional security in Eurasia, this conclusion has sobering implications for U.S.
defense policy as a whole because it will place limits
on what can be achieved through arms control treaties, obstruct the Barack Obama administration’s declared ambition to move on to a zero nuclear weapons
trajectory, and inhibit a genuine military and political
partnership with Russia.
Furthermore, given the postulate presented here of
a deteriorating domestic situation due to an increasingly sclerotic economic-political formation, we could
well encounter a situation where a revolutionary situation inside Russia due to the blockage of progress
intersects with a massive security crisis that could, as
in 1991, involve a coup and the danger of seizure of
nuclear weapons and potential wars across Eurasia.
Or, we could see a diversionary war as the RussoJapanese war was launched in part in order to busy
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“giddy minds with foreign wars.” Arguably, we are
witnessing the first signs in today’s Russia of the advent of a long-term crisis culminating in such a domestic and then international crisis. This crisis would
combine mounting disaffection, if not protest, and
continuing subpar economic performance is a situation that approximates Vladimir Lenin’s 1915 definition of a revolutionary situation. According to Lenin’s
oft-quoted definition:
What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken
if we indicate the following three major symptoms: (1)
when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain
their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in
one form or another, among the “upper classes,” a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure
through which the discontent and indignation of the
oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take
place, it is usually insufficient for “the lower classes
not to want” to live in the old way; it is also necessary
that “the upper classes should be unable” to live in
the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the
oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual;
(3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there
is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses,
who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed
in “peace time,” but, in turbulent times, are drawn
both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the
“upper classes” themselves into independent historical
action.13 (italics in original)

To be sure, none of this suggests the imminence of
a revolution. Rather, it suggests the imminence of a
structural crisis leading to the situation defined here
by Lenin and which evermore characterized Tsarist
Russia after the great reforms of the 1860s and the Soviet state after Leonid Brezhnev. Neither we, nor any
9

other reputable observer, expect an imminent collapse
of the Putin system. But Russia already appears to be
visibly bearing the seeds of its own entropy and ultimate collapse. Distinguished Russian scholars like
Lilia Shevtsova and Olga Kryshtanovskaya openly
state that Russia has slipped into a revolutionary situation.14 That process took some 50 years in Tsarist Russia and a generation in Soviet Russia, suggesting the
acceleration of large-scale socio-political change and
its growing department, even if we are talking about
a long-gestating process. But if this assessment has
merit, then we are only at its inception, not its conclusion, and many more negative phenomena and Russian behaviors can be expected before the advent of
a crisis that could occur, if this acceleration of protest
trends and institutional entropy occur by 2030. Potential contingencies could even possibly entail the use
of force either at home (and not just in a counterinsurgency mode against jihadi rebels as in the North
Caucasus) or beyond Russia’s borders as in the RussoGeorgian war of 2008. Indeed, as the regime moves
further along its current trajectory, such belligerent
behavior increasingly appears to be the norm. As Andrei Illarionov, a former economic advisor to Putin,
has observed:
Since its outset, the Siloviki regime has been aggressive. At first it focused on actively destroying centers
of independent political, civil, and economic life within Russia. Upon achieving those goals, the regime’s
aggressive behavior turned outward beyond Russia’s
borders. At least since the assassination of the former
Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Doha,
Qatar, on 14 February 2004, aggressive behavior by
SI (Siloviki-men of the structures of force-author) in
the international arena has become the rule rather
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than the exception. Over the last five years the regime has waged ten different “wars” (most of them
involving propaganda, intelligence operations, and
economic coercion rather than open military force)
against neighbors and other foreign nations. The most
recent targets have included Ukraine (subjected to
a “second gas war” in early 2009), the United States
(subjected to a years-long campaign to rouse antiAmerican sentiment), and, most notoriously, Georgia
(actually bombed and invaded in 2008). In addition to
their internal psychological need to wage aggressive
wars, a rational motive is also driving the Siloviki to
resort to conflict. War furnishes the best opportunities
to distract domestic public opinion and destroy the
remnants of the political and intellectual opposition
within Russia itself. An undemocratic regime worried
about the prospect of domestic economic social and
political crises—such as those that now haunt Russia
amid recession and falling oil prices – is likely to be
pondering further acts of aggression. The note I end
on, therefore, is a gloomy one: To me the probability
that Siloviki Incorporated well be launching new wars
seems alarmingly high.15

Accordingly, even though no observer expects a
comparable revolution anytime soon, the signs of crisis are also quite visible for anyone who cares to look
for them. At the same time, the advent of social and
information technologies, as well as Russia’s partial
integration into the global economy, suggests that any
repeat performance will take even less time than this,
so it is not inconceivable that within 10-20 years, we
could see a Russia openly enmeshed in a structural
crisis from which there is no way out other than largescale transformation, if not revolution.
Given Russia’s strategic weight and military capability, this prognosis poses immense questions, if not
problems, for the U.S. Government as a whole as it
11

seeks to grapple with the realities of Russian policy.
Were this a monograph on the subject of U.S.-Russian
relations, it would take a long report to work through
all those issues. But here, we must content ourselves
with recommendations for the U.S. Army in its activities. To do that, we must view the Army in its current
strategic context.
ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE U.S. ARMY
Any potential Russian crisis within the next generation will inevitably reverberate throughout the global
system and with special force in Europe, Eurasia (the
former Soviet Union), and East Asia. Moreover, that
crisis will similarly and equally inevitably interact
with indigenous crisis phenomena and trends, mainly
in what used to be the Soviet south, i.e., the Caucasus
and Central Asia (and potentially Ukraine and Belarus), if not in Europe. Indeed, a crisis in the former
Soviet Union could ignite one in Russia. Central Asia
and the Caucasus are already enmeshed in several
actual or potential security challenges that can materially affect U.S. interests and partners, if not allies,
for their own reasons—whether or not a crisis occurs
in Russia. Furthermore, the advent of these crises in
the Caucasus and Central Asia, or elsewhere, could, of
their own accord, embroil the U.S. military and government (not just the Army) in their resolution. If they
coincide with, trigger, or are the result of a crisis in
Russia proper, the challenges to the U.S. Government
and Armed Forces will be magnified commensurately,
especially if nuclear contingencies come into play.
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Unfortunately, these prospects, which are more
likely than many believe, will catch the U.S. Army,
the Armed Forces, and the government as a whole in
the throes of a serious and possibly unprecedented
strategic quandary. As many observers have noted,
today the U.S. Army faces a situation where it has no
declared enemy, no priority mission, and no clear concept of operations for any particular contingency that
may occur. Whereas the Navy and the Air Force do
have a concept of operations (but not a strategy) for
overcoming enemy forces’ anti-access and area denial
strategies (A2/AD), namely air-sea battle, the Army
has no such concept.
Moreover, and many commentators have missed
this point, the air-sea battle concept is not exclusively
reserved for an Asian-Pacific threat originating from
China but could be employed, e.g., against Iran in
the Straits of Hormuz. Or, in the event of a Russian
attempt to take over one or more Baltic states, the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would then have to resort to a European
version of this concept of operations for the initial
counterattack against such a Russian thrust. Neither
is such a contingency purely notional, even though it
remains a remote possibility for the immediate future.
Moscow launched the first cyber strike ever attempted
against a sitting government against Estonia in 2007
after a year of covert preparation, and Central European governments, particularly in the Baltic region,
remain apprehensive about Russian intentions and
capabilities in this region, which are rapidly being increased.16 Neither can we take European or Eurasian
security for granted. Russia has also admitted that it
planned the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 beginning in
2006, thus publicly undermining all the pious state-
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ments about it having been attacked and was thus
able to surprise key international actors, including the
Georgian government.17 Since Russian efforts to subvert European governments through “asymmetric”
means, the linkage of energy, organized crime, intelligence penetration, political subversion, and military
threats, specifically recurring nuclear and missile
threats against all of Eastern Europe from the Baltic
to the Black Sea states, are constant and unremitting.
Since Moscow has shown its continuing addiction to
aggressive actions in its neighborhood, complacency
about European contingencies in the future is clearly
unwarranted.18 Such concerns must engage the strategic planner, especially one who is looking to events a
decade or more from now.
But such observations about the European theater,
not to mention the ever volatile greater Middle East
or the increasingly volatile East Asian theaters, underscore the Army’s and the U.S. Government’s abiding
strategic dilemma, which holds true whether or not
Russia implodes or explodes a decade or so from now.
That dilemma has two aspects. First, there is no visible
strategy for either the Army or the other Armed Forces (merely listing missions and concepts of operations
cannot, in this context, substitute for a true strategy).
Second, as innumerable analyses and the current domestic crisis indicate, we are on the brink of strategic
insolvency, with a defense establishment that cannot
be maintained in its present form or size without radical and unpopular (to many constituencies) reforms.
While any Russian crisis greatly magnifies the
challenges to U.S. power and interests, essentially, the
Army finds itself obliged to say that no matter what
kind of war ensues, it will go wherever the President
orders it to fight (as if any other conclusion was think-
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able) with whatever forces it has at the time. But it has
no current or preexisting idea what the nature of that
war is or an a priori concept of what goals it hopes to
obtain in any particular theater.19 It has no idea of what
its strategic objectives are or should be, and neither do
the other Services. All we have is a tactical or operational concept for the initial operation of gaining access to the contested theater. That hardly answers the
requirement for strategy. This situation represents the
antithesis of strategy and confirms the critical posture
of many analysts, e.g., Colin Gray, that “All too often,
there is a black hole where American strategy ought
to reside.”20 As a result, critics have charged that the
Army, in seeking to define for itself a strategic role, is
“grasping for scenarios.”21 These scenarios comprise
missions generally regarded as the core capability
of the Marines or elite special operations forces like
seabasing (operations that can be conducted without
relying on infrastructure ashore) and counterproliferation missions.22 To compound the Army’s dilemma, there is a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm among
political leaders in both parties, despite overblown
campaign rhetoric, for sending it into another war
anytime soon.23 So, lacking a mission or a compelling
strategic rationale or narrative, the Army starts from a
disadvantage relative to the other Services, who have
at least a concept of operations. But the Army’s and
the other Services’ problems do not end here. Indeed,
at the strategic level, they only begin here.
In the context of the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, the air-sea battle concept comfortably fits with the concept of deterrence of major
theater war that has stood at the forefront of U.S. strategy and policy since 1945. It is compatible either with
the idea of deterrence by denial, i.e., deterring an en-
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emy by making it clear that we will deny him a victory
or with the alternative view of deterrence by punishment, namely raining down upon him so destructive
a military force that, even if some sort of victory was
temporarily achieved, the destruction wreaked upon
him would far outweigh any such temporary or local gain. But that makes air-sea battle a concept that
is optimally shaped for deterrence and for replying
to a breakdown of deterrence. In other words, it is a
concept of operations that is admirably shaped for the
initial phase of a war. But being nothing more than
a concept of operations, air-sea battle, as publicly described, suffers from serious defects. Given what we
know about Russian nuclear strategy, the attempt to
use air and sea power to rain down long-range strikes
on Russian targets in, around, and immediately beyond the Baltic littoral almost certainly invites a retaliatory nuclear first strike by Moscow that will have
an immediate and profound strategic effect, and not
necessarily the one that Moscow counts on, namely its
attainment of control over the ladder of intrawar escalation and a search for negotiations to forestall any
further nuclear use. It is not too likely that Moscow
would, however, opt for such a contingency, knowing
that it would face this immense destruction for what
are ultimately marginal gains.
In East Asia, as Ambassador Charles Freeman
similarly observes:
The evolving U.S. battle plan presupposes that, from
the outset, any war that occurred (involving China in
an offensive role—author) would involve U.S. strikes
on forces and facilities on Chinese territory or immediately adjacent to it, This does not address the obvious
difficulties of escalation control in these circumstances. Given China’s possession of nuclear weapons, this
plan is simply unrealistic.24
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Likewise, Thomas Christsensen and Richard Betts
wrote several years ago that:
Thinking over the long term, however, it is hard to
imagine how the United States could “win” a war to
preserve Taiwan’s independence against a resolute
China. . . . Sinking the Chinese navy and defeating
an invasion attempt against the island would not be
the end of the story. Unless the U.S. Air Force were
to mount a massive and sustained assault against
mainland targets, the PRC would maintain the capability to disrupt commerce, squeeze Taiwan, and keep
U.S. personnel at risk. As one American naval officer
put it, “China is a cruise missile sponge.” This will
be doubly true once China builds more road-mobile
solid-fuel missiles and learns better ways to hide its
military assets.25

Thus air-sea battle could easily conceivably lead to
an unpalatable strategic dead end but in the form of a
much wider, prolonged, and desperate struggle with
enormous stakes, where we will have fallen into that
war with vastly insufficient forethought. The Napoleonic maxim, “On s’engage et puis on voit” (One commits himself and then looks around), hardly suffices
as a guidance for contemporary strategic action. But
the Army’s lack of a viable concept of operations or
mission for a breakdown of deterrence leaves it in precisely this situation, where it has a concept in search
of a mission and a theater. Therefore, it cannot bring
anything to the “table” concerning strategic missions,
operations, or its enduring contributions to grand
strategy, and the Navy’s and Air Force’s situation in
this regard is hardly much better.
Neither do U.S. strategic dilemmas end here, for
we are clearly confronting the overall problem of stra17

tegic insolvency, a dilemma that would undermine all
existing strategic formulations, not to mention operational concepts like air-sea battle. We are already confronting this dilemma, even if there is no sequestration process as is possible as of October 2012.26 Recent
assessments of the new Asia-Pacific strategy pull no
punches and state outright that the force structure being readied to implement that strategy is simply not
sufficient to accomplish the mission. Congressman J.
Randy Forbes (R-Va), Chairman of the House Armed
Services Readiness Subcommittee, openly states that:
The ‘pivot’ toward the Asia-Pacific region is a lofty
objective, but maritime assets available to execute it—
existing and planned—are simply not enough.27

Rear Admiral David Johnson, who supervises the
Navy’s submarine construction program, recently admitted that if “the price tag for building the newest
vessels remains where it is today, there will have to be
cutbacks to the Virginia-class (submarine) program,”
even though the Navy has already brought down
those costs and is doubling its production from one
to two subs annually.28 Michael Auslin similarly argues that the Air Force’s current budget is insufficient,
given the range of missions and capabilities it needs
to execute its strategic missions.29 Likewise, a recent
article observes that in Korea, we are unprepared for
the real possibility of having to execute missions connected not just with a war there, but with a potential
unification scenario. Although former Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates stated that besides the capability to break down the door and win the air-sea battle,
we must be able to restore a functioning government
and society in war zones “and rebuild the house after
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war.” The Army and overall U.S. military force required to do that mission is not the force that is either
currently deployed in South Korea or that the United
States has trained and ready to deploy, despite all our
previous experiences in having to confront such requirements.30 Finally, the recent study by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington,
DC, of the rebalancing of U.S. forces to the Asia-Pacific
theater also pointed to substantial funding problems
with regard to the new rebalancing.31 These are only a
few recent indicators of this insolvency in an ocean of
commentary on this point.
Neither would all our problems be resolved if funding magically appeared. Our problems are as much, if
not more than, strategic as economic. Arguably, the announcement of air-sea battle has ignited a new round
in the Asian arms race. One can already see Japan,
South Korea, and India substantially upgrading and
modernizing their military capability and ambition to
become major defense producers and even exporters.
Russia, too, is already well into a huge modernization
program of some $716 billion to reshape its entire force
and develop a substantial conventional high-tech capability by 2020, and its apprehensions about China
are poorly concealed.32 Thus, it is entirely possible that
continuing as we have been doing, assuming funding
remains available, could bring about a continent-wide
Asian arms race in conventional, and possibly nuclear
as well, weapons that would merely aggravate the already high level of tensions in Asia and do nothing to
stabilize the area or reduce the likelihood of military
conflict. That is assuming funding is available. If it is
not available, we may achieve a comparable effect but
deprive ourselves of the means of dealing effectively
with any violent contingency, if and when it occurred.
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But beyond that, the Army, if not the other Services, also face deep cognitive challenges to their plans.
This is a particular dilemma for the Army because
many writers and authorities here and abroad believe
that the main centers of future military operations will
be in the aerospace, cyber, and naval—i.e., long-range
strike—“theaters” and not land and traditional sea
forces. Thus General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the
Russian General Staff, recently stated that:
As you see, warfare center has moved to aerospace and
information spheres, including cyber security, from
traditional war theatres on land and sea. Concepts of
network-centric war have made great progress.33

Makarov is hardly alone, either in Russia or here
or elsewhere. Accordingly, the mantra of boots on
the ground will hardly be convincing, even though
the purveyors of short decisive victory through longrange strikes and high-tech have little to show for
their many promises. Indeed, some adherents of better
warfighting through technology have begun to realize
that “our understanding of nonkinetic effects in cyberspace is immature.”34 In that case, a war with a large
cyber dimension, or even with a significant though not
preponderant one, could easily become quite unpredictable and even uncontrollable, not unlike the fears
of what a nuclear war could become. So reliance on
air, aerospace, naval, and cyber operations can hardly
provide the basis for a reliable or reassuring warfighting strategy. Indeed, this brings us back to the dilemma postulated previously, namely, that current threat
assessments fail to capture the highly complex future
operational environment. Such a void leaves the Army
(and to be accurate, the other Services, too) bereft of
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viable strategies for prosecuting war. Neither can the
Army take refuge, as some have thought, in the idea
that its future wars (whatever happens to the other
Services) will be “murky irregular conflicts.”35 This is
not just because the future is inherently unknowable.
It also is true that it is a great fallacy to assume that the
next war, even if it is an irregular one, will look like
the current or last war. The Army, like it or not, must
be ready for everything. Yet the pace of change is so
swift and deep that the military is finding it difficult
to understand what future advances in biotechnology
and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scenarios might look like.36 Undoubtedly, the same will
be true for “murky irregular wars.”
As one recent article observed, there is a wide
range of actual or easily conceivable contingencies for
which we cannot rely on Special Forces:
Douglas Ollivant has also soundly observed that we
cannot assume that special operations forces will be a
salve for every security challenge we face. Some scenarios will simply be too big for SOF to handle alone.
Even if the US does not seek to reconstruct collapsing states, securing weapons of mass destruction, and
leadership targets in the aftermath of an implosion
of Syria, North Korea, Libya, or any number of other
states would be demanding tasks that special operations would have difficulty handling by themselves.
Some sanctuary-raiding missions would require larger ground forces. Others may simply lend themselves
better to general purpose forces. Recent African success waging combined land-amphibious operations in
Somalia suggests that land forces executing amphibious raiding in Africa could inflict substantial damage
on pirates and other foes. In other situations we may
not be able to rely on proxies to do the job for us, either because of a principal-agent mismatch or lack of
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capability. Finally, SOF and airpower in recent conflicts also depend implicitly on the enemy lacking the
ability to threaten the bases and supply networks that
sustain them with ground power, commando forces,
or long-range weapons. Should Afghanistan’s government lose substantial amounts of territory or collapse
outright after US withdrawal, the basing arrangements
upon which we base our proxy warfighting would be
threatened.37

Moreover, even if the Army and the other Services
accept the need for comprehensive readiness across
the spectrum of conflict, it is still quite unclear how
the Army will operate in WMD contingencies, even
if it acknowledges their likelihood in the future.38 At
the same time, the Army must be ready for all manner of combat operations ranging from contingencies,
where smaller units with fewer but better and betterequipped army and joint forces engage the enemy,
up to and including large land battles of battalion or
brigade size, if not larger. Therefore, the Army must
formulate a compelling strategic argument that is not
just a service argument for more appropriations (as
one might suspect air-sea battle is) and that offers a
compelling enhancement of U.S. and allied security in
Europe and Asia, if not elsewhere.
TOWARD AN ARMY STRATEGY FOR EURASIA
The Army concept is one where the Army works
actively in peacetime with allies and partners to reshape their militaries and as part of overall U.S. policy
to reshape the strategic environment in Europe, Asia,
Africa, etc., to prevent wars from breaking out. While
this concept of shaping the theater during peacetime
to preclude or prevent war and build up allied and
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partner capacity fully comports with deterrence by
denial, as we saw in Georgia in 2008, it does not necessarily preclude a breakdown in deterrence or ensure
that host country forces will be prepared for actual
war that is imposed upon them. The Army and the
U.S. military as a whole now recognize the need for
more effective responses to the challenges of partnering with other militaries, including those in the former
Soviet Union, to shape the environment and provide
the basis for meeting contemporary global strategic
requirements, as the characteristics of war change rapidly and assume a highly protean and dynamic profile.
In the recent Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint
Force 2020, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Army General
Martin Dempsey observed that one of the eight key elements of anticipated global integrated operations is:
Fourth, globally integrated operations place a premium on
partnering. This allows expertise and resources existing outside the U.S. military to be better integrated in
a variety of operational contexts. The complex security
challenges of the future almost invariably will require
more than the military instrument of national power.
Joint Forces must be able to integrate effectively with
U.S. governmental agencies, partner militaries, and
indigenous, and regional stakeholders. This integration must be scalable, ranging from the ability of an
individual unit to enroll the expertise of a nongovernmental partner to multi-nation coalition operations.39

This requirement, coupled with the other seven
requirements for jointly integrated forces that are
capable of conducting scalable operations involving
multiple stakeholders listed there, comprise a major
challenge to the Army under stretched budgetary conditions. Nevertheless, crisis denotes both challenge
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and opportunity. In the concept of the contingencies
outlined here of a renewed crisis in Eurasia, if not elsewhere, due to a potential or even likely crisis, if not
collapse, of Putinist Russia in the future, strategic contingency might open the way for an alert Army and
other military leadership to see a way out the Army’s
present quandary.
What the Army and U.S. governmental elites
must understand is that the argument presented in
this chapter provides early warning of an impending, if not imminent, geopolitical crisis that could
well morph into major strategic challenges. Indeed,
Russian analysts themselves know well how precarious security is, particularly in the Caucasus and/or
Central Asia, especially in view of upcoming U.S. and
NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. For example, the Valdai Club, a leading Russian think tank,
recently wrote that:
The entire Belavezha Accords system of state and
territorial structure, which took shape as a result of
the 1991 national disaster (the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991), is illegitimate, random, unstable, and
therefore fraught with conflict. The entire post-Soviet
Eurasian space is an area with a complex combination of integration, separatist, and irredentist tendencies. The system has been in a state of permanent
crisis for almost all of the 20 years since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, and it is safe to say that in the
future it is doomed to more or less conflict-ridden
transformation.40

Such conflicts would almost certainly entail direct
Russian military intervention, and the most threatened areas are those where the United States has now
developed serious interests and partners, namely Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This analysis also
24

naturally highlights the ongoing jihadi insurgency in
the North Caucasus, for which Moscow has no credible strategy at present, not to mention the possibility
of a “Falklands” scenario against Japan in the Kurile
Islands, China’s growing military power and contingencies associated with that trend, and the ever present pressure of the United States and NATO.41 Neither
is this just an unofficial think tank report. In 2010, the
joint staff of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) stated that:
The likelihood of conflicts arising on the basis of political, religious, ethnic, and other contradictions [in the
former Soviet Union] is high, and it is impossible to
resolve them without peacekeeping technologies.42

Western writers observe, too, that the peripheries
of Eurasia like the South Caucasus remain regions at
risk.43 Given what we know of Russian military policy,
it is quite unlikely that the CSTO or the Russian Army
has yet acquired the relevant “peacekeeping technologies.” Thus a crisis could break out here irrespective of
what happens in Russia, and certainly Central Asian
governments believe that such an outbreak is all too
plausible after the International Security Assistance
Force withdrawal from Afghanistan.44
There are further complicating factors in these
peripheries, too. First, due to geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts and the continuing, if not rising, criticality of energy and other raw materials, regions like
Central Asia are increasing in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance.45 Second, in keeping with those
trends, the peripheries are areas of visible, complex,
but never ending great power contestation, not the
least of which is Sino-Russian rivalry and collusion
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in constant probes against U.S. power, partners, values, and interests.46 These probes continue in an effort to determine the scope and limits of U.S. power
to defend partners and interests in the peripheries,
and, if we fail to respond to these challenges, we and
the targets of these probes pay the price. Thus Russian probes against Georgia in 2008 that met no U.S.
resistance led to more threats, as did encroachments
from the Chinese probes against U.S. naval vessels in
the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea in 2009.47 In
addition, many of these probes or threats are not, at
least initially, capable of resolution by means of U.S.
conventional, let alone nuclear, weapons. As General James Cartwright, U.S. Marine Corps, then Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified to Congress in 2007:
While America possesses conventional capabilities
second-to-none, we lack the capability to respond
promptly to globally dispersed or fleeting threats
without resorting to nuclear weapons. As good as they
are, we simply cannot be everywhere with our general-purpose conventional forces and use of a nuclear
weapons system in prompt response may be no choice
at all.48

Since many of these actual or likely probes or crises that are expected in Eurasia regardless of events
in Russia cannot and will not simply be met by U.S.
forces for multiple reasons, we need to understand
that we have now been given early warning and need
to act accordingly. Meanwhile, if this is the situation
in the peripheries as seen by both Russian and foreign
authorities and experts, Moscow’s own view of its domestic security situation (apart from the unresolved
insurgency in the North Caucasus) is hardly one to in-
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spire confidence. Clearly, the regime has good grounds
for anxiety, as its own behavior shows. Russia’s government labors under an enormous and constantly
growing apprehension about domestic security that
can only grow more, as does domestic opposition to
it. Since 2005, the Russian Ministry of Defence formed
Special Designation Forces from Spetsnaz brigades
under the minister’s direct control. They have air,
marine, and ground components, and conduct peace
support and counterterrorist operations.49 Since the
minister answers only to the president, essentially this
also means putting all Russia under threat of counterterrorist or other so-called operations without any
parliamentary accountability or scrutiny.
Since then, matters have, if anything, grown worse.
An April 2009 report outlined quite clearly the threat
perceived by the authorities. Specifically, it stated that:
The Russian intelligence community is seriously worried about latent social processes capable of leading
to the beginning of civil wars and conflicts on RF territory that can end up in a disruption of territorial integrity and the appearance of a large number of new
sovereign powers. Data of an information “leak,” the
statistics and massive number of antigovernment actions, and official statements and appeals of the opposition attest to this.50

This report proceeded to say that these agencies
expected massive protests in the Moscow area, industrial areas of the South Urals and Western Siberia, and
in the Far East, while ethnic tension among the Muslims of the North Caucasus and Volga-Ural areas is
not excluded. The author also invoked the specter of
enraged former Army officers and soldiers who are
now being demobilized because of the reforms might
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also take to the streets with their weapons. But despite
the threat of this unrest, the government is characteristically resorting to strong-arm methods to meet this
threat. In other words, it is repeating past regimes
(not least Boris Yeltsin’s) in strengthening the Internal
Forces of the Ministry of Interior (VVMVD), and now
other paramilitary forces as well.51
More soberly, this report, along with other articles,
outlines the ways in which the internal armed forces
are being strengthened. Special intelligence and commando subunits to conduct preventive elimination
of opposition leaders are being established in the
VVMVD. These forces are also receiving new models
of weapons and equipment, to include armored, artillery, naval, and air defense systems. In 2008, 5.5 billion
rubles were allocated for these forces’ modernization.
Apart from the already permitted “corporate forces”
of Gazprom and Transneft that monitor pipeline safety, the VVMVD is also now discussing an Olimpstroi
(Olympics Construction) Army, and even the fisheries
inspectorate is going to create a special armed subunit
called Piranha.52
Since then, even more information about the extent
of the domestic reconstruction of the VVMVD into a
force intended to suppress any manifestation of dissent have emerged. As of 2003, there were 98 specialpurpose police detachments (OMONs) in Russia. By
comparison, during the 1998 crisis of the regime and
its elites under Mikhail Gorbachev, 19 OMONs were
created in 14 Russian regions and three union republics. By 2007, there were already 121 OMON units
comprising 20,000 men operating in Russia. Moreover,
by 2007, there were another 87 police special designation detachments (OMSNs) with permanent staffing
of over 5,200 people operating with the internal af-
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fairs organs, making a total of 208 special purpose or
designated units with 25,000 well-trained and drilled
soldiers. These forces, known as OMSNs, have grown
from an anti-crime and anti-terrorist force to a force
charged with stopping “extremist” criminal activity.
All these units train together and have been centralized within the VVMVD to fight “organized crime,
terrorism, and extremism.” From 2005 to 2006, the financing of these units was almost doubled. By 2009,
they were also working with aircraft assets, specifically the VVMVD own aviation center, with nine special
purpose air detachments throughout Russia. Seven
more such units are to be created. Furthermore, the
VVMVD has developed a concept for rapidly airlifting
these forces to troubled areas from other regions when
necessary. These forces are also receiving large-scale
deliveries of new armored vehicles with computers, in
some cases, and command, control, and communications capabilities. Since these are forces apart from the
regular VVMVD:
On a parallel basis with the OMON empire, a multilevel internal security troop machine is being developed-with its own special forces, aircraft, armored
equipment, situational-crisis centers, and so forth.53

When one considers this huge expansion of the
domestic silovye struktury (power organs), it becomes
clear why, in 2008, Russia announced that it would
increase funding for the Ministry of Interior by 50 percent in 2010, and it becomes clear where the government’s estimation of the true threat to Russian security lies.54 If anything, things have gotten worse, and
there also is now a spreading jihadist insurgency in
the North Caucasus that is out of control and has re-

29

cently launched operations in Russia’s heartland, i.e.,
Tatarstan.55 Therefore, neither the Russian government nor anyone else should take the durability of the
current state for granted.
What, then, can be done under conditions of economic stringency and a true strategic fog?
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CHAPTER 2
RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM 2012:
“DÈJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN”
Steven Rosefielde
INTRODUCTION
Russian economic reform is a perennial favorite, “a
tale of two cities,”1 where some see only past accomplishment and future glory, and others a “treadmill
of Muscovite reform.”2 Therefore, no one should be
astonished that discussions of contemporary Russian
economic reform are “déjà vu all over again.”3 This
does not mean that the two views are equally meritorious interpretations of Russia’s economy and its
prospects. There is only one correct view, and it is the
“treadmill of Muscovite reform.” The importance of
the double vision lies elsewhere in the implacable political will in the Kremlin and segments of the west
not only to deny the obvious, but also to depict tomorrow’s Russian economy as the bluebird of happiness.
BLUEBIRD OF HAPPINESS
Official Soviet and Russian characterizations of
economic performance and potential are persistently
optimistic and used by some Western observers to
paint rosy assessments of past accomplishments and
future prospects. A single example will suffice. During the 1980s, official Soviet data (goskomstat) indicated that the Union of Soviet Socialist Russia’s (USSR)
gross domestic product (GDP) was growing more rapidly than America’s, even though Mikhail Gorbachev
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acknowledged that the Soviet economy had been stagnant since 1978!4
After Gorbachev decided to dissolve the Soviet
Union on December 25, 1991, his successor, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, immediately launched a campaign for rapid democratization and economic transition (demokratizatsia and perekhod) aimed at transforming Kremlin rule from Communist party autocracy
to democracy, and Russia’s economy from central
planning to free enterprise. Neither happened, but it
became politically correct to say that they did.5 Anders Aslund declared that Russia was on the express
lane to capitalism in 1993,6 to have become a “market economy” in 19957 and a “capitalist” system in
2007.8 In 2004, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman
congratulated Russia for becoming a “normal” developing country, including having made substantial
democratic progress.9 Their judgment was seemingly
confirmed on December 16, 2011, when Russia agreed
to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), pending
formal Kremlin treaty ratification.10
The World Bank today portrays Russia as a democracy,11 despite the objections of Anders Aslund12
and Michael McFaul,13 American Ambassador to Russia, and categorizes it as a MIC, that is, a “normal”
middle income market country.14 In its view, Russia weathered the global financial crisis of 2008 admirably,15 and its prospects are favorable due to the
Kremlin’s “partnership” with the World Bank Group
(including the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, International Finance Corporation,
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency).16
Nonetheless, despite all these accomplishments, Russia’s economy is said to be at risk.17 It is vulnerable to
budgetary constraints (nonoil fiscal deficit connected
with expected declines in petroleum revenues) and
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long-standing structural issues, including the need to
improve the investment climate significantly;18 close
large infrastructure gaps; diversify its export, tax, and
broader economic base; improve governance; and
strengthen institutions.19 The World Bank contends
that Russia’s investment climate is poor, its infrastructure is laggard, its exports are excessively concentrated in natural resources, its tax and economic bases
are too narrow, and its governance and institutions
are weak.20
The World Bank asserts that Russia’s leaders recognize these shortcomings and have responded by
devising four broad economic reform initiatives to address: “Growth and Diversification, Skills and Social
Services, Russia’s Global and Regional Role, Governance and Transparency.”
1. Growth and Diversification. Russia’s economy
is dominated by natural resource extraction undertaken by a few large corporations, a concentration
reflected in its output and export structures and its
fiscal dependence.21 Recognizing this, the Kremlin has
launched economic reforms to encourage “nonstrategic” small- and medium-sized enterprises,22 and to
increase the size of and modernize Russia’s high-tech
(e.g., the Skolkovo “innovation city”)23 and financial
sectors.24 This diversification not only will improve
the structural balance, but also is intended to spur
growth through the curtailment of state-owned enterprises and the rapid modernization of underdeveloped activities,25 including innovation (“innovative
Russia-2020”).26 These goals will be facilitated further
by regional diversification (“Strategic Projects”),27
improved public management,28 enhanced business
competition (achieved through better government
regulation),29 better financial management,30and infrastructural investment.31
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2. Skills and Social Services. This is the second major category of the Putin regime’s economic reform
agenda.32 The World Bank contends that Russia has
made immense strides in the areas of universal primary education, equality for women, eradication of
extreme poverty and malnutrition, lowering child
and maternal mortality, and reaching very high levels
of higher education enrollment. Putin’s reforms will
build on these accomplishments. Russia will strengthen its social safety net,33 improve demographics and
public health,34 adjust education to provide a better
mix of labor skills,35 ameliorate inequality and social
exclusion,36 and soften interregional disparities.37
3. Global and Regional Role. The third major
component of Moscow’s economic reform agenda38
includes initiatives facilitating economic integration
in the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS)39
ecological and environmental defense, especially in
the Arctic. Globally, Russia is intensifying its international partnerships everywhere.40
4. Governance and Transparency. The fourth
major element of Moscow’s economic reform agenda41 is important, especially improving self-government,42 fighting corruption,43 and achieving judicial
efficiency.44
This survey reveals that Russian economic reform
from the World Bank’s perspective is mostly about
routine policy and state regulation that are generically
appropriate for any MIC, not market economic transformation. There is no core strategy, just a programmatic vision and promise that the government will
do everything better. The World Bank’s report, which
parallels the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development’s (OECD) counterpart 2006 study,
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provides a valuable inventory of these initiatives45
and makes the case for the proposition that Russia is
on the fast track to becoming a normal country like
America from a position of being a normal MIC with
a fledgling democracy and rapidly maturing markets.
It forecasts that Russia’s GDP will grow at 3.5 percent
per annum between 2012 and 2015.46 Others holding
similar views press this or that aspect of Russia’s reform agenda reflecting diverse parochial interests but
nonetheless adopt the position that the Vladimir Putin
administration is moving forward with a progressive
state regulatory and pro-competitive market agenda.
REALITY CHECK
The World Bank’s inventory of Russian governmental economic reform programs and policies, although descriptively accurate, provides a misleading
impression of the character and intent of the Kremlin’s
post-communist regime. Russia’s government is antidemocratic, and its economy is organized for the benefit of privileged insiders, not the Russian people. The
federation is no longer Communist, but this should
not be construed as a radical break from Russia’s
hoary tradition. Its autocratic Muscovite rent-granting
system has been in force continuously since the reign
of Ivan III (The Great), Grand Prince of Moscow and
Grand Prince of all Rus’, in one form or another, since
the 15th century.
The cornerstone of the paradigm is a particular
type of autocracy, where the ruler is explicitly or implicitly owner of realm. The Tsar, General Secretary
of the Communist Party, and now President (like the
French absolute monarch Louis XIV), “is the law,”
with the power to act as he chooses, regardless of what
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he says. The autocrat can promulgate a constitution
and impose administrative law (Catherine the Great),
create a parliament (Nicholas II), install central planning (Joseph Stalin), and rule diversely with a unitary
economic governance mechanism like rent-granting,
the market, central planning, and regulation, or with
a mixed regime.
Just before the Bolshevik coup d’etat in November 7, 1917, Russia had a tripartite economic governance system combining “rent-granting,” (where the
nobility and village communes oversaw agriculture,
natural resources, and some industry in return for service, crop sharing, and taxes), state enterprise (tsar’s
estates, government enterprises, including weapons
and luxury goods), and markets (based primarily on
freehold ownership in low tech activities dominated
by locals, and high-tech industries dominated by foreign direct investors).
The Soviets appeared to overthrow this order by
criminalizing private property business and entrepreneurship (nationalization of the means of production
and monopolizing state economic control)47 and introducing central planning. However, rent-granting remained a powerful force, allowing “red directors” of
all types to maintain the authority to use state resources with considerable discretion. On paper, the Soviet
system seemed to be comprehensively directive, but,
in practice, red directors were granted the privilege of
operating the red Tsar’s assets with munificent fringe
benefits in return for service and a share of the usufruct, profits, and taxes.
Mikhail Gorbachev began the process of reverting
to Nicholas II’s mixed Muscovite model with his famous “perestroika” reform of 1987 (radical economic
reform of the command planning system), which al-
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lowed leasehold proprietorships, markets, and entrepreneurship. Boris Yeltsin accelerated the process with
his perekhod (transition) initiative, restoring freehold
property ownership. This was promptly heralded as
the beginning of a transition from communist authoritarian central planning to democratic free enterprise,
but the judgment was premature. It was a post-royalist reversion to Nicholas II’s Muscovite market assisted autocratic rent-granting, with a large dollop of
state ownership in the military and natural resource
sectors. Oligarchs became the new servitors.
Putin’s government today, like Yeltsin’s earlier,
is a Muscovite autocracy organized for the benefit of
privileged insiders, not the Russian people. The “people’s assets” from the Soviet period were granted by
Yeltsin to his favorites through various subterfuges,48
creating the social foundations for the new post-Soviet
Muscovy. The regime’s predominant features are oneman rule and rent-granting, not democracy and market competition. This makes the regime intrinsically
inefficient compared with the popular and consumer
sovereign (neoclassical democratic competitive) model ascribed to Russia by the World Bank and radically
alters real economic reform potential. The policies and
reforms undertaken by the Kremlin and enumerated
by the World Bank are merely efforts to enhance the
efficiency of the Muscovite paradigm, not to move
beyond it to democratic free enterprise. As a consequence, these endeavors can streamline and modernize a retrograde economic governance mechanism
(including the public sector) but cannot Westernize it.
They cannot make public programs responsive to the
electorate or prevent the supply of goods in the private sector being primarily responsive to the demands
of Putin and his “servitors” (oligarchs).
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This judgment is confirmed by Russia’s wretched
economic performance from 1989 to 2012. Although,
the way the World Bank casts the statistics, Russia’s
GDP doubled from 2005 to 2008 (18.9 percent per annum),49 in reality, by using OECD data, the federation’s per capita GDP was virtually flat for more than
2 decades (there was a hyperdepression during the
interval).50 This dismal assessment is easily confirmed
by comparing the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA)
estimate of Russian per capita income in 1989 of
$23,546 (adjusted to a 2011 dollar price base), which
should be more or less the same today because there
was little or no real growth point to point during 19892011, with the World Bank’s contemporary figure of
$10,500.51 Obviously, the World Bank’s picture of postCommunist Russian economic progress is amiss. If the
CIA was right in 1989, Russian living standards have
declined substantially since then, using the World
Bank’s contemporary estimate. Most of the discrepancy between the $23,546 and $10,500 figures is attributable to the CIA’s exaggerated 1991 purchasing power
parity estimates, but the point remains. Russia has not
converged toward the developed Western standard of
living under Yeltsin and Putin from the 1989 benchmark; it has diverged, falling further behind.
MUSCOVY AND THE WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS
Muscovite rent-granting is a governance strategy
used by Kremlin autocrats to create a cadre of loyal
supporters by privileging the few to exploit the many.
Muscovite rulers are primarily concerned with defending their realm and acquiring sufficient revenues
to support the court and the power services (secret
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police and armed forces). They do not care if their
servitors (contemporary oligarchs and other insiders),
those subordinated to them, and peripheral players
are inefficient as long as revenues are adequate, even
though everyone is urged to do better. They do not
care if servitors are overpaid, and everyone else is
under-remunerated (Gini coefficient 42).52 Servitors,
for their part, are more concerned with obtaining additional rents from the autocrat than competitively
maximizing profits. Like their liege, they prefer to
enrich themselves through insider channels than competitively cost minimize and revenue maximize (profit maximization) in accordance with the neoclassical
paradigm. Rulers and servitors often appreciate that
democracy and free enterprise are better for the many
but place their own well-being above the people’s
desires. This makes Muscovy intrinsically anti-democratic and anti-competitive, disclaimers to the contrary notwithstanding. History has demonstrated that
autocratic rent-granting can be combined with state
ownership, markets, central planning, and economic
regulation without ceding sovereignty to the people
or consumers, and this is the way that Putin has chosen to play the game. The approach is the antithesis of
the Washington Consensus.53 The programs, regulations, and reforms of the Russian government are primarily for the autocrat, not the demos, and improved
competitiveness insofar as it is permitted serves the
same purpose.
TREADMILL OF MUSCOVITE REFORM
The policies and reforms undertaken by the Kremlin in partnership with the World Bank Group can have
positive results. Technology transfer and moderniza-
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tion in the public and private sectors, together with an
expanded role for competitive markets, can improve
productivity. The Tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet experiences, however, reveal that benefits are not automatic. The liberalization of Nicholas II’s economy,
including high tech foreign direct investment (FDI),
had mixed results, mostly negative, as the Bolshevik
revolution attests. The Soviet Union tried most of the
World Bank Group’s economic reform recommendations, including technology transfer and leasehold
marketization. The result was stagnation and collapse.
Yeltsin adopted the G7 transition strategy and immediately precipitated a decade-long hyperdepression.
This time, of course, outcomes may be different.54 Let
us therefore provisionally accept the World Bank’s
forecast that Russia’s GDP will grow 3.5 percent during the time frame from 2012 to 2015, a lackluster
rate of advance given the country’s relative economic
backwardness. What precisely is there about Muscovite rent-granting that makes it productively inferior,
unjust, and impervious to energizing reform?
The answer is simple. The Muscovite paradigm encourages rent-grantees to concentrate their attention
on acquiring unearned incomes rather than creating
value-added products or services, and it protects the
privileged from competitive forces that might mitigate the harm rent-grant generates. Rent-granting is
intrinsically underproductive, immoral, and corrupt
from a neoclassical perspective, because it allows
the privileged to receive income and wealth without
earning them. Today’s Russian “petrogarchs’” fortunes are tied more to currying favor with the Kremlin than efficiently managing companies and adding
value. Other insiders receive state contracts without
any obligation to perform, creating the semblance, but
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not the substance, of value-added (rent-fabrication).55
The Muscovite system in this way offers an illusion of
progress that masks its inefficiency and underproductivity. Corruption (privilege granting) in the Kremlin’s scheme of things is not merely a matter of moral
failure; it is the system’s life blood.
None of this precludes Russia’s privileged from
trying to enrich themselves doubly by acquiring rents
and maximizing profits; however, the regime’s culture
of corruption inhibits constructive impulses. The rentseeking mentality keeps servitors’ attention riveted
on state handouts, with profit maximizing little more
than an afterthought.
Adam Smith famously claimed that the potential
losses caused by corruption, including conspiracies
in restraint of trade, were less severe than might be
anticipated due to the positive effects of moral selfrestraint56 and free competition (the invisible hand).57
It is easily supposed that the defects of rent-granting
are self-correcting, too; however, this does not follow because the Muscovite ethic is predatory, and the
Kremlin is committed to creating privilege by deliberately suppressing competition. Putin has no objection to ordinary people competing among themselves
and supplying services to the privileged at least cost,
but any business that is lucrative can be or is taken
over by the privileged and absorbed into the protected sphere. The same tactics are used in the Kremlin’s
dealings with foreign companies at home and abroad.
Russia’s Muscovite economy, consequently, is woefully inefficient. Labor is miseducated, misallocated,
and underincentivized. Privileged companies do not
profit maximize. They underinvest and misinvest, a
problem exacerbated by the financial sector’s misallocation of loanable funds. Foreign direct investors like

47

British Petroleum (BP) operate in treacherous waters
and are routinely bilked.58 Government regulation
and programs are rent-granting activities, not handmaidens to market competition. The people’s will is
irrelevant, and consumers merely have limited market
choice, not consumer sovereignty (their demand does
not govern competitive supply).
The problem, of course, can be solved by the Kremlin voluntarily repudiating Muscovy or being forced to
do so by a popular awakening, as many today seem to
anticipate, but not otherwise. Better plans and regulations of the sort recommended by World Bank Group
cannot compensate for the inefficiencies imposed by
rent-granting, and, as the Soviet experience proved,
they are inferior substitutes for markets.59 Expanding
the scope and competitiveness of ancillary markets
should be beneficial, but this is precisely what Muscovy opposes to the extent that it leashes privilege.
This is why Gertrude Schroeder’s dictum holds undiminished. Russia is still on a treadmill of fundamentally futile reform.60 Both the Kremlin’s and the World
Bank Group’s nostrums are “Déjà vu All Over Again.”
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as Moscow and St. Petersburg are highly congested and create substantial problems for urban transport management,
while outside these cities poverty levels and unemployment
can reach significantly high levels. According to Rosstat,
the average level of unemployment from November 2010
to January 2011 varied from only 1.4 percent in Moscow to
47.5 percent in the Republic of Ingushetia. Headcount poverty rates (2008) ranged from 38 percent in Kalmykia (in the
south) to 7.4 percent in oil-rich Khanty-Mansiysk.
Providing access to infrastructure of comparable quality is
a principal development objective of the Federation, yet is
also a significant challenge given its huge size.
Three strategic projects, including a Pacific oil pipeline, a
drilling rig and an auto plant have been launched in the
Far East.

See “Strategic Projects to Boost Russia’s Far Eastern Economy,”
January 5, 2010, available from www.chinaview.cn.
28. World Bank, Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the
Russian Federation.”
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Russia has a strong interest in continuing to improve efficiency and effectiveness of public financial management.
Among other measures, the Government already introduced a three year budget framework, implemented legal
and institutional mechanisms for monitoring sub-national
public finance and Treasury principles of budget execution,
created budget authority at the municipal level, and adopted legislation on insolvency of budgets of the regions. In late
2010 and 2011, Russia experienced large oil windfalls. Rising
public expenditure commitments—including on the military, public sector wages, and pensions—are threatening to
undermine fiscal and overall macroeconomic stability. The
Government needs to substantially improve its long-term
fiscal position by rationalizing public expenditures, managing the effects on public finances of an aging population,
creating fiscal space for productive infrastructure spending, returning to an explicit fiscal rule, and broadening the
tax base.

29. Ibid.
The Government has renewed and stepped up efforts to improve the business environment. Over the past few years
these efforts have included the reduction of the burden of
regulatory compliance on business, particularly in dealing with licensing and inspections at the subnational level,
systematic monitoring of business environment indicators
at the level of the regions, strengthening the enforcement
of competition regulations, automating key administrative processes concerning business (e-filing of taxes), and
stemming the proliferation of new regulations through the
introduction of regulatory impact assessments. Despite the
promising recent initiatives aiming at improving the business climate, perception indicators of the business environment remain poor. Russia ranks 120th among 183 economies
in the 2012 Doing Business report. Government efforts now
focus on streamlining key regulatory processes (e.g., issuance of licenses and permits) and monitoring administrative corruption affecting business at the level of the regions,
where most regulatory processes occur. See further details
in Annex 3.
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30. Ibid.
The Russian Government is prepared to address existing
weaknesses in the financial system. Prudential and nonprudential supervision requires strengthening through an
improved regulatory framework in line with the G20 objectives. In particular, the Central Bank of Russia needs supervisory powers for several areas to mitigate banking sector
risks. Also, financial system assets are concentrated in the
banking sector where loan quality may be overestimated
and the level of provisions is still lower than it should be.
The breadth and depth of the equity, bond and investment
fund markets remain well below capacity. Russia’s capital markets also face deficiencies in market infrastructure
(clearing and settlement) and a small institutional and retail
investor base. The issues in the banking system and capital
markets mean that there are problems in access to finance.
The lack of access to finance is an obstacle for micro, small
and medium firms, but is a particularly significant obstacle
for medium and large firms. Structural obstacles to an enhanced access to finance remain to be addressed.

31. Ibid.
The Government regards infrastructure as a key development constraint with estimates for necessary investments at
about US$1 trillion until 2020. According to a joint Bank/IFC
study, Russia’s potential energy savings are roughly equal
to the annual primary energy consumption of France. Russia’s transport infrastructure is generally poor and has been
declining because of underinvestment in maintenance and
rehabilitation. Major weaknesses are evident in the quantity,
quality and institutions of several large infrastructure sectors. Upgrading Russia’s infrastructure would require not
only significant investments but also a strengthening of the
country’s institutional framework. Russia’s environmental
management suffers from poor governance and sometimes
obsolete management practices. Environmental quality
and control are poor for a majority of Russians living in the
country’s population centers. This has detrimental effects
not only for those peoples’ well-being but also a significant
negative impact on Russia’s economy.
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32. Ibid.
The Russian Federation has made significant achievements
in social and human capital development. The most notable
achievements are in the areas of universal primary education, equality for women, eradication of extreme poverty
and malnutrition, lowering child and maternal mortality,
and reaching very high levels of higher education enrollment. With these achievements, the Russian Government is
increasingly focusing its strategies on moving Russia closer
to the level of achievements of other G8/OECD countries.
In light of these ambitious goals, despite the impressive
achievements to date, Russia is facing new challenges that
will be critical to address if the government goals under the
updated Strategy 2020 are to be achieved.

33. Ibid.
While general poverty levels have fallen sharply since the
early 2000s, vulnerability to poverty remains a concern.
Poverty rates are declining but remain significant with
more than 18.5 million Russians living in poverty in 2010.
Chronic poverty is now at about 7 percent, but the relatively
high vulnerability to poverty affects about a quarter of the
population (some 37 million people) 3. Efficiency in social
spending, better targeting of social programs, as well as new
transfers will be of critical importance in the future, especially with Russia’s efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit and
its exposure to changes in oil prices. Social protection is the
largest budget item (55 percent) within the social expenditures4. Up to one quarter of social support beneficiaries are
not poor. Furthermore, some of the social programs are suffering from low quality and weak integration with active
policies that will bring people into jobs and out of poverty
or social care. As Russia continues to develop, social transfers and programs will take up an increasing share of the
national budget as in other OECD countries. Thus, enhancing its efficiency will be paramount as will be improving the
quality of care and social programs.

34. “Since January 2011, citizens have got the right to choose
a primary care doctor and an insurance company within the mandatory health insurance system,” OECD, “Economic Policy Re-
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forms 2012: Going for Growth; World Bank, Country Partnership
Strategy (CPS) for the Russian Federation:
Demographic and health trends are characterized by low
fertility, high adult mortality and morbidity rates, and inefficient health spending, in addition to a rising pressure
on pensions. The demographic profile of the Russian Federation shows a shrinking and aging population. Average
male life expectancy in Russia is only 62.8 years (13.8 years
less than the EU average), as opposed to 74.7 for women
(7.9 years less than the EU average). The excess mortality
is overwhelmingly attributable to cardiovascular diseases,
cancer, alcohol poisoning, as well as injuries due to traffic
accidents. According to Rosstat estimates, the working age
population size will decrease by 10.4 million between 2011
and 2025, which is a major challenge for the Russian economy. Labor force shortages are expected to be compensated
through labor immigration. Progress has been made in the
fight against AIDS/HIV and TB. Still, Russia is among the
10 countries with the highest multi-drug resistant TB burden in the world. Furthermore, the Russian health system
suffers from poor quality and inefficient spending with limited resources flowing to preventive care and an excessive
amount of resources going to the hospital sector. Despite
these challenges, Russia’s total health expenditures is only
5.4 percent of GDP compared to an OECD average of 8.8
percent. Health indicators generally remain low in an international perspective and when compared to countries with
similar levels of development. Given the relative low retirement age and the aging population, the fiscal burden arising
from pensions will continue to grow.

35. World Bank, Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the
Russian Federation:
Skill mismatches in the labor market are turning into an
increasingly important development constraint. Professional education and the renewal of skills for labor market
entrants as well as existing workers are critical for adopting
new technologies, diversifying the economy, and improving
productivity levels. The latest EBRD-World Bank Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
ranks skills as the number one concern for businesses in Russia. This is further exemplified by the fact that excess labor
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market capacity appears to have been exhausted. Combined
with the changes to the demographics of the Russian population, this indicates a serious and tightening bottleneck in
the economy with regard to the provision of skilled workers, the quality of higher education and the renewal of skills
within the existing labor force. Labor force shortages resulting from demographic trends make the Russian economy
dependent on immigrant labor. The Russian Government is
undertaking steps to attract more highly skilled immigrants
to the country and is currently developing a scheme of organized recruitment of migrant workers. During 1999-2007,
Russian GDP grew by an average of 7 percent annually with
labor productivity growing an average of 6 percent per year
accounting for 2/3 of the expansion in per capita GDP. Both
female and male employment rates are below the EU average. The Russian Government is aware of the challenges
which are to be addressed in the updated Strategy 2020. See
further details in Annex 4.

36. Ibid.
The country’s strong economic recovery and downward
poverty trends belie significant challenges of inequality and
social exclusion. Since Russia began its transition from a
planned economy to a market economy some 20 years ago,
economic growth has been steady and GDP per capita has
increased threefold. Inequality as measured by the Gini
coefficient rose significantly, however, from 28.9 to 42.2
between 1992 and 2009. Social stresses have been similarly
magnified. Given that federal spending on social services in
2007-2008 already accounted for about 17 percent of GDP,
or half of total federal spending 6, and was further increased
by around 1.3 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2.2 percent of
GDP in 2010, effectively addressing the issues of inequality
and social exclusion will require an alternative preventative
approach that can tackle the root causes of these issues.

37. Ibid.
The sharp disparities in development and living standards
among Russia’s regions require a differentiated policy approach. Russia’s achievements conceal huge variations
among regions in the level of social spending and poverty
rates. For example, 82 percent of preschool education is fi-
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nanced through local government budgets, and therefore
poorer regions will be more disadvantaged in their capacity
to finance preschool education than richer regions. Substantial differences among Russia’s regions are also apparent in
per student spending and in the quality of education at the
primary and secondary education level. Finally, vulnerable
children including those with mental or physical disabilities
and those who are infected with HIV suffer from educational exclusion. Addressing these variations among the regions
across the human development spectrum will be critical for
maintaining the path of achievements and calls for a more
differentiated approach to policies and interventions.

38. Ibid.
Russia’s national choices have critical impact on regional
and global challenges. Russia is one of ECA’s regional engines of growth, both as the major destination of exports
and migrant labor from the CIS countries. The Russian Government wants to support economic integration within the
CIS, including the creation of a common migration space
and common labor market, but also has to grapple with
social integration and adaptation of labor immigrants. The
Russian territory contains about 22 percent of the world’s
undisturbed ecosystems. These have global value and significance for biodiversity protection, carbon storage and
sequestration, and other critically important environmental
functions. Strengthening forestry governance and management is particularly critical. The country’s forests are at risk
from forest fire, pest and disease outbreaks, and low rates of
reforestation. Further strengthening of the national system
for weather forecasting, hydro-meteorological services and
climate monitoring remains a high priority for the Government as the impact of climate change is expected to increase
the frequency of extreme and hazardous weather events.
Due to the large-scale economic development and climate
warming in recent decades, Russia’s remote Arctic areas
have become more accessible, resulting in a significant increase in human activities. This has led to more pressures
on the pristine but fragile environment in the Arctic zone.

39. Ibid.
At the ECA regional level, Russia has become a prominent
emerging donor. Over the last CPS period, it has imple-
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mented an ambitious development assistance program with
significant contributions. With the approval of 75 percent of
the population according to a 2010 WBG-managed opinion
survey by the Levada Center, Russia will focus its assistance
on LICs and lower-income MICs in ECA where it has many
social and economic ties, and will also become active in other
LICs. As a member of the Eurasian Economic Community, it
initiated the establishment of a regional multilateral mechanism (EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund) administered by EDB to
help deal with crisis related challenges in affected EurAsEC
countries. Russian lead agencies have developed an understanding of the complexity of development aid communications and a sense of urgency for more active work in
ensuring adequate information in support of Russian development aid. The Russian Government now plans to create
a stronger institutional framework for development aid. It
wants to set up a new bilateral development aid agency and
enhance capacity within existing public agencies through
better staffing, increased staff training, and development of
expert potential.

40. Ibid.
At the global level, Russia has made important steps toward
deeper integration into the international community. Russia
is already a member of the G8, G20, and APEC. It is also
making significant progress toward becoming a member
of the OECD and the WTO. To reach its full potential as
a prominent member of these global institutions, the Russian Government would like to employ the whole array of
available policy instruments. Yet, with regard to the area of
global public goods, where Russia is showing special interest in decisive issues like financial stability and food security, the Department for International Financial Relations in
the Ministry of Finance is understaffed and the Government
needs to strengthen the institutional structures and technical expertise necessary to provide effective leadership.

41. Ibid.
In recent years, the Government of Russia has completed
or initiated a number of major reforms in the public sector.
These efforts were intended to ensure sound management of
public resources, create a more favorable business environ-
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ment, and enhance public service delivery. Still, many challenges remain. Annex 5 analyzes recent developments and
their impact, the main challenges, and the Government’s
current strategies for improving public sector governance.

42. Ibid.
Improving effectiveness and efficiency of public administration has been a high priority for the Russian Government in
the last decade. The Government has undertaken a major
effort to clarify and delineate functions between levels of
executive government and establish local self government.
The Government also launched a broad set of public sector reforms in areas such as civil service, budget process,
and public administration. Some of these reforms, however,
were only partially implemented and are not fully visible
to the average citizen. The reforms are yet to translate into
tangible and noticeable improvements in the quality and
effectiveness of public administration in the eyes of the
citizens and businesses. Government functions and civil service staff kept growing between 2004 and 2010. Government
regulation is seen as excessive and often ineffective. Public
services are heavily embedded in traditional administrative
arrangements, which often encourage corruption and are
burdensome for citizens and businesses.

43. Ibid.
Corruption has been recognized as one of the major obstacles for investments and growth. In response, the Government has embarked on a comprehensive anti-corruption program. Anti-corruption efforts have received new
impetus in recent years under the leadership of President
Medvedev. A Federal Anti-corruption Law and National
Anticorruption Plan have been adopted and civil servants
are required to declare their assets. Surveys of corruption
perceptions show that Russia continues to lag relative to
the ECA region and in global terms. The Government has
made reform of the state contracting systems a key priority.
Reported unofficial payments to obtain public procurement
contracts were relatively high (BEEPS 2008), with 30 percent
of firms reporting having made such payments, amounting
to an average 11.5 percent of the value of the contract. Some
improvements have been made, including introducing
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e-procurement through a single government portal, and according to Rosstat, competition in public procurement tenders has increased (average number of bidders in electronic
auctions increased from seven in 2007 to 26 in 2009).

44. Ibid.
The judiciary is viewed as weak despite some improvements in recent years. Some high profile court cases have
caused international concern about the full independence of
the criminal justice system. However, according to surveys
by the Levada Center, citizens’ confidence in the courts rose
from 45 percent in 2006 to 64 percent in 2010. According
to the latest Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), the share of firms using the legal
system increased from 27 percent in 2005 to 43 percent in
2008, while only 3 percent of the companies surveyed reported corrupt practices. Two areas stand out for continued
state attention in the judicial system: (i) continuing the trend
towards greater transparency and efficiency in the functioning of courts (through investments in information technology and disseminating information to citizens on judicial decisions and the functioning of courts), and (ii) strengthening
the enforcement of judicial and administrative procedures
through the bailiff system, ensuring efficiency, transparency
and integrity.

45. OECD. Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 2006, 2006.
46. World Bank, Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the
Russian Federation, p. 52.
47. Private freehold property was criminalized throughout
the Soviet period. Leasehold property was briefly permitted from
1921 to 1929 under the New Economic Policy for businesses employing 20 or fewer workers, and then reintroduced with few restrictions under Gorbachev after 1986.
48. Rosefielde and Hedlund, Russia Since 1980.
49. “In the period since 2005, the per capita GDP of Russia
doubled to approximately $10,500 in 2010.” The year 2008 is used
as the endpoint in the text because Russian per capita GDP was

64

lower in 2010 than 2008. World Bank, Country Partnership Strategy
(CPS) for the Russian Federation, p. 47.
50. West Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. GDP for West Europe
and Russia is calculated in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. See Angus Maddison, Historical Statistics, Groningen, The
Netherlands: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, available from www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontalfile_03-2009.xls.
51. Steven Rosefielde, Efficiency and The Economic Recovery
Potential of Russia, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 1998, Table S1, p. xxii;
CIA, Handbook of International Economic Statistics, CPAS92-10005,
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Russian 1989 GDP in 2011 U.S. dollar prices is $23,546. See www.
economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/fedstl/gdpdef+1.
52. Russia-CIA World Factbook, 2012.
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CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC REFORM UNDER PUTIN 2.0:
WILL PETRODOLLARS SUFFICE
TO KEEP THE SHIP AFLOAT?
Stefan Hedlund
During his brief stint as caretaker of the Kremlin,
Dmitry Medvedev succeeded in inspiring a great deal
of hope about a different future for Russia. He went
on record saying most of the right things, and he demonstrated his modernity by doing so in the country’s
new-fangled social media. If nothing else, Medvedev
will surely be remembered as Russia’s first genuine
Twitter president.
With Vladimir Putin back in the Kremlin, however, a distinct sense of familiarity is again beginning to
spread. Medvedev is fading into the background and
may soon have dissolved completely, akin to a lump
of sugar thrown into a cup of coffee. It is tempting to
suggest that the impact of his one-term presidency
will turn out to have been no more profound than that
of his Twitter postings. But would that be correct?
The true test of the quality of Medvedev’s legacy
will rest in whether the dreams and visions that were
associated with his modernizing rhetoric have left a
mark or will evaporate together with their originator.
More specifically, we may ask if Russia under Putin
2.0 will turn out to be a different place from that of
Putin 1.0. Many of those who took part in the wave of
open protests that followed in the wake of the rigged
December 2011 Duma election certainly hoped and
perhaps still believe so.
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One of the most eloquent exponents of a belief in
the possibility of change is Aleksei Navalnyi. Having
emerged as a crusading young lawyer, he morphed
from ubiquitous anti-corruption blogger to opposition leader and to a public relations nightmare for the
Kremlin. His famed branding of United Russia, Putin’s erstwhile “party of power,” as a “party of crooks
and thieves” quickly went viral and may have utterly
destroyed the brand as such.1 Navalnyi was arrested
on December 5, the day after the Duma election. When
subsequently released from a Moscow police station,
he told a waiting crowd of supporters that, “We were
arrested for 15 days in one country and released in
another one.”2
Cynics may smile and adopt a condescending attitude. They may admit that the uproar that followed in
the wake of the election was real enough. It was novel,
both in its reliance on social media, such as Twitter
and Live Journal, and in bringing large sections of the
country’s urban elites into the streets. There can be
little doubt that it did send shockwaves through the
country’s ruling elite. But can this really be construed
as change, or even as a trigger for change, in any sense
that would entail a revival of much-needed economic
and political reform?
At a casual glance, the answer to this question will
have to be negative. For all their fervent cyber activity
and for all their loud claims that Putin must leave, the
protesters in the end could not prevent him from winning a landslide first-round election victory. Although
the initial wave of calls for honest elections did result
in demotion and reassignment for Vladislav Surkov,
the grey cardinal of the Kremlin, his creation of the
brand and practice of “managed democracy” did
prove its resilience.
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Putin’s return to the Kremlin may not have been
accompanied by the anticipated fanfare. But it did
provide yet another firm demonstration that supreme
power in Russia will be undivided and unaccountable. With Medvedev humiliated, previously heated
speculation over who was really in charge within the
“tandem” came to an abrupt halt. Fearful of consequences for their own positions and for their associated revenue streams, members of the praetorian
guards scrambled to adjust accordingly.
The bottom line is that predictability has returned.
The next scheduled Duma election will not be held
until 2016, and Vladimir Putin may be expected to remain as president at least until 2018. The prospects for
a return any time soon to the path of radical reform
that marked Putin’s first term as president, in consequence, do not look good.
At the height of the rallies, members of the liberal
opposition voiced hopes for early elections to a new
Duma, which might re-energize the reform process.
But it is hard to see how that can be arranged, within
the rules of the constitution. The president does have
a right to dissolve the Duma, but only in cases where
his nominee for prime minister has been rejected three
times by a majority of the deputies or where there has
been a vote of no confidence in the government.3 In
either case, this would require Duma deputies to vote
for an outcome where many presumably would lose
their seats and associated perks. This does not seem
very likely to occur. An alternative could be to simply
invalidate the results of the December election. But
since this would require admission by the president
that widespread fraud had, indeed, taken place, it
would seem to be even less likely. Assuming that all
have been aware of these basic realities, the clamoring
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for early elections may be reduced to simple posturing
and publicity seeking.
All of this is certainly true, and the tentative conclusions, as just mentioned, are not encouraging. A return to much-prized political stability may well turn
out to entail stagnation, perhaps even to the point
of fossilization, recalling the latter part of Leonid
Brezhnev’s rule. The reason why this must be taken
so seriously derives from the fact that, in today’s globalized economy, even standing still is tantamount
to sinking.
A continued inflow of massive earnings from energy exports may keep the federal budget in order and
Russia free of sovereign debt, but this constitutes little
more than artificial life support. The sheer weight of
evidence regarding what needs to be done in order to
breathe new life into the Russian economy is simply
overwhelming. If the price of oil should take another
steep nosedive, then the consequences would be dire,
indeed. The sharp decline that began in March 2012
provided a warning of what may come.
This said, we cannot ignore that something has
snapped and that the regime will have to adapt. The
immediate response by then President Medvedev to
the initial outburst of anger from below was to announce that important political reform was in the
making. Specific items on the list concerned legislation to facilitate registration of political parties and a
return to direct elections of governors.4 (These promises have since been acted upon, albeit with varying
speed, determination, and dilution.) The question is
what the implications of such changes in the formal
rules of the game may be.
Will this turn out to have been no more than new
twists in a familiar old game with predictable out-
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comes? Or, may it be construed as evidence that Putin
2.0 will, indeed, represent something qualitatively different from Putin 1.0? The Kremlin may certainly be
suspected of being less than sincere in its proclaimed
ambition to allow more political freedom. Yet the genie has now been let out of the bottle, and it may prove
hard to get back in again. So, are we then looking at
prospects for change that may be of consequence for
the quality of governance and thus for the performance of the Russian economy?
This question goes to the very heart of what theories on institutional change are designed to capture,
namely, the contrast between changes in formal rules
and changes in informal norms. While the former
may be achieved by direct agency, the latter will come
about only indirectly, and the interplay is of core importance. Changes in values, beliefs, and expectations
may trigger changes in the formal rules and be triggered by such changes. For a good outcome to occur,
there must be mutual support and reinforcement.
If rules are made that deviate too far from underlying norms, then a counter reaction will follow. The
same will hold if values, beliefs, and expectations
evolve away from existing systems of formal rules.
It is against this analytical background that we shall
proceed to look at the prospects for Russian economic
development under Putin 2.0. The argument will be
built in five consecutive steps.
The first will take a closer look at the Medvedev interlude, probing for changes in underlying systems of
informal norms that may turn out to have lasting importance. More specifically, we shall look at responses
to the nature and sudden termination of the ruling
tandem, at the possible emergence of elements of civil
society in Russia, and at effects of the high-profile
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campaign against corruption. This will set the stage
for questioning the inherent stability of the regime.
The second step aims to show just how vulnerable the Russian economy is to swings in hydrocarbon
prices. It will focus on how mounting fears of discontent from below have caused the Russian government to engage in lavish fiscal spending and, in consequence, to abstain from using the recent period of
high energy export revenues to rebuild precautionary
reserve funds. This will be shown to have aggravated
the inherent vulnerability of the country’s fiscal policy
and foreign debt exposure to changes in energy prices.
The third step will approach the much-discussed
question of imperative needs to undertake modernization of the Russian economy. It will outline why
the challenge is so crucially important, discuss what
it would take for a working solution to be found, and
argue that, for all the huff and puff that emanated
from the Medvedev Kremlin, the campaign in the end
boiled down to little more than empty talk. This will
provide important input for our concluding discussion on where the Russian economy may be headed.
The fourth step will argue that an important obstacle to change rests in the fact that the Russian
economy has been made hostage to the fortunes of the
energy complex. It will address the counterintuitive
suggestion that resource-rich countries may be somehow “cursed” by those riches. It will show how the
Putin regime has benefited both from an inflow of petrodollars, which has helped reduce debt and prop up
the federal budget, and from being provided with an
“energy weapon,” which may be wielded in support
of claims to regain respect as a great power.
The fifth and final step will expand on the negative
impact that the energy riches have had on the Russian
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economy. This discussion will move beyond the academic debate on the possible presence of a “resource
curse” and focus instead on how inherent institutional
problems have combined to produce a form of “Russian curse,” which is deeply rooted and rather distinctive. It will be seen to cast a long shadow over the
prospects for serious reform to be implemented that
may improve governance and thus promote both efficiency and much-needed modernization. Let us proceed now to look at the Medvedev interlude.
THE MEDVEDEV INTERLUDE
The main importance of the Medvedev presidency
lies not so much in what was actually achieved, which
was precious little, but rather in what was revealed.
In retrospect, it may be tempting to conclude that it
was all no more than a ruse. It was, arguably, a ploy
devised by Putin to ensure that he could have his cake
and eat it, too. Within the tandem, he could hold on
to power while respecting the letter of the law, which
prevented him from serving more than two consecutive terms as president. If we look simply at intentions,
there would be an element of truth in this write-off.
But if we turn to look also at consequences, matters
are not so simple.
The cohabitation of two political leaders at the highest level of power at first seemed to belie the deeplyrooted belief that power in Russia must be undivided
and unaccountable. The country was suddenly ruled
by two men with very different agendas and personalities. It appeared for a time to be an open question
as who was really in charge. Those who so preferred
could pin their hopes on pending changes in the direction of increased legality, decreased corruption, a
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more cooperative foreign policy, and a more favorable
investment climate. Others could look to Putin for reassurance that nothing much would change.
An important consequence of this deliberately introduced confusion was that widely different expectations were being formed. In some quarters, such
expectations caused underlying liberal values and
beliefs to be re-energized, in support of a hoped-for
movement towards legality and accountability. It was
the deep frustration of people who subsequently felt—
justifiably so—that they had been simply deluded that
triggered the protest movement against Putin. The
chickens were, quite simply, coming home to roost.
By far the most important single lesson to be
learned from the Medvedev interlude concerns how
a political system in general approaches questions
of succession at the top. The essence of a democratic
system is that incumbents may face the prospect of
loss of office without fear. The mantra of the transitology literature has been that we may speak of consolidated democracy only after elections that have
brought peaceful and orderly changes in government.
In Russia, none of this has much, if any, relevance. The
potential consequences of being voted out of high office have remained dire, ranging from loss of income
and assets, to prosecution and incarceration, or even
worse. Problems concerning succession at the top
have consequently not been taken lightly.
Towards the end of Boris Yeltsin’s second term
in office, health reasons alone made it clear that no
amount of further manipulation could prolong his
time in power. It also became obvious just how keen
he was on finding a successor who could ensure his
security. Having appointed and fired a number of
prime ministers, who were deemed either to be too
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weak or not to be trusted, he finally settled on Putin.
In keeping with the agreement, one of the latter’s very
first acts in power was to provide his benefactor with
immunity against prosecution.5
As Putin’s second term in power was, in turn,
drawing to a close, considerations of security again
came to the fore. Handing over the reins of power
would be something of a gamble. There were distinct
risks that new men in power might move to prosecute
for alleged malfeasance during Putin’s time in St. Petersburg.6 There was also the question of his alleged
personal fortune of maybe $40 billion, to which he
has no formal (official) ownership title.7 A successor
would have to be strong enough to provide protection but also loyal enough not to get ambitious on his
own account.
There were two leading candidates for the post of
successor: Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov. The
former had served with Putin in St. Petersburg, had
no power base of his own, and could be relied upon
to remain loyal. The other was well connected within
the power structures and could clearly be trusted to
remain strong. But would he also be able to resist the
temptation of usurping power for himself? Putin’s
choice of Medvedev turned out to be a good one. He
did remain loyal, allowing his patron to ensure his
own protection from behind the scenes.
The bottom line is that, during his first two terms
in power, Putin was successful in ensuring that all
such formal institutions that might have served to
provide accountability in government were drained
of all real content. By the time he opted to retreat into
the tandem, power had been made entirely personal.
He could, in consequence, hand over the keys to the
Kremlin without running the risk of either prosecu-
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tion or expropriation. There was, however, also a price
to be paid.
What Putin had achieved may be usefully contrasted against what James Madison once wrote about
political factions, in his perhaps most classic contribution to The Federalist: “There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its
causes; the other, by controlling its effects.” Noting
that “liberty is to faction what air is to fire,” Madison
clearly rules out the former option. All men cannot be
made the same, nor would it be wise to suppress their
right to express different points of view. The solution
was seen to lie in the creation of a republican form
of government that allows factions to be organized
and to compete within the framework of established
constitutional rules.8
Turning to Russia under Putin, factional struggles
during the 1990s had threatened to literally tear the
state apart. But the solution when Putin assumed power was not seen to lie in working to improve institutions, whereby passions and interests might have been
articulated and vetted against each other in an orderly
manner. The essence of Putinism instead would be a
de facto suppression of all such formal mechanisms
whereby discontent may be channeled and whereby
conflicts may find an open and orderly resolution. In
the absence of such mechanisms, mounting pressures
of discontent, which will build up in any type of political system, will have to find other outlets. Open street
protests such as the mass rallies that began shaking
Moscow towards the end of 2011 constitute the most
visible illustration. But, as we shall argue here, the
threat of a hostile takeover of power from within is of
greater concern.
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The second lesson to be drawn from the one-term
Medvedev presidency concerns the associated question of the existence of civil society in Russia. By the
time Medvedev moved into the Kremlin, conventional
wisdom held that, during the first two terms of the
Putin presidency, civil society had been simply beaten
into submission. Subjects had been offered to engage
in material self-enrichment, at the price of abstaining
from any and all such forms of activity that are normally associated with a vibrant civil society.
During Medvedev’s time in office, there were
growing indications that some form of civil society
might be returning to life. Yet, few, if any, were prepared for the mass mobilization that was to follow.
The watershed arrived on September 24, 2011, when
President Medvedev told a United Russia congress
that he and Prime Minister Putin had agreed to simply
swap jobs. Medvedev would step down, and Putin
would run for the presidency. Accepting the nomination, Putin added insult to injury by saying that this
was a decision the two had reached in 2007 but kept
a secret.9 The sheer arrogance of it all apparently was
too much for many to stomach.
What made the ensuing wave of protests so difficult for the elite to “manage” was that this time, the
protesters were neither pensioners nor other vulnerable groups complaining about hardship. Those who
took to the streets were those that had stood to gain
the most from the economic upturn under Putin. They
were the winners, and they were not showing due
gratitude. They were, on the contrary, making demands for public goods, such as honest elections, that
the elite simply could not deliver. They conducted
their protests in a peaceful, nonprovocative manner.
They could not be appeased with additional fiscal
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spending. Ordering the riot police to beat the capital’s
cultural and entrepreneurial elite into pulp would
have looked bad indeed.
The bewilderment of those in power was clearly
manifested in Putin’s initial reactions, which ranged
from attempting to blame then U.S. Secretary of State
Hilary Clinton for having inspired the protests, to
denigrating the protesters as “Bandar-logs,” the chattering monkey people in Rudyard Kipling’s Jungle
Book, whose incoherent behavior causes them to be
scorned by the rest of the jungle.10
These reactions were quite in line with Putin’s established way of badmouthing both foreign leaders
and domestic opponents. But this time round, his demeanor was no longer viewed as a sign of strength.
He was viewed instead as being utterly disconnected
from reality. When Putin ran for re-election in 2004,
his refusal to take part in public debates could be construed as the arrogance of power, of not condescending to even talk to his opponents. Now it was viewed
as simple fear of having to answer pointed questions
and perhaps even of being booed.11
It may certainly be argued that the Kremlin does
not have any serious grounds for worry about the
large protest rallies, or indeed about the vibrant activities that are taking place in various social media.
There is little to indicate that Russia will experience
rebellions from below that are similar in kind to the
famed “Arab Spring” or even to the “color revolutions” that transformed Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine
in 2004. As mentioned, the real cause for concern lies
in a different direction: in a threat that emerges from
within the elite.
In a comment on his own role as officially approved presidential candidate, billionaire Mikhail
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Prokhorov claimed that he abhorred the prospect of
a revolution from below and remained hopeful that
divisions within the elite would force the regime to
accommodate at least some demands for reform: “I
think that the liberal part of the elite is bigger and bigger from day to day, because I have a lot of calls from
different levels, and they really express their support
for my candidacy.”12
The importance of this observation lies in the fact
that there may, indeed, be support from within the elite
for proceeding with cautious reform. Some, like Russian political commentator Stanislav Belkovsky, have
even suggested the advent of a second “perestroika.”13
The presumed reasons vary. Some may have developed genuine sympathies for the need to reform. Others may view reform as a simple necessity to avoid
being swept away by a tidal wave of discontent from
below. The bottom line is that formal changes in the
rules may be expected. The challenge to the regime
will be similar to that encountered during Putin’s first
term as president: to allow some formal changes in
the rules of the game to proceed while ensuring that
such changes will not in any fundamental way alter
the game as such.
The third, and by far the most striking, lesson to
be drawn from the Medvedev interlude is a direct
corollary of the president’s ambition to appear as a
champion of legality. By projecting an image of himself as a crusader against corruption, he provided an
implicit carte blanche from the very top for striking
revelations. With the president taking the lead in castigating corruption, hard line officials were unable
to crack down against people like Aleksei Navalnyi,
who made a name for himself as a fearless anti-corruption blogger. Nor was it possible to prevent other
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members of officialdom from speaking out of school.
On the contrary, doing so may even have been perceived by some as a sign of loyalty. Under a different
president, one would, for example, not have expected
to hear Russia’s top military prosecutor, Sergei Fridinsky, tell the Rossiyskaya Gazeta that at least 20 percent
of the defense budget is being siphoned off every year
via various forms of fraud.14
The main importance of these revelations lies not
so much in the revelations as such, as in what they
say about the political system that Putin has built. His
regime has often been accused of being authoritarian,
and parallels have been drawn both to the Soviet order and to the autocracy of the Russian imperial order. This is at least partly misleading. It is true that the
Kremlin does project an authoritarian image and that
there have been cases of conduct that recall memories
out of Russia’s dark past. One need only mention here
the destruction of Yukos; the kangaroo trials against
its Chief Executive Officer Mikhail Khodorkovsky; the
spate of unresolved killings of journalists, notably but
not exclusively Anna Politkovskaya; and the beating
to death in a prison cell of the promising young lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky.
Yet, if Putin’s regime had, indeed, been truly authoritarian, it would have had little trouble dealing
with at least the most egregious forms of self-enrichment and diversion of funds that are so clearly detrimental to the interests of the state. To be specific, it is
hard to see how an authoritarian agenda of rearmament and force projection can be made to agree, with
allowing a fifth and possibly more of the defense budget to be simply stolen every year.
There has to be a reason, and that reason, we shall
argue, goes to the very heart of the political order of
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Putinism. Assuming that the Kremlin remains in firm
control of the security services, it should have little
problem tracking down the main culprits that have
been robbing the state blind. It is, indeed, very likely
that extensive documentation has already been collected. But no serious action is taken, and for good
reason. Allowing members of the elite to tap into the
resources of the state and to move the loot into safe
havens abroad has become the linchpin of the implicit
contract between the ruler and his boyars. Cracking
down might trigger a veritable civil war within and
among the elites, and, in the end, perhaps even a hostile takeover of power.
We shall have reason to return to the systemic
implications of these observations in our concluding
discussion on the prospects for reform. Here we shall
proceed to look at how Russia was affected by and
emerged out of the global financial crisis. This is done
in order to emphasize the crucial role of hydrocarbon
prices and the inherent weakness of the nonenergy
sectors of the Russian economy.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
The global financial crisis struck Russia hard, albeit with some delay. During the fall of 2008, when the
subprime mortgage crisis was sending shock waves
through the global economy, Russia remained outwardly unperturbed. It was held, or at least pretended, that the crisis was U.S.-made and would have little
impact on Russia. As late as at the World Economic
Forum in Davos in early 2009, Minister of Finance
Alexei Kudrin could still famously claim that Russia
was “an island of stability.”15 Reality, however, was
about to catch up.
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Over the first two terms of the Putin presidency,
the Russian economy had grown by on average 7 percent per annum, and the federal budget had been kept
solidly in the black. In 2008, Russian gross domestic
product (GDP) was still growing at 5.2 percent, and
the federal budget still turned in a surplus, corresponding to 4.1 percent of GDP. In 2009, Russian GDP
contracted by 7.9 percent, and the federal budget recorded a deficit corresponding to 5.9 percent of GDP.16
The drastic nature of this transformation calls for three
important observations to be made.
The first brings home just how prudent the Russian
government had been in accumulating precautionary reserves while the going was still good. Central
Bank foreign currency reserves peaked on August 8,
2008, at $598.1 billion; and on September 1, the “rainy
day” Reserve Fund reached its peak of $142.6 billion.17
When the budget swung into deficit and when calls
were made on the Central Bank to provide crisis support, there was ample room for such intervention.
The second observation concerns how the crisis
measures were formulated. There is broad consensus
that the government implemented an anti-crisis program which, in the words of Pekka Sutela, “rightly
earned accolades” from several international organizations: one “has to agree with the IMF [International
Monetary Fund] and the World Bank’s assessment
now that Russia’s anti-crisis policy was a major success overall: timely, consistent, and effective.”18 Closer
inspection, however, will reveal that the authorities
placed a heavy premium on measures that were clearly designed to preserve systemic stability. The main
priority was to bail out the country’s highly leveraged
oligarchs. This was done by the government, offering
an immediate credit line allowing debts coming due
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to foreign banks to be paid. It was done by the Central Bank, spending about $100 billion of its reserves
on market interventions to ensure a gradual devaluation of the ruble. While the first move offered wellconnected oligarchs to escape immediate margin calls,
which might have pushed them into bankruptcy, the
latter offered them ample time to convert rubles into
dollars at favorable rates of exchange.
As Sutela puts it, the latter was tantamount to a de
facto privatization of a good part of the nation’s foreign currency reserves.19 It was, however, also quite
consistent with what Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes
have presented as Putin’s “protection racket.”20 While
the going was good, the oligarchs acted as loyal clients
of Putin. When they fell on hard times, the patron had
to live up to his part of the bargain, which was to offer protection. Although there was blatant favoritism
involved, it cannot be denied that by saving banks and
oligarchs, the regime also prevented a slide into mass
unemployment and possible social unrest.
Our third, and by far most important, observation
concerns the impact of the crisis on Russian prestige.
During Yeltsin’s time in power, the Kremlin was
becoming ever more insistent that Russia must be
granted access to all those international “clubs” where
other great powers regularly meet. A case in point
was the G7 group of leading industrialized nations.21
Although Russia was far, indeed, from qualifying for
membership on its economic merits, political considerations caused the others to occasionally grant Russia
informal membership in an expanded G8.22 In effect, it
meant that Russian delegates were welcome at cocktails and photo ops but not at closed discussions on
matters of global economic policy.
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At the outset of the first Putin presidency, there
emerged another, and to the Russian elite, far more
palatable frame of reference: the BRICs. Introduced by
Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill in 2001, this catchy
acronym denoted a group of fast-growing economies
that included Brazil, Russia, India, and China. At their
first formal summit meeting, held in the Russian city
of Yekaterinburg on June 16, 2009, the leaders of the
four BRIC economies had much to say about the importance of their group as a whole, as an emerging
challenge to the established world economic order,
and about their prospects to take a joint lead in achieving global economic recovery.
Remaining within the world of finance, it was striking to note how quickly Russia’s financial markets
rebounded. Investors could derive pleasure from the
fact that, over 2009, the Russian Trading System (RTS)
index of the Moscow Stock Exchange rose from 632
to 1,445, with market capitalization rising from $55.3
to $146.7 billion. The rise would continue over 2010,
albeit at a slower pace, with the index ending the year
at 1,770 and market capitalization at $186.6 billion.23
Having looked set for extinction “as a class” in
2009, in 2010, Russia’s famed oligarchs would be back
in the game. Or, at least most of them would. According to Forbes, in 2010, the number of Russian billionaires had risen to 62 from merely 32 in 2009, and their
joint worth had more than doubled, from $142 billion to $297 billion.24 The market rebound was clearly
driven by a rapid rise in the price of oil. Over 2009,
the price of Urals crude, which is Russia’s main export blend, increased from $34.20 to $72.08 per barrel, and it continued climbing in 2010, ending the year
at $90.94 per barrel.25 The immediate impact was felt
on the current account, where hydrocarbon revenues
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are of paramount importance in generating a muchneeded surplus. Having dropped from $103.5 billion
in 2008 to a mere $48.6 billion in 2009, the surplus rose
to $70.6 billion in 2010.26 Given that every $1 change
in the price per barrel is generally estimated to translate into a change of about $2 billion in federal budget
revenue, the rebound also had a profound impact on
federal budget performance.
All told, we may conclude that what rode to the
rescue for the Russian economy was a broad recovery
on global energy markets. The surprising speed of the
turnaround would be reflected also in a drastic transformation of Russian moods, from a deep sense of crisis in the midst of 2009 to renewed complacency by the
end of 2010. It may be useful to recollect just how deep
it was believed at the time that Russia would sink.
During the first half of 2009, the Reserve Fund was
being depleted at such a rate that in April, Finance
Minister Kudrin predicted that it would be “practically exhausted” in 2010.27 By the end of July, the government announced that it was expecting federal budget
deficits corresponding to 9.4 percent of GDP for 2009,
to 7.5 percent for 2010, and to 4.3 percent for 2011.28 In
order to cover the shortfall, sales of Eurobonds of up
to $20 billion was envisioned for 2010 alone, and more
was expected to follow.29
As it turned out, the budget deficit for 2009 stopped
at 5.9 percent of GDP. For 2010, the number was kept
to 4.1 percent, and the federal budget actually ended
with a surplus of 0.8 percent for 2011.30 In tandem
with this improvement in budget performance, reserves also stabilized and began rising again. From a
low point of $383.8 billion at the end of April 2009,
by the end of August 2011, Central Bank reserves had
reached $545.0 billion, closing in on the record high
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of $598.1 billion that was achieved on August 8, 2008.
The number has since remained at or slightly above
$500 billion.31 The Reserve Fund, meanwhile, continued to shrink, but at an orderly pace, from $60.5 billion at the outset of 2010, to $25.4 billion at the outset
of 2011. In February 2012, a large one-time deposit out
of 2011 energy earnings caused it to rise again, to $61.4
billion.32 As the crisis in the euro zone deepened, the
world of finance came up with another suggestive acronym: PIIGS, denoting the crisis-ridden euro economies of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. If
compared to the members of this sordid group, Russia
looked positively inspiring. With a debt-to-GDP ratio
of less than 10 percent, Russia looked good, even if
compared to the northern group of less crisis-ridden
European Union (EU) member states.
Following the downgrade of U.S. sovereign debt
in August 2011, which was triggered by congressional
gridlock over the debt ceiling, it was even becoming
questionable how much longer the EU and the United
States would remain as global economic leaders and
role models. It was surely tempting to join O’Neill in
wondering how long it would take investors to “accept that the growth markets are actually fiscally more
prudent and financially in better shape than in the
Western world.”33
If, however, Russia were to be compared to the
other members of what is now known as the BRICS
following the April 2011 inclusion into the group
of South Africa, then a completely different picture
emerges. During 2009, the main year of the crisis,
both China and India maintained solid growth, with
GDP increasing by, respectively, 9.1 and 5.7 percent,
and Brazil just barely managed to hold the line, with
a drop of merely 0.2 percent.34 In a provocative commentary, Dmitry Trenin concluded that:
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Moscow ought to forget about trying to undermine
America’s global hegemony and concentrate instead
on retaining its place in the ‘top league’ of world powers. China, India, and Brazil are candidates for membership in it. Russia is a candidate for exit.35

In a speech at a Global Policy Forum in the Russian city Yaroslavl in early September 2011, economist
Paul Krugman, winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in economics, had even harsher words to offer: “Russia really doesn’t belong in the group. It’s a petro-economy
in terms of world trade.” While Krugman notes that
Russia does have potential to become a part of the
group, at the moment it is not even close. India and
China come across as labor-abundant, rapid-growth
economies, and although Brazil relies on raw-materials oriented exports, it does have a strong manufacturing sector: “Russia doesn’t fit at all.”36
Keeping in mind Krugman’s observation that Russia does at least have the potential to become a highgrowth economy based on drivers other than energy
exports, let us proceed now to look at how that potential has been mismanaged, at how empty talk of
modernization has come to serve as a substitute for
serious action.
EMPTY TALK OF MODERNIZATION
Looking beyond financial markets and macroeconomic stabilization, we may ask what lessons the Russian leadership was ready and able to learn from the
financial crisis. Did it absorb the implications of depending so heavily on the global market for hydrocarbons? Did it realize the imperative need to diversify
away from this dependence and to build precaution87

ary reserves while the flow of petrodollars remained
high? Or, was it, on the contrary, bent on simply digging in, on reaping the benefits while possible and
deferring any type of change that might threaten
systemic stability? The latter would very clearly turn
out to be the case, much to the detriment of the future
development of the Russian economy and of Russian
society at large.
The main challenge to Russian economic policymaking surely remains that of securing global economic competitiveness. Given the tremendous brain
power that was housed in the old Soviet “military
industrial complex” and the fact that Russia on the
whole has a highly skilled and educated work force,
it is rather sad to note that the country presently has
an almost zero presence on global high-tech markets.
The contrast against China and India in this regard is
highly sobering.37
There can be little question that those in power are
well aware of the problem. While there has been considerable complacency about swings in capital flows,
the very real risk of being relegated to the rather ignominious status as a mere raw materials appendix
to the developed nations, notably including China,
has been taken very seriously. The need to modernize
was, in consequence, to become something of a mantra or a hallmark of the Medvedev presidency.
In a much cited article titled “Go, Russia!” published in September 2009, President Medvedev was
quite frank: “Should a primitive economy based on
raw materials and endemic corruption accompany us
into the future?” Making his case for the need to modernize, he spoke about a “humiliating dependence on
raw materials,” about how “finished goods produced
in Russia are largely plagued by their extremely low
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competitiveness,” and about the need to stamp out
“bribery, theft, intellectual and spiritual laziness, and
drunkenness.”38
It was a powerful statement, which did inspire
hope for serious action to follow. There also did seem
to be an awareness of what would need to be done. In
a major speech just before he was elected president,
Medvedev had outlined what would become the main
priorities of his presidency. Advancing a long list of
priorities, he emphasized that the road to modernity
must be paved with the “four I’s” of innovation, institutions, infrastructure, and investment.39 If we ignore
for the moment the rather obvious need to upgrade
the country’s seriously dilapidated infrastructure, the
key to understanding Russia’s future may be seen to
lie in the interplay between the remaining three.
At the face of it, it may all seem so very simple.
Good institutions will promote increased investment,
which in turn will promote innovation and global integration. But the chain works equally well in the opposite direction: bad institutions will depress investment
which in turn will hamper innovation and lead to isolation. The question of modernization must be viewed
against precisely this background. It is not sufficient
that Russia has come to look like a modern society.
It is true that the townscapes of major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg are presently very similar to
those of other big cities around the world. The sheer
density of very up-market shopping gallerias may be
as high as in any other big metropolis. But this is all
largely deceptive.
The core question concerns how decisions are
made behind the modern façades. Are decisionmakers confident that legal and economic institutions are
of sufficient quality to ensure that investment will
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yield adequate return? Do they feel safe from predation by interests protected by the government, or
indeed by the government itself? If we look at how
little is being achieved despite the massive inflow of
revenues from hydrocarbon exports, the answer to the
latter questions must be firmly negative.
For lack of a better measure, we shall argue that the
share of fixed capital investment in GDP constitutes
a good predictor of the prospects for future growth
and technological change. According to World Bank
numbers for 2010, that share was 45 percent (and rising) for China and 22 percent (stagnant) for Russia.40
If, moreover, we were to take into account that investment goods in the Russian economy are predominantly bought from monopoly producers charging inflated
prices, the share of investment in Russian GDP, measured at world market prices, would drop to below
10 percent.41 The reasons are as simple as they are
troublesome.
In the context of an economy where contracts and
property rights are shaky at best, where government is
unaccountable and prone to discretionary imposition
of what Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes have referred
to as “informal taxes,”42 and where members of the
bureaucracy are always on the prowl for extortionary
bribes, the rational strategy will be one of short-term
spot-market trading and of ensuring that profits and
capital flows are kept well below the radar screens of
predatory government agencies. In addition to depressing the overall level of fixed capital investment,
this environment will also give rise to what has come
to be known as “round tripping,” i.e., that a substantial share of capital flowing into and out of Russia is
made up of Russian capital leaving and returning, following a brief stay in some foreign account.
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The importance of this latter phenomenon may be
reflected in the fact that Cyprus tends to be among
the top foreign investors in the Russian economy.43 It
is also significant that single events of a mainly political nature have left big marks in the charts, such as
when Rosneft and Gazprom purchased Yukos assets
in the first half of 2007 by allegedly securing foreign
credits of, respectively, $25.1 billion and $5.8 billion.44
Much of the heavy inflow of capital that was recorded
in 2007 could also be explained by Gazprom Netherlands investing to buy out Shell from Sakhalin. From
a perspective of modernization and global integration, the latter should probably be counted with a
negative sign.
The reason why all of this is so important rests in
highlighting the bogus nature of capital flows to and
from Russia. Given that “round tripping” capital will
be logged as capital flight on departure and as foreign
direct investment (FDI) on arrival, it follows that both
these flows will be greatly inflated in importance.
While the numbers as such may be correct, they will
generate a warped understanding of Russia’s integration into the global economy. What the Russian economy so desperately needs is technology and management skills that may promote serious modernization.
The hallmark of “true” FDI is that it embodies precisely these contributions. Returning Russian money
does not.
Numerous reasons may be advanced to explain
why Russian actors engage in the practice of “round
tripping.” Ranging from tax evasion to money laundering and to outright criminal activity, they all have
one feature in common: investors prefer to keep their
activities out of sight of potential predators. This may
be taken as firm evidence in support of the general
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understanding that the “climate” for productive investment in the Russian economy has come to be so
widely perceived as being simply appalling.
Financial market analysts have routinely advanced
numbers on what the capitalization of the Moscow
Stock Exchange would have been if Russia had been
judged on its purely economic merits. An excellent illustration is that of Gazprom. In 2000, it had a market
value of $13.8 billion, which was tiny compared to
ExxonMobil ($299 billion), Shell ($121 billion) or even
Texaco ($38 billion). In a suggestive comparison from
the time by Bill Browder of Hermitage Capital Management, if Gazprom had been optimistically valued
at the same level as Exxon per barrel of hydrocarbon
reserves, it would have been worth $1.8 trillion, or
132 times the current market price. The government’s
stake would then have been worth $698 billion, or 4.6
times the entire Russian national debt.45
In addition to the discount applied by markets to
Russian stock, simply because it is Russian, we may
add that the role of the stock market in the Russian
economy has been set in decline. In the run-up to the
2012 presidential election, Dmitry Pankin, head of the
Federal Service for Financial Markets, bemoaned the
poverty of financial markets in Russia. The market
capitalization of the stock market, which used to be
100 percent of GDP, had fallen to less than 50 percent
of GDP. Domestic initial public offerings in 2010 were
minuscule at 0.1 percent of GDP, and the volume of
corporate bonds was extremely small, amounting to
only 6 percent of GDP. Mutual funds, which are so
important in mature economies, barely existed at 0.3
percent of GDP. The causes of this dearth of financial
markets are, according to Pankin, to be found in poor
law enforcement and judicial services. His verdict is
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not a happy one: “The road to render Moscow a financial center is very long.”46
What makes it so hard to inspire confidence in
investors is that the Russian government routinely
engages in forms of behavior that cause investors to
demand a very large discount. Although admittedly
extreme, the campaign to destroy Yukos Oil has often
been advanced as an illustration of the price that Russia is forced to pay for the behavior of its government.
A more recent illustration of the same concerns the
tragic case of Sergei Magnitsky, a promising young
Russian lawyer who was employed by Browder’s
Hermitage Investment fund. In November 2009, he
was battered to death in police custody. His gruesome
fate has become an international issue of major proportions, and his friends, led by Browder, have even
succeeded in persuading President Barack Obama to
impose restrictions on a number of officials implicated
in his death.47 At the 2012 World Economic Forum in
Davos, Browder took the opportunity to ask why the
guilty parties were not being prosecuted.
In the pointed words of journalist Gideon Rachman, blogging from the event for the Financial Times,
the response from Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Igor Shuvalov was (presumably) meant to sound
reasonable and reassuring: “He described the case as
‘horrendous’ and said that some people had already
lost their jobs and been charged over it.” But it was
very difficult to get to the bottom of the case, “because
the ‘system’ was protecting some guilty people.” The
clear implication was that nothing would happen.
Most importantly, Rachman reports having been told
by one participant that based on Shuvalov’s answer
alone, he had decided not to proceed with a big potential investment in Russia.48 It was somehow symptom-
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atic of this general atmosphere of “untouchables” that,
towards the end of 2010, while Judge Victor Danilikin
was busy reading the 250-page verdict in the second
“kangaroo” trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Medvedev was addressing a business council on modernization, bemoaning the fact that so few Russian companies had opted to issue equity during the year: “Part
of the problem, of course, is our investment climate,
which is bad. Very bad.”49
The only tangible measure that was taken during
Medvedev’s time in the Kremlin, in an effort to make
up for Russia’s lagging position in the sphere of global
high-tech development, was the creation of a technopark in the Moscow region town of Skolkovo. Designed to become a Russian version of the American
Silicon Valley, the hype around this project has been
intense. Substantial efforts have been made to attract
companies, foreign as well as domestic, and many
have responded, at least in name. President Medvedev also made a point of being filmed visiting the real
Silicon Valley, where he could tout his new iPad and
meet all those brilliant young Russians who prefer to
pursue their ventures outside Russia.
For all its rhetorical efforts, it remains questionable
if the Russian regime is capable of understanding that
the real Silicon Valley is not about geography. It is
about a state of mind, one, moreover, that is anathema
to everything that Putinism has stood for. Talented
young Russians are responding to this realization by
voting with their feet. According to numbers released
by the Federal Audit Chamber in February 2011,
about 1.25 million Russians, many of whom likely
were young entrepreneurs, had emigrated over the
past 3 years.50
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An oft-cited case in point is that of Andre Geim,
a brilliant young Russian-born scientist, now residing
in Manchester, England, with a Dutch passport. Following the announcement that he and his collaborator Konstantin Novoselov had won the Nobel Prize in
Physics for 2010, it was immediately announced that
the two would be invited by the Skolkovo leadership
to join the venture. This was an offer they had little
problem refusing, claiming that:
the Kremlin could throw money at science, but research would still be stymied by corruption, red tape
and a lack of the vital international teams and facilities
needed to engage in groundbreaking work.

When asked specifically by a Russian journalist
what it would take for him to return, Geim responded
curtly: “Reincarnation.”51
Let us turn now to the core question of how it can
be that a country that is simply awash in theoretically
investable funds, and that has such an impressive pool
of talent to draw on, succeeds in achieving so little.
The first part of the answer calls for a closer look at
the source of the financial wealth, i.e., the country’s
energy complex.
HOSTAGE TO THE ENERGY COMPLEX
The rise to power of Putin was intimately intertwined with a spectacular rise in income from hydrocarbon exports. In the wake of the meltdown on the
country’s financial markets in August 1998, the prevailing sentiment was doom and gloom. Most of 1999
was marked by expectations that it would take a very
long time for Russia to recover. But behind the scenes,
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a powerful recovery was under way. A massive devaluation of the ruble had caused imports to plummet, making room for domestic producers with spare
capacity to respond rapidly. During the second half of
1999, the Russian economy was already expanding at
double digits.52
When Putin moved into the Kremlin following
his landslide election victory in March 2000, the general sentiments about the Russian economy remained
grim. Then the hydrocarbon cavalry rode to the rescue, helping boost the image of Putin as an efficient
economic manager. The price of Urals crude had bottomed at $8.73 per barrel on December 4, 1998. When
Yeltsin resigned at the end of 1999, it was still at $24.71.
By the time of Medvedev’s inauguration in May 2008,
it had risen to $120.01.53 It was still a couple of months
shy of its peak. The spike in the price of oil, moreover,
was only part of the story. Putin’s image was further
enhanced by the fact that both prices and volumes
were rising in tandem, which is unusual indeed.
Due to the general dislocation of the 1990s, Russian oil production had slumped from a high of 11.48
million barrels per day (bpd) in 1987 to an annual
average of around 6 million bpd. In 2000, it was still
at no more than 6.54 million bpd. Then output began
to climb, driven by improved efficiency in operations
by the privatized Russian oil companies. Much was
for short-term gain, “creaming” reservoirs that had
been neglected during the Yeltsin era. But it did bring
a rise in output. By 2008, when Putin moved out of
the Kremlin, Russian oil production had risen by more
than half, to 9.88 million bpd.54 In the latter year, Russia was tied with Saudi Arabia for the role as the largest producer of oil in the world.
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It was the combination of these two trends that
drove the transformation of the Russian economy.
As outlined previously, it generated a huge current
account surplus, allowed foreign debt to be almost
eliminated, and made room for precautionary reserves to be built within the federal budget. By the
time the global financial crisis struck, Russia had a
most inspiring track record of successful fiscal conservatism. But the hydrocarbon bonanza also had a dark
side, one that would taint the image of Russia as a
reliable partner.
As the Russian energy complex began rising in
prominence, accounting for about two-thirds of exports and half of federal budget revenue, the Kremlin found that it could be of use not only in achieving
macroeconomic stability. The export of gas in particular offered the opportunity of wielding an “energy
weapon.” At the outset of Putin’s presidency, Russia
was generally viewed as an economic basket case and
as politically irrelevant. As the energy riches caused
Russian confidence to rise, foreign imagery was also
being transformed. Pictures of an emerging “energy
superpower” were projected.55 Harkening back to the
days of Ronald Reagan and the Cold War, warnings
were again issued to European nations about the dangers inherent in becoming reliant on Russian gas.56
Even the specter of a resumption of the Cold War
itself was brought back.57
Barring the Cold War rhetoric, which is so wide of
the mark as to be simply ludicrous, there were serious
grounds for worry. The reasons related mainly, if not
exclusively, to Russian pipeline policy and to the export of gas. Oil has been important to Russia as a revenue source, but oil is fungible. It can be transported in
many different ways, and it can be bought and sold on
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spot markets around the world. As amply evidenced
by the flamboyant but essentially empty rhetoric of
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, threats of ceasing oil deliveries carry little weight unless backed by
a large cartel.
Gas is very different. To the extent that gas is
transported via pipeline, which has long been the predominant mode, the two sides will be locked into mutual dependence, and there can be no serious talk of a
global market for gas. The arrival of liquid natural gas
(LNG) and shale gas is transforming this picture, but
it has had very little impact on Russian policymaking
to date. Close to 100 percent of Russian export of gas
goes to Europe and to neighboring Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), and it is all via pipeline.
There is some gas being exported from Sakhalin as
LNG, but, for the present purpose, it may be safely
ignored. The evolution of Russian gas export policy
during the first two terms of the Putin presidency was
marked by three important features, all of which gave
rise to serious conflict.
The first concern is that undertaking a transition
from central economic planning to market economy
entailed a drastic break with the old practice of heavily subsidized prices on domestic energy consumption.
For political reasons, the Russian government made
sure that harmonizing domestic gas prices would proceed slowly—so slowly, in fact, that the process still
remains to be completed. For national gas giant Gazprom, this implied that losses on the domestic market
had to be compensated via profits on foreign markets.
It offered a great deal of leeway in discriminating between different foreign customers. While countries
that were deemed as friendly to the Kremlin would see
their prices rise slowly, those considered less friendly
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could be slapped with drastic increases. Conflicts over
such price hikes could also be laced with supply shutoffs, all of which combined to give the Kremlin an
image as an energy bully.
The second and equally contentious area of conflict derives from the fact that Russia inherited a gas
pipeline infrastructure that transports gas to Europe
across territories that are now independent states,
mainly Ukraine and Belarus. As Gazprom got locked
into pricing conflicts with such transit states, it rapidly discovered that its own highly lucrative export
to the EU could be held hostage. Deliveries of gas to
Ukraine could, for example, not be shut down without also shutting down deliveries to EU member
states. The conclusion that the transit states must
be sidelined was done by building bypass pipelines
such as the Nord Stream, which already transports
gas directly from Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in
Germany, and the South Stream, which is to transport
gas from the Caspian Basin via the Black Sea to southeastern Europe. Both Poland and the Baltic states responded vehemently to what they viewed as a project
designed to shut down their energy supplies without
disrupting the flow to Germany.
The third and potentially most serious area of
conflict is a form of collateral damage. When pricing
conflicts between Gazprom and Ukraine led to major
supply shutoffs in 2006 and again in 2009, several EU
member states found that their supplies were also shut
off, causing them to freeze in the dead of winter. Although ambitions were not to take sides on who was
mainly to blame, Moscow or Kiev, it was inevitable
that the reputation of Gazprom, and by implication
that of the Kremlin, as a reliable partner and supplier
suffered a great deal of damage. This fed into ongoing
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European ambitions to formulate a common energy
policy based on competition and diversification of
the sources of EU energy imports. The “third energy
package” introduced explicit demands for ownership
“unbundling,” i.e., that Gazprom must divest itself of
its pipeline assets.
As Russia began to profit from the rapid increase
in earnings from hydrocarbon exports, another and
more academically slanted issue came to the fore:
“Dutch disease” or a possible “resource curse.” The
“Dutch disease” is a standard term in economics, once
coined by The Economist to describe the consequences
for the Dutch economy of opening up the Groeningen
gas field in the North Sea. In short, it says that a rapid
rise in commodity exports causes upward pressure on
the exchange rate, which in turn stimulates imports
and makes life harder for noncommodity exporters.
As domestic resources are drawn into the commodity
sector, other sectors suffer compounded damage, and
the final outcome will be a seriously warped economic
structure. The Netherlands in the end did not fall prey
to this disease, nor are there any signs that Russia has
suffered more than mild symptoms of the same.
A more complex set of consequences of the broader
“resource curse” hold that economies with a dominant
resource sector will tend to be less democratic and
will suffer lower rates of growth than more diversified economies. The latter are features that we shall return to, in a qualified form, in our concluding discussion. First, however, we shall round off the portrayal
of Moscow as hostage to its own energy complex by
looking at the question of sustainability. Again, this
shall be focused more on gas than on oil.
As the Russian economy emerged out of the global
financial crisis, the reasons why gas is so important
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were made plain. It is true that recovery was greatly
assisted by a rise in the price of oil. The annual average price of Urals crude, received from non-CIS states,
peaked at $95.27 in 2008. During the crisis year 2009,
it dropped by 40 percent to $57.47. It then began to
rise to $76.24 in 2010 and $107.30 in 2011.58 With some
delay, this also fed into rising prices for gas.
The problem for Moscow is that relying on a steady
growth in prices will be fraught with danger. There
will come a point where the price grows so high that
it triggers another global recession, the implication of
which would be another massive “correction” for Russia. Sustainability must be sought in increased output
and in making more room for export by promoting
domestic energy efficiency. Neither presently offers
much inspiration.
The Russian oil sector is stagnating, and its reserves are being depleted. Its glory days were associated with the discovery of a number of supergiant
fields in Western Siberia, such as the Samotlor, all of
which have long since passed their peak. It is true that
the post-crisis years have seen further expansion in
Russian oil production. In 2009, it rose to 10.04 million bpd. This allowed Russia to actually bypass Saudi
Arabia, which had cut back its production from 10.84
to 9.89 million bpd. But in 2010 and 2011, Russian production leveled off at about 10.3 million bpd.59
The substantial additions to output that were recorded during Putin’s first two terms were chiefly
due to better management of existing fields. That low
hanging fruit has now been plucked, and exploration
for new fields will take place in less accessible and geologically less favorable areas. When announcements
are made of new record levels having been reached,
the added volumes are measured not in millions, but
rather in tens of thousands of bpd.
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At the end of 2009, the total proven reserves of oil in
the Russian Federation were 74.2 billion barrels, or 5.6
percent of the global total. The reserves-to-production
ratio, which defines the number of years the remaining reserves will last at current levels of production,
was no more than 20.3 years. In comparison, the total
proven reserves for Saudi Arabia stood at 264.6 billion barrels, and its reserves-to-production ratio was
74.6 years.60 The much publicized fact that Russia has
overtaken Saudi Arabia as the largest producer in the
world must be viewed against this background.
Natural gas offers a completely different and potentially more inspiring picture. At the end of 2009,
Russia had proven reserves of 44.38 trillion cubic
meters (tcm), or 23.7 percent of the global total. Its
reserves-to-production ratio was 84.1 years. Iran and
Qatar, by contrast, had proven reserves of, respectively, 29.61 tcm and 25.37 tcm. Russian production
of natural gas also far outstripped that of its rivals.
In 2009, Russia produced 527.5 billion cubic meters
(bcm). Iran was second, at 131.2 bcm, and Qatar was
third, at 89.3 bcm.61
The problem here is that despite, or perhaps due
to, its dominant position, Gazprom has not been managing its reserves very well. Its output over the past
decade has been essentially flat. In 2001, it produced
512.0 bcm of gas (excluding gas condensate). In 2006,
output had risen to 556.0 bcm; but during the crisis
year 2009, it fell back to 461.5 bcm. In 2010, it recovered to 508.6 bcm.62 Estimates for 2011 show a further
rise to 513.2 bcm, which is about the same as in 2001.63
Part of the reason is that Gazprom has an equally
poor track record in exploration. It has long depended
on a handful of supergiant fields in Western Siberia,
all of which have long since passed their peak. It has
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also been slow in developing existing finds, such as
the giant offshore Shtokman field and the Kovytka
field in Eastern Siberia that it wrested from TNK-BP
in 2007 and then placed on hold. Pressure from the
Kremlin has caused the company to step up its exploration efforts, and 2011 saw a record 686.4 bcm gas
reserve increment.64 But there is much past neglect to
make up.
Gazprom’s legal monopoly on exports, and its
control over the country’s huge “Unified Gas Supply
System,” has also been holding back more efficient
independent producers such as Itera and Novatek.
Again, pressure from the Kremlin is forcing change.
Gazprom was slapped with a major tax increase in
2011, and parts of its assets have been taken over by
the independents. The hands of “friends of Putin”
have clearly been at work behind the scenes.65
But by far the greatest challenge both to Gazprom and to Russia is the arrival of “unconventional
gas,” notably shale gas, which has caused a complete
change of scenes. In November 2011, the International
Energy Association (IEA) prophesied that we may
now be entering a “Golden Age of Gas.” Under this
scenario, gas demand grows by 2 percent a year between 2009 and 2035. Even in a less upbeat scenario,
the IEA sees annual gas demand rise by 1.7 percent, or
by 55 percent for the period as a whole.66 In its latest
Energy Outlook, BP similarly anticipates that by 2030,
gas may have come to rival coal and oil as a primary
energy source.67 Since gas is cleaner than other fossil
fuels, this is positive news for the environment, and it
should be positive news for Moscow. But is this really
the case?
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At the end of 2009, the United States had no more
than 6.93 trillion centimeters (cm) in proven reserves
of natural gas. But in that same year, it still bypassed
Russia to become the largest gas producer in the
world, with an output of 593.4 bcm.68 While Moscow
could delight in having replaced Saudi Arabia as the
largest oil producer in the world, it had to accept being
bypassed by the United States as the largest gas producer in the world. In 2010, U.S. output rose further,
to reach 611 bcm, compared to 589.9 bcm for Russia.69
Both Gazprom and the Kremlin are poorly positioned to respond to this new challenge. The Russian understanding of energy security has long been
marked by a perceived need to control energy flows
and to lock in its customers. This has generated an obsession with pipeline construction, to the detriment of
investment in LNG. Russia’s first terminal for LNG was
built by Shell on Sakhalin and came on line in 2009. It
was long thought that the supergiant Shtokman field
had been earmarked for LNG, to be transported to the
United States. But now Gazprom has wrested control
over Sakhalin from Shell, and Shtokman no longer is
destined for LNG.
Gazprom may have thought that LNG could be
safely ignored. It is expensive and does not offer
control to the extent that pipelines do. The shale gas
revolution, or simply the “shale gale,” changed all
that. Following years of massive investment by Qatar, in particular in export terminals for LNG, and by
the United States in import terminals for the same, the
United States suddenly was no longer in need of imported gas. With its import terminals standing idle,
LNG was instead rerouted to Europe, where a gas glut
emerged. Gazprom suffered doubly, both from a loss
of market shares to the cheaper LNG and from having
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to agree to demands from its customers that oil-price
linkage must give way to spot-market pricing.
Although the Kremlin remains obsessed with
building pipelines, the wisdom of this policy is coming under serious doubt. Its aggressive pipeline diplomacy has already antagonized China, which may no
longer have much interest in piped Russian gas, and
it has caused a scramble by other actors ranging from
China to Turkey and the EU to build rival pipelines
that bypass Russia. If the combination of LNG and
exploration for shale gas resources in other places, including Poland, Ukraine, and China, should lead to
the emergence of a global market for gas, then Russia
will be faced with a whole new ball game, one where
it will no longer be the unquestioned lead player.
The EU and other outside observers have long
been harping on the need for diversification of the
Russian economy. There is presently very little in the
Russian economy that is worth sinking serious money
and effort into, outside the energy complex. But this
does not mean that Russia should rest content with
pumping and piping.
The way forward should proceed via a wager on
high-tech development inside the energy sector. Russian operators should invest heavily in acquiring advanced drilling technology that may unlock offshore
riches in the Arctic. They should invest in mastering
LNG and thus be in position for the arrival of a global
market for gas. They should be thinking seriously
about unconventional gas. But none of this is high on
the agenda.
Nor do we see any serious efforts to promote efficiency and conservation in domestic energy use,
which could make room for expanded exports even at
constant levels of production. A case in point is hybrid
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technology and fuel-efficient cars. China is investing
heavily in high-tech battery development for electrical cars; Russia is not. Also, huge amounts of gas are
being flared by Russian operators every year simply
due to poor coordination between oil and gas producers. According to a report from the World Bank, the
amount flared in 2008 was 40 bcm, causing losses to
the state of $13 billion and exceeding the total volume
of gas flared by Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
and Indonesia combined.70
In conclusion, Russian energy policy would seem
to leave quite some room for improvement. Retaining
our understanding of energy as critical to the future
development of Russia, let us look at how a “Russian
curse” is hanging over the prospects for serious reform to be undertaken under Putin 2.0.
THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC REFORM
The main question for the future concerns not only
what needs to be done, but also and more importantly
what can be realistically expected to be done. The
answer to the former part of the question has been
so often repeated that it has taken on an air of mere
cliché. The core of the problem is that fixed capital
investment is way too low, and the reason given, as
indicated previously, is that the investment climate is
simply abysmal. Unless there is a change for the better, investors will not commit their money, and enterprises will stand little to no chance of succeeding in
the global marketplace. Russia will then be reduced to
the ignominious role of a raw materials appendix to
the more developed economies, notably so to China.
There are eminent grounds for such worry. The
times when export of raw materials could serve as a
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driver for economic growth are long gone. The same
can be said for the classic belief that the mere presence
of a development gap in relation to the more highly
industrialized economies could serve to drive catchup growth. If Russia is to achieve true integration into
the global economy, its rulers need to realize that sustainable economic growth and technological progress
must be driven by endogenous factors. A whole set
of what Mancur Olson once referred to as “marketaugmenting” institutions must be put into place and
be secured.71 These include not only credible enforcement of contracts and property rights, but also incentives for human capital development.
The main reason why both the United States and
the EU have good reasons indeed to worry about competition from countries like China and India lies in an
ongoing narrowing of the educational gap. European
governments in particular have long cherished a belief
that European economies may continue thriving in
the face of competition from low cost manufacturing
countries, simply because of the superiority of their
human capital. There is a strong element of denial
here. Following decades of heavy human capital investment in India, China, and elsewhere, it is becoming increasingly debatable to what extent European
knowledge-intensive production may be kept safe
from outside competition. As President Putin moves
back into his old digs inside the Kremlin, he needs to
ponder this trend. What seems threatening to the Europeans should be simply frightening to Russia.
The magnitude of the challenge that lies before Putin 2.0 may be brought home via a comparison of the
respective growth records of Russia and China. Over
the nearly 2 decades from 1989 until 2007, the former
being the last year of positive economic growth in the
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Russia recorded
about zero average annual growth. The high rates of
growth that made so much media noise during Putin
1.0 actually achieved little more than make up for the
hyperdepression during the Yeltsin era. In sharp contrast, China had meanwhile been chalking up close to
10 percent annual growth since 1978.
The most obvious reason behind this stark difference in performance is that investment intensity in
the respective cases has been so very different. As we
have noted, China invests well over 40 percent of GDP
and Russia less than half of that. The core reason why
fixed capital investment in Russia remains so low may
be explained by the frequent reference to the country’s appalling investment climate, which, in turn, is
little more than shorthand for the presence of massive corruption. Perhaps the most discouraging lesson
from the 4 years of the Medvedev presidency is that,
despite much talk about campaigns to root out corruption, this scourge has actually gotten worse, even
much worse.
Towards the end of January 2012, the Russian Interior Ministry’s economic security department reported
that the size of the average bribe in Russia had more
than tripled in 2011: “The size of the average bribe
and commercial payoff in reported crimes increased
more than 250 percent to 236,000 rubles ($7,866).”72 A
couple of weeks later, Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev told a Ministry board meeting that “The average size of a bribe and commercial palm greasing
in identified crimes almost quadrupled and reached
236,000 rubles.”73
At about the same time, the Russian Central Bank
reported that net private sector capital outflow for
2011 had reached $84.2 billion. This must have come
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as something of a shock to the Kremlin, which in July
had predicted capital outflow for the year as a whole
at $35 billion. Capital flight had peaked at $133.7 billion in 2008, when the global financial crisis erupted,
and dropped to $56.1 billion in 2009, when Russia was
coming out of the crisis. In 2010, it had been reduced
further, to $33.6 billion, and hopes had been that 2011
would stay at about the same level.74
The sharp deterioration provided a clear indication of the sensitivity of investors to political uncertainty. Close to half of the total outflow for 2011, or
$37.8 billion, left in the fourth quarter, following the
announcement that Putin would return to the Kremlin.75 The outflow continued in the new year, with $35
billion leaving in the first quarter and an additional
$8 billion in April.76 Although the Russian economy
is fundamentally very healthy, with positive growth
and an insignificant debt burden, markets clearly remain wary of political risk.
Compared to Russia’s GDP of close to $1.5 trillion, the numbers, as such, are not very large. It may
be argued that capital outflow is positive in the sense
of relieving inflationary pressures. But if the Russian
current account should turn negative in 2013, as many
expect, then something will have to be done in earnest
to ensure that capital remains and is invested within
the country. The question is what should be done.
The most immediate needs for action are felt in the
realm of fiscal policy. Over the short term, a policy
of cautious borrowing, careful spending cuts, and
increased taxes may serve to postpone an inevitable
return to fiscal prudence. But all are fraught with danger. Given Russia’s low ratio of debt to GDP, markets
will be only too happy to lend even substantial sums.
But a return to mounting debt will also bring increased
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political dependence, which is clearly not to Putin’s
liking. Spending cuts would also be welcomed by
markets but carry the risk of antagonizing important
groups that voted for Putin, who may need their support again before too long. Increasing taxes is clearly
in the cards, especially given what Putin has said
about a pending “tax maneuver.”77 As noted earlier,
Gazprom has already been targeted, and more may
follow for the energy sector at large. Yet, raised taxes
carry the risk of choking off badly needed growth and
must hence be approached with caution.
While undoubtedly important, the question of
getting Russia’s fiscal house in order is only part of
the greater picture. If more money is going to be invested in the Russian economy, by Russians as well
as by outside investors, and if entrepreneurial young
Russians are to remain in their native country, serious
measures need to be taken to achieve improved governance. This is where we need to return to Olson’s
call for “market-augmenting” government and to ask
what it would take for serious change to result.
The good news from an institutional perspective
is that the recent wave of protests from below has created yet another window of opportunity. Important
elements of civil society have openly emerged, emboldened by new means of communication that are
entailed in various social media. The old social contract between Putin and the emerging middle class
has broken down, and demands for formal changes in
the rules of the game are being met. The core question
concerns whether this may be viewed as the beginning of successful collective action, demanding public
goods that go beyond material self-enrichment. The
answer is not a promising one.
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As so many have already pointed out, the opposition is fragmented. It lacks a both a common cause and
a common leader. The remnants of the liberal movement from the Yeltsin era—people like Boris Nemtsov
and Grigory Yavlinsky—no longer have the credibility needed. There is a strong risk that when, and if,
truly charismatic leaders emerge, they will be driven
by a strongly nationalist message. It is true that demands for change in a liberal direction have emerged
and will have to be met by the regime. While this is
necessary for true change in the nature of the game to
result, it is clearly not also sufficient.
Belkovsky may well be right in his claim that we
are at the beginning of a new “perestroika,” but we
should not forget how the old one ended. The main
message of institutional analysis is that changes in
the formal rules will be successful only when backed
up by a corresponding transformation of informal
norms—and of enforcement mechanisms. The latter is
crucial. The core of the challenge to prospective Russian reformers remains linked to improving economic
governance, which in essence boils down to ensuring that there is credible enforcement of the rules of
the game.
An important part of the reason the track record
to date has been so poor may go back to the beliefs
of the early reformers in the role of deregulation as a
panacea that would bring about a rapid transition to a
high-growth market economy. By focusing so one-sidedly on government failure, on getting the “grabbing
hand of government” into the “velvet glove of privatization,” the reformers blinded themselves to the fact
that inattention to the broader challenges of sweeping
institutional transformation would produce serious
cases of market failure. In the absence of a government

111

that may credibly commit to upholding contracts and
property rights, it will make little sense to even talk
about “market economy.” Self-interest seeking, which
is the core of the market mechanism, will then be decidedly short-term, often value detracting rather than
value adding, and, on the whole, detrimental rather
than supportive of the common good.
The persistent failure of the Russian government to
appear as a credible third-party enforcer of contracts
and of property rights is deeply rooted in Russian
tradition. There is no predetermination here, indicating that this will always have to remain the case. But
the prominent role of the country’s energy complex
has served to activate rather than phase out deeply
ingrained patterns of behaviour.
In a high-performance market economy, the
overwhelming share of all transactions will crucially
depend on impartial enforcement of contracts and
property rights. In the Russian economy, transactions
within the energy complex, and within the raw materials sector more generally, have assumed a clearly
hierarchical nature, where enforcement is informal
and basically devoid of transparency. What is known
in Russia as “authoritarian market economy” has
thus evolved into little demand for accountability in
government, or indeed for the rule of law.
A central feature of governance in this “market”
economy rests in its inability to actually enforce what
it dictates. The true test of economic authoritarianism
lies in whether the rulers are able to produce by command from above what liberal market forces produce
by horizontal coordination. In this crucial test, the Putin regime has proven to be woefully inadequate, and
for good reason.
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In a political culture where the bureaucracy has
wide latitude to obstruct and evade any and all types
of proposals for change that go against its own vested interests, the only serious impetus for change can
come from heavy government priority and attention.
Since the government is not able to credibly maintain
more than one priority at the time, the overwhelming focus on the energy complex by the government
has entailed a complete lack of attention to other and
arguably more important tasks.
The Putin regime has surely been quite happy with
its rapid accumulation of wealth from hydrocarbon
exports. It may have derived even greater satisfaction
from the sense of power and prestige that has been
associated with its status as an emerging “energy superpower.” But these achievements have not come
without a price.
The main conclusion to be drawn here is that pervasive corruption has assumed the role of a veritable
linchpin for the system of power. Despite all the authoritarian rhetoric, Russia is not ruled by a strong
man, or even by a strong regime. It is ruled by a
conglomerate of rent seekers, whose members place
short-term personal enrichment above any form of
longer-term interest of the state. In a long-term Russian perspective, this is something essentially new,
and it may turn out to be deeply destructive.
The role model for the “vertical of power” that
Putin has been so fond of was housed in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It ensured that
commands from the center would be acted upon and
prevented corruption from developing into a serious
threat against the main priorities of the system. The
“party of power” that Putin built is none of this. In
contrast to the CPSU, which was feared by all, “Unit-
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ed Russia” has been subjected to so much public ridicule that, in the end, it had to be kept out of Putin’s
presidential election campaign. The very absurdity of the thought of publicly branding the CPSU as
a “party of crooks and thieves,” and getting away
with it, may serve to drive the message home. Fake
authoritarianism will, in the end, come up short, as
will all substitutes.78
The essence of the Kremlin conglomerate is that
it may be kept together only for as long as the appointed rent manager succeeds in maintaining the
balance among and within the predatory elites. This
is where we arrive at what some have referred to as
a “Russian curse.” The role of the country’s energy
complex has not been to introduce a “resource curse.”
The problems of Russian authoritarianism, corruption, and poor economic governance were well entrenched long before the arrival of the hydrocarbon
bonanza. It would also seem hard to argue that Russia
today is poorer than it would have been without its
energy riches.
The reason the hydrocarbon wealth may yet be
viewed as a nemesis of sorts is that the immense
riches that have been up for grabs have not only aggravated the inherent forces of greed but promoted
rent-seeking behavior that is often value detracting.
In important ways, it has also constrained the regime.
Despite the low rate of domestic investment and the
high rate of capital outflow, the Russian government
cannot close borders or even restrict capital flows.
This would cause a rebellion within the elite. Despite
the sheer size of energy incomes that are diverted into
private pockets, the Russian government is equally
unable to enforce the state interest in cracking down
on corruption. In these senses, the regime is arguably
more fragile today than ever before.
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The ills are well known, and continued harping on
what should be done in terms of formal changes in
the rules of the game will be of little value. Some of
these changes may indeed be introduced, but likely
to little avail. A serious economic improvement will
require a new agreement between the country’s ruling
and entrepreneurial elites, and that is presently not in
the cards. Although the main demand during the big
Moscow rallies was for honest elections, what really
galvanized the opposition was anger over the brazen
way in which the elites have been feathering their own
nests. But meeting the call for a serious crackdown
on corruption would entail a head-on confrontation,
which could trigger a hostile takeover of power.
Returning to the question of what likely will be
done, we may, in consequence, not realistically expect
that there will be much change at all beyond cosmetic
redesign. For as long as the price of oil remains high,
or even very high, and for as long as the “shale gale”
does not rise in force to sweep aside Gazprom, then
the Kremlin conglomerate may be kept alive and well.
The price to the Russian economy will be measured
in increasing “primitivization” and marginalization
from global markets. Even the hitherto so important
production and export of armaments will soon peak
and be eclipsed by other countries, again notably so
by China.
Perhaps this is where we may view at least a ray
of hope for change. If key members of the elite begin
to worry that their own sources of wealth and revenue are under threat, then demands for change may
perhaps emerge from within. It was in this light that
some preferred to view the presidential candidacy
of Mikhail Prokhorov—as a way of championing the
case for better governance without radically altering
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the configuration of power. China may perhaps serve
as a role model here.
The key to the economic successes of China lies in
having found a way of combining an expanded role for
the market with retaining a pervasive role for the state.
Corruption in China is in every bit as deeply rooted in
history as it is in Russia, and it is certainly not to be
taken lightly. Yet, the Chinese form of cohabitation between party, state, and private entrepreneurship has
clearly prevented corruption and predatory instincts
from eroding the prospects for economic growth and
technological change. While self-enrichment has been
allowed, the state has kept the predators in line and
made sure that the common good of the country’s economic development is kept in focus. Rent seeking on
the whole has been successfully combined with value
adding rather than value detracting behavior.
The pronounced Russian ideology of neoliberal
deregulation and hard core individualism has been
the very opposite of the Chinese way. By allowing a
free rein for the predators, it has sacrificed the interests of the state and placed the economic future of the
country in jeopardy. The highly short-term nature of
the games that are played in Russia, and the essential
lack of cohesion both within and among different segments of the elites, combine to lock the Russian economy into a downward spiral. The fundamental lack of
security that so clearly marks the regime is manifested
not only in reckless fiscal spending but also in a fear of
embarking on any form of much-needed change that
might trigger counter reactions.
Perhaps the more business oriented members of
the ruling elite will, indeed, come to a realization that
even their own revenue streams may soon come under
threat. Perhaps this will cause them to lobby for action
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to be taken, and perhaps this may result in a working
cohabitation of private interest in self-enrichment with
the state or collective interest in value-added longerterm sustainability. But it will all depend crucially on
Putin’s acquiescence, and there is little to indicate that
he is contemplating anything but to stay the course
and to hope for continued life support from world
energy demand.
If it does not happen, then the real crunch will
come when and if the price of oil takes another steep
nosedive. This time round, the magnitude of the fall
would be far greater than in 2008-09. There would
be little to no reserves available and consequently no
room for bailouts from the Russian state. The result
would be a scramble for safe havens, to save whatever personal assets can still be kept out of the hands
of creditors. With the elites in serious turmoil, this
could be the trigger for yet another “time of trouble,”
at the other end of which we would find a hard core
nationalist revival.
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CHAPTER 4
AUTHORITARIANISM AND MODERNIZATION
IN RUSSIA: IS RUSSIA KA-PUTIN?
Harley Balzer
Russia’s leaders have repeatedly proclaimed the
importance of modernizing the nation’s economy and
stimulating innovation. Yet, despite a dozen years of
laudable rhetoric and, more recently, significant increases in spending for education and science, Russia’s
economy still overwhelmingly depends on commodity exports. While other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India,
and China) countries have introduced global brands
reflecting their growing participation in the global
knowledge economy, Russia’s global brands are in the
natural resources sector. The Soviet Union’s highly
uneven achievements in education, science, and technology are being dissipated, and it will be exceptionally difficult to reverse the decline. Intensifying global
competition in education and science means that Russia’s academic community will have to exert a tremendous effort merely to avoid falling further behind.
Invoking the reminder that “We launched Sputnik”
rings quite hollow after more than 6 decades.
Inside Russia, blame for the decline in education and science is placed squarely on the chaos of
the 1990s, inadequate funding from the government,
and the difficulty of reforming the Soviet system.
The achievements of the Yeltsin era—a modest shift
to competitive grant funding, programs to integrate
higher education and research, and far greater freedom to travel and interact with foreign colleagues—
are dismissed as insignificant.
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The argument here is that the problems are due far
more to political failures and corruption that reinforce
the intransigence and self-interest of Russia’s epistemic communities than to the Soviet legacy or the difficulties of the transition. Comparison with China and
with the former communist countries of Central Europe undermines the Soviet legacy argument: Having
begun with a nearly identical system—in the 1950s,
the Chinese copied the Soviet Union’s education and
science institutions quite closely. Yet in just 3 decades,
the Chinese have overtaken Germany and Japan to
rank second to the United States in publishing articles
in international peer-reviewed scientific journals.
Russian scientists in 2010 published about the same
number of articles in international journals as they did
in 1990. China’s experience also demonstrates the important effects of openness and internationalization.
Chinese who have spent considerable time abroad
and then return to China have begun to exert a positive influence on the nation’s scientific community,
demanding international standards and competition
in hiring, promotion, and publishing. In Russia, resistance to internationalization remains fierce.
The organizer of the conference asked us to address three questions: What must be done? What
are the obstacles? What will be done, and with what
consequences?
The overwhelming priority among a plethora of
things that must be done is to diversify the economy.
After 12 years of the Vladimir Putin-Dmitry Medvedev tandem, Russia’s economy depends more on
hydrocarbons that it did in 1999. Russia now needs a
price of somewhere between $110 and $130 per barrel
of oil to balance its budget.1 If the price of oil were to
drop to $80 per barrel, the Reserve Fund would last
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1 year. Diversifying the economy requires changes to
the political system (incentives and term limits), reforming educational institutions and research organizations to promote more competition and greater
internationalization, and changing the incentive structure for epistemic communities in ways that promote
greater competition and internationalization.
The most serious obstacles are corruption and
self-interest in the political system, educational and
research institutions, and Russia’s epistemic communities. Change is almost always demonic, and professionals who achieved secure careers before 1991 have
little desire to alter the basic elements of their model.
Many of those who wished to live under a different
system have left the country. The Chinese experience,
and that of most Central European countries, demonstrates that reorienting a Soviet-style system is challenging but not impossible. Russia demonstrates that
unless political leaders alter the incentive structures,
epistemic communities will continue to do what they
are used to doing.
The record of the past 12 years suggests that not
much will be done to impose significant reforms on the
system but that an enormous amount of money will
be spent in the name of reform. Much of this money
will be stolen or wasted. Creative people will continue
to leave Russia to work elsewhere. Russia will continue to decline as a center of education and research
and development (R&D). There will be some notable
exceptions, but, overall, the picture is bleak.
This chapter discusses of some of the important differences between the authoritarian regimes in China
and Russia. It then turns to the knowledge economy
prospects of both countries, focusing on higher education, scientific research, and innovation. The conclu-
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sion contrasts Chinese accomplishments in education
and science with the continuing decline in Russia.
Even if Putin’s return as President produces meaningful change in the Russian performance, intense global
competition means that modest improvements will
not alter Russia’s relative position. The changes that
are most needed—competition, internationalization,
and integration—will require both political change
and reorientation of Russia’s epistemic communities.
AUTHORITARIANISMS
While Russia and China both remain authoritarian
regimes, the character of the authoritarianism differs
significantly. Russia’s system is highly personalized,
with Putin now occupying the sort of position Deng
Xiaoping achieved in China in the 1980s and early
1990s. While Deng never codified his status with a corresponding title, Putin has been dubbed Russia’s “national leader.” Neither system is transparent, but the
Chinese system obscures how decisions are reached
among a collective leadership,2 while Russia’s system
obscures how the top leader determines policy.3
The political science community has generated a
large body of work on authoritarianism and recently
on “upgrading” authoritarianism. The two major conclusions from comparative studies of authoritarian regimes are that 1) single-party regimes perform better
and last longer when well institutionalized; and 2) a
unified opposition is more likely to defeat incumbents
in an electoral democracy.4 Neither finding is a surprise. But these findings do help explain why incumbents devote significant resources to co-opting a “loyal
opposition” and fostering conflict among opponents.5
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The literature on “authoritarian upgrading” examines in detail the various ways nondemocratic regimes have sought to perpetuate their rule. Much of
this literature has been generated by scholars focusing
on the Middle East and North Africa,6 but scholars of
China have made significant contributions,7 as have
analysts examining other regions.8 The menu of policies adopted by these regimes includes:
• containing or crowding out civil society,9
• managing political contestation,
• selective economic reforms,
•
controlling new media and communication
technology
•diversifying international linkages, in particular
relying on China as both a model and patron,
that provide an alternative to Europe, America,
or international financial institutions that impose
various forms of conditionality.
A paired comparison10 of Russia and China allows
us to examine differences in authoritarian regimes
more closely. The comparison is particularly valuable because 1) China modeled so much of its original
political and economic system on Soviet institutions;
and 2) China is now performing better in the political
realm, in economic development, and in education,
R&D, and innovation. China’s epistemic communities
are integrating with their international peers to a far
greater extent than those in Russia.11
Relative economic performance can be seen in
a comparison of economic output growth in the
past 5 years (see Table 4-1):
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2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 (projected)

Russia
5.6
-9.0
3.6
3.4
3.5

China
9.6
8.7
10.0
9.7
7.5

Table 4-1. Economic Output Growth.
China has conducted a major evaluation of the
causes of Soviet implosion and examined authoritarian regimes elsewhere.12 This stunning example
of a regime learning how to improve its authoritarian institutions has resulted in significant changes,
including:
•	A form of “market-preserving federalism that
has allowed enormous leeway for (at least
some) regions to find their own paths to successful economic development.13
•	Term and age limits constraining how long political leaders may serve.
•	
Expansion and improvements in education,
with a major emphasis on internationalization.14 When the new Central Committee is
announced in 2012, some 20 percent of the
members will have foreign higher education
credentials (overwhelmingly advanced degrees, though this will change over time to increase the proportion with foreign bachelor of
arts degrees.)15
•	Merit plays growing role in cadre selection. It is
not the sole criterion, and family and guanxi relationships continue to be extremely important.
But the Chinese appear to have established a
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“floor” of basic competence for officials, with
intense competition forcing them to produce
results.16
•	
Party discipline continues to play a role,
providing a way to keep corruption within a
poorly defined but nevertheless enforced set of
limits.17
•	Finally, the leadership is not only aware of the
major challenges facing the regime (regional
and sectoral economic imbalances, demography, information society, and corruption), but
has been adopting specific measures to confront
these difficulties. The process has been slow
and uneven, with tremendous resistance from
those reaping benefits from the existing system.
Much will depend on the willingness of the
new leadership to push for needed changes.18
In contrast, Russia’s leaders have done little to institutionalize the post-Boris Yeltsin system. Rather,
Putin (like his Soviet and Tsarist forebears) seems to
have determined that institutional strictures impose
limits on his political power. While abiding by the letter of Russia’s laws, he rejects their spirit. The system
is reminiscent of Fyodor Dostoyevskii’s Grand Inquisitor dream sequence, which suggested that people
would always exchange freedom for bread, miracle,
mystery, and authority. It is codified in Vladislav
Surkov’s (Putin’s so-called grey cardinal and the architect of much of the regime’s ideology and domestic
policy in 2000-08) writings about “sovereign democracy.” Those writings state that Russia must never
be in a position where other countries could dictate
what sort of political, social, or economic system the
country would have.19 Hence, any time sovereignty is
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limited, the country could not possibly be a democracy. One of many major problems with the concept of
sovereign democracy is that it was developed with no
public input. It reflects one individual’s assessment of
what the country needs or wants.
Putin’s system may be described as increasingly
managed pluralism.20 In various realms, the government endeavors to keep up (technology and the Internet); crowd out (civil society); and blame “others”
(“democrats,” Yeltsin, the West). This approach came
close to failing during the 2011-12 election cycle and
is now undergoing some revision, mostly in the direction of legislative changes that limit freedoms,
changes in electoral laws that are designed to maintain the advantages enjoyed by the “party of power,”
new and repressive police measures and laws against
dissidents, and new controls over the media, including new media.
One way in which the relative success of Chinese
“upgrading” may be measured is by comparing the
perceived legitimacy of the two regimes. Both societies experience significant amounts of protest. But in
China, blame is focused overwhelmingly on local officials, NOT on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
or the regime. The Chinese version of authoritarian
upgrading has managed some degree of both capitalism and accountability without democracy. In contrast, Russia’s “power vertical” creates a situation
where it is nearly impossible to shift blame to others:
Moscow makes all the significant decisions and controls the distribution of rents. It is difficult to blame
others when the “national leader” is a self-proclaimed
control freak. The system produces rigidity but not
accountability.
Russia was the worst-performing member of the
G20 during the economic crisis after 2008. By 2011,
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the problems were clear, and more serious difficulties were avoided only by a modest (and perhaps
temporary) recovery in oil prices. Meanwhile, other
associated symptoms of decay are visibly manifesting
themselves:
• Food prices are rising.
• Agriculture is suffering.
•	The natural resource model of economic development is viewed as defunct.
•	The Putin-Medvedev “tandem” is considered
to have been just a show.
• There are tangible signs of real elite concern.21
However, it is not clear that differences among
Russia’s elites are genuine:
•	A popular joke in Moscow during Medvedev’s
Presidency was that each leader had a strong
team of advisors, that these advisors had both
personal and substantive differences of opinion, and that the differences could translate
into quite different policies. The one thing that
was not clear was to which team Medvedev
belonged.
•	The alleged difference of opinion between Putin and Medvedev over Libyan policy could
have been staged, allowing Russia to keep lines
open to both sides.
•	The tandem appears to have been designed to
appeal to different audiences both inside and
outside Russia: Medvedev to the educated and
the new middle class; Putin to nationalists and
blue collar workers. Medvedev developed a
good relationship with Obama; Putin focused
on the near abroad and China.
•	The difficulties and protests provoked some
splits in the elite, but serious questions remain
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regarding how independent “opposition” figures like Alexei Kudrin and Mikhail Prokhorov
really are.
It is evident that at least some portions of the elite
view Putin’s economic model as having reached a
dead end. The broader public has been less motivated
or mobilized, but even before the election campaign
began, the regime was subjected to increasing criticism
and satirized with growing sharpness. Corruption, in
particular, has been a target. Opposition blogger Aleksei Navalnyi’s characterization of United Russia as the
“Party of Thieves and Scoundrels” acquired a life of
its own. Groups within the elite generated a number
of reports critical of the political and economic system.
For example, Medvedev’s own think tank, INSOR, issued a report that, not surprisingly, called
for Medvedev to remain in the presidency. The Center for Strategic Development produced a document
covering many of the same concerns and ended by
invoking the need for a “third man” to assume the nation’s leadership. Vladimir Milov, Boris Nemtsov, and
Mikhail Kasyanov published a report called “Putin.
Corruption,” demanding change at the top. What is
striking about all of these critiques is that they focus
on personalities rather than institutions.22
Lilia Shevtsova is correct that only pressure from
below will force real change.23 But pressure from below alone is more likely to produce violent/revolutionary change. A peaceful transition to democracy requires a balance of supply and demand: pressure from
below must demand democracy, and some effective
portion of the elite must be willing to supply it. This is
why consolidated, as opposed to electoral or illiberal
democracy, remains the exception among political regimes. Michael McFaul got it badly wrong when he
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wrote about democrats creating democracies and authoritarians establishing authoritarian regimes.24 The
key is devising institutional structures that force even
“sham” democrats to continue to behave according to
democratic rules. This requires both an institutional
structure that precludes absolute power and an opposition willing to enforce the rules.
The Russian protests in late 2011 and early 2012
were a surprise to just about everyone. But there were
warnings that the population had become less complacent. Most observers missed or dismissed these warnings. This was easy to do when Putin’s regime consistently emphasized the absence of alternatives, and the
protests that occurred remained focused on specific
issues rather than more general political demands.
This changed on September 24, 2011, when Putin let
it be known that he was returning to the Presidency.
Even if he could claim that he would win an election
against any possible opponent (and, of course, serious
opponents were barred from becoming candidates),
the manner in which this was done made it clear that
a “selectorate” of one had taken the decision. To many
Russians, this was an insult. Putin’s behavior was illadvised, given the changes in Russia’s political landscape over the previous 8 years.
Studies of the 2003-04 election cycle generally have
emphasized the greater margin of victory for both
United Russia and Putin.25 United Russia did, indeed,
increase its majority in the Duma in 2003, and in March
2004, Putin won by a far more comfortable margin
than in 2000. But turnout declined when compared to
the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, and the vote “against all”
was notably greater in both December 2003 and March
2004.26 This induced the regime to change the electoral
rules, abolishing minimum turnout requirements and
removing the “against all” option from ballots.
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Monetization of social benefits produced protests in 80 of Russia’s then 89 regions during January to March 2005. Russian motorists staged protests
in Vladivostok over limits on auto imports. After a
speeding car carrying the governor of Altai rammed
another vehicle and killed the governor, the driver
of the car that was struck was put on trial, provoking protests in Altai and many other regions. Similar
incidents elsewhere of cars using official blue lights to
evade traffic jams and causing accidents generated the
“migalki” (blue bucket) protests, with people wearing
buckets on their heads.
In late-2010, protests in Samara, Irkutsk, and
Kaliningrad demanded removal of governors and
local governments. The protest in Kaliningrad by
“Spravedlivost’” on January 30, 2010, was the largest
public demonstration in Russia since 1991. In Moscow, Strategy 31 activists staged protests on the 31st
day of each month with a “31st” to protest violations
of Article 31 of the Russian Constitution guaranteeing
freedom of assembly.27
One of the most direct warnings about popular dissatisfaction came in two reports from Mikhail
Dmitriev’s Center for Strategic Research, the first in
March and the second in November 2011.28 Based on
focus groups, Dmitriev and his colleagues found significant resentment of both personalities and policies.
Dmitirev’s claims for the superiority of focus groups
over survey research are rejected by many behavioral
sociologists, and his team did not recruit focus groups
outside major cities. Nevertheless, he did sound an
important warning.
Survey data from the Levada Center also should
have provided a warning regarding any effort to manipulate the legislative elections. Its poll in August

136

of 2011 found that 64 percent of Russians wanted to
see “significant” or “complete” turnover in the Duma.
(See Figure 4-1.)

Remain essentially the
same as now
Significant turnover

Complete turnover

No response

Levada Center, August 2011

Figure 4-1. Percentages of Desired Turnover
in Russian DUMA.
Given the spread of dissatisfaction, it is legitimate
to ask why and how the regime has managed to remain
intact through the economic crisis that began in 2008.
Analysts have pointed to Putin’s popularity, oil rents,
and the overwhelming weight of regions and population groups that depend on the government’s redistribution policies. Natalia Zubarevich’s discussion of
multiple Russias has become extremely popular.29 My
concern with this analysis is that it treats regions and
population groups as monolithic, rather than exploring their diversity. Even in the company towns that
depend most on the government, some individuals
have expressed alternative opinions. Mayoral elections in four cities in early 2012 produced outcomes
that rejected the United Russia incumbents.30 Even if
many smaller towns are overwhelmingly pro-Putin
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and inclined to seek support from Moscow rather than
challenge the government, not everyone adheres to
this view. The Levada Center data showing that nearly two-thirds of Russians wanted to see “significant”
or “complete” turnover in the Duma should give us
pause in assuming that the overwhelming majority of
Russians accept the status quo.
A second prevalent myth is that protest is entirely rooted in economic conditions.31 This makes oil
prices the key to regime survival. This view, rooted
in Soviet-era materialism, ignores the impact of at
least four other factors: dignity, fatigue, ideology, and
specific policies.
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia not because
of bread riots or price shocks, but because Mohammed Bouazizi immolated himself after being humiliated by a female police officer. People who feel that
their basic dignity has been assaulted may, at times,
behave in ways that political scientists or sociologists
would consider irrational. Dignity is one of the crucial
common elements in both the Arab Spring and the
protests over Russia’s elections.
Fatigue with long-serving leaders is another important trigger. Hosni Mubarak lasted 3 decades before
Egyptians decided that they had had enough. Putin
was less fortunate: a significant share of the Russian
population did not welcome his return to the Kremlin. Ideology got a bad name from the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic’s (USSR) use and abuse of Marxism,
and liberalism suffered from the economic decline in
the 1990s. Nevertheless, human rights remain a powerful mobilizing force. Some Russians have learned
enough about the world to demand legality, an end to
corruption, and, in some cases, even democracy.
Russians across the country have shown a willingness to protest against specific policies. If leaders
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emerge who are able to connect these specific grievances to more general issues of the political system,
the chemistry could be combustive. Khimki, migalki,
l’goty, and other protests could ignite a wider fire. If
the case is made that each of these represents not an
isolated instance, but rather is the product of a system
that does not permit adequate societal input regarding important policy decisions, the system itself could
be called into question.
Epistemic Communities.
In addition to lack of leadership, an important reason why the local protests have not (yet?) generated
effective demands for change in the political system
involves the role of Russia’s epistemic communities.
While criticism and attention have focused on political
and economic policies and top-level leaders, many of
the most intractable problems in Russia involve professional groups and individual professionals that, for
reasons of self-interest and investment in Soviet practices, continue to reject genuine internationalization.
This can be seen in demography, education, science
and medicine, and innovation/R&D.32
Professional demographers have long warned
that Russia faces a serious population decline. Yet
Putin’s regime continues to rely on the projections of
critics of “Western” demography, who assert that the
government’s combination of propaganda and “maternity capital” payments has successfully reversed
Russia’s population decline.33 A more sober analysis
of the situation notes that the increase in births over
the past 5 years is due to an increase in the number of
women aged 20-29, the cohort most likely to have children. The maternity capital program appears to have
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encouraged women to have children sooner, to make
sure they can take advantage of the program before
economic conditions change, but has not had a significant impact on the total fertility rate (TFR), the indicator that is key to reversing population decline. In one
of his election campaign articles, Putin stated that his
regime would raise the TFR to 1.73 by 2015. It is not
clear just how this will be accomplished, and offering
a number to three decimal places raises eyebrows.
The majority of Russian professionals, or at least
their leadership, continue to adhere to belief systems
and incentive systems inherited from the Soviet era.
The result is a growing divorce from international
professional communities. It is not total separation.
Many Russian specialists keep up with global developments and collaborate with foreign colleagues. But
a significant share of the professionals prefer the comfort and apparent security of doing things the way
they have done them for decades. This is particularly
the case for leaders of “legacy” organizations carried
over from the Soviet era.
The consequences of Russia’s “thin” internationalization are apparent in education, science and technology, and innovation/R&D. The situation is thrown
into particularly stark relief if Russia’s performance
since 1991 is compared to China’s since 1978. In the
1950s, China adopted the Soviet systems of education, science, and technology almost completely, and
received significant assistance from the USSR in doing
so.34 If China, starting from a much lower base, has
succeeded in reorienting the components of its knowledge economy to become a major player in global science and education, while Russia continues to dissipate the Soviet legacy in education and science, this
suggests that policy, rather than the systemic legacy
or path dependency, is the key factor. The epistemic
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communities in both countries continue to play an important role in the policies that have been adopted.
Starting points of reform, rather than history, mentality, or institutions, may be the key factor explaining
the difference. China began “reform and openness”
following the disastrous decade of the Cultural Revolution. Epistemic communities were fragmented, with
many individuals “sent down” to the countryside.
Professional groups in China were not in a position
to assert claims to expertise when Deng initiated reform. In contrast, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced perestroika when the USSR could claim to be a co-equal
superpower. Soviet/Russian professionals believed
that their practices, knowledge base, and skills were
as good as (or better than) any in the world. Where
Chinese specialists sought to learn as much as possible from the developed countries, with the goal of
eventually learning enough to become leaders, many
Russian professionals felt that there was little the foreigners could teach them. Many who did value foreign
models have left the country, a trend Putin continues
to encourage. While the Chinese embraced globalization as a way to catch up and overtake the developed
countries, many Russians view globalization as an
American project designed to inhibit their development. The result is that China has internationalized in
stunning ways, while Russia has resisted international
integration in equally stunning ways.35
Education.
In creating a modern knowledge economy, Russia is stymied by myths about its Soviet past. All the
rhetoric about the “scientific-technical revolution”
obscured serious problems in education, science and
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technology, and innovation. In education, Soviet
achievements in a few fields produced complacency
rather than a sense that the world is highly competitive and requires constant effort just to avoid falling
further behind. Since the demise of the USSR, Russia
has become a world leader in the proportion of the
population enrolled in higher education. Unfortunately, the quality of that education remains uneven,
and the standards for awarding degrees have been
seriously compromised.36
Both Russia and China have significantly increased the number of students receiving higher education. Growth in China has been tremendous, though
starting from a much lower base. Russia now has a
larger share of its population receiving higher education than any other country in the world. Annual
admissions to higher education exceed the number of
high school graduates.37 However, about half of the
students are enrolled in correspondence divisions of
higher education institutions, and another 10 percent
are in evening divisions. Less than half study full time.
(See Table 4-2.)

1990
2008

Russia
2,824,500 (2 percent)
7,513,000 (5 percent)

1997
2006

China
1,000,000
5,500,000

Table 4-2. Higher Education Enrollments.
Russia has probably reached the peak of higher
education enrollments, given that the number of high
school graduates will decline each year until 2017.
China announced a target of 30,000,000 students to
be enrolled in higher education by 2010, though this
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figure undoubtedly includes secondary specialized as
well as higher education institutions.
Rapid expansion in any education system raises
questions of quality, and this is a serious concern in
both countries. One significant issue is that in both
systems, the number of faculty has not kept pace with
the increases in enrollments. As Table 4-3 shows, the
number of faculty has grown by 66 percent, while student enrollments have increased by 165 percent. (The
faculty data includes sovmetitelstvo, the practice of individuals teaching at more than one institution. This
was a common practice in Tsarist Russia, due to low
salaries. Stalin banned it. It returned after 1991, again
due to low salaries.)
Year

State

Private

1993-94

239,800

3,800

1995-96

240,200

13,000

2000-01

262,200

42,200

2005-06

322,100

65,200

2007-08

340,400

78,800

2008-09

341,100

63,400

2009-10

342,700

54,800

Source: Rossiia v tsifrakh, 2010.

Table 4-3. Russian Higher Education
Faculty Resources.
In both the Chinese and Russian systems, the response to concerns about quality and poor perfor143

mance in an environment of finite resources has been
to focus on a limited number of “elite” institutions.
China’s 211 program has identified 106 higher education institutions, with nine of them receiving top priority. In Russia, the government has chosen 29 research
universities through competitions and selected an additional 10 federal universities. The Research University project began with two pilot institutions, and the
government then conducted two open competitions,
selecting 27 more universities. The Federal University
program also began with two pilot projects, one in
Krasnoyarsk and one in the Southern Federal District.
The Russian government subsequently named an
additional six institutions. Moscow State University
and St. Petersburg State University have maintained
their special status, bringing the number of federal
universities to 10.38
The difference in the selection process for the two
types of institutions reflects an effort to balance competing priorities. In selecting the research universities,
quality was supposed to be the main consideration.
However, the author’s personal experience participating in several rounds of competitions for special status
and funding for universities indicates that it is nearly
impossible to eliminate the issue of regional distribution from consideration.39 The federal universities
were selected on the basis of regional needs. The absence of any competition, or even a requirement that
the institutions provide a plan for what they would
do differently with their new status, raises concerns
that reform is not on the agenda. Even if some administrators have thoughts about significant change, the
process of amalgamating several previously independent institutions with their own physical plant, faculty, administration, and traditions will occupy their
attention for several years.
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A great deal of money is being spent, but much of
it for construction, equipment, and other infrastructure. In Russia, this process rarely involves competitive bidding, and opportunities for corruption and
waste are widespread. Inefficiency in using the new
funding also derives from rigid bureaucratic controls
over how money is allocated and what it may be used
for. Often, funds are provided late in the fiscal year
but must be spent before the year’s end. In one case, a
rector of a university sent practically every member of
the university faculty on a business trip (komandirovka)
to use funds that arrived late in the calendar year. This
probably did more to help Aeroflot and Russian Railways than to improve higher education.
Among the most striking differences between Russian and Chinese higher education is the character of
internationalization. The Chinese have embraced educational globalization; Russia’s academic community
remains more wary. Russian concerns were clearly visible in discussions about the Bologna Process (a series
of ministerial meetings and agreements between European countries designed to ensure comparability in
the standards and quality of higher education qualifications) in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The rector of
Moscow University, Viktor Antonovich Sadovnichy,
initially stated that Russia had the best universities in
the world and therefore should eschew involvement
in Bologna. Liudmila Alekseevna Verbitskaia, rector
of St. Petersburg University, shared the evaluation of
Russia’s world leadership, but her interpretation of
its meaning was that Russia should participate in the
Bologna process in order to have maximum influence
over the project. Press accounts in the 2000s and several dozen personal interviews with university administrators suggest that Sadovnichy’s opinion is widely
shared, though he has altered his view over time.
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Results of the Chinese embracing internationalization, while the Russians remain hesitant, may be seen
in international rankings, treatment of faculty with
foreign degrees, and the role of returnees. Russian
higher education has nearly vanished from international rankings. In 2009, The Times of London included
five institutions from Hong Kong (ranked 24, 35, 46,
124, and 195) and six from mainland China (ranked
49, 52, 103, 153, 154, and 168) in its ranking of the
world’s top 200 higher education institutions. Russia
placed only two on the list, Moscow State University
(155) and St. Petersburg State University (168). After
The Times altered its criteria to accord less weight to
reputation beginning in 2010, Russian institutions
vanished from the top 200. In 2012, Moscow University had dropped into a tie with 25 other institutions at
276; St. Petersburg University was tied with 49 other
institutions at 351.40
One response has been for Russians to produce
their own rankings. A first effort in this direction produced much more satisfactory results for Russian institutions: Moscow and St. Petersburg ranked in the
top 100 (Moscow at 5); no Chinese institutions ranked
in the top 100; the second 100 included two Russian,
two Chinese, and two Hong Kong institutions. The
truly stunning data came in the ranking of numbers
300-430. Here, 45 Russian higher education institutions were included among the 130 on the list. Overall, the Russian ranking system included 52 Russian
institutions among the world’s top 430, or 12 percent.
These results reflect the criteria used for the rankings,
which included the number of specialties, number of
students, and number of alumni. Small, specialized, or
liberal arts institutions were clearly not going to rank
well in this system.
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The Russian government has announced plans to
establish an “official” ranking system, using its own
criteria. This fits a pattern of Russia reacting to globalization by insisting on different rules, rather than
endeavoring to mesh with the global trends. Scholars
at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations developed an alternative to the Davos rankings.
Russia’s Finance Ministry has its own criteria for identifying global financial centers. The Russian Academy
of Sciences insists on its own methodology for determining scientific productivity.
The Chinese, too, have begun to publish their own
rankings. In contrast to Russia, they downplay their
own institutions. While Moscow University ranked in
the top 100 higher education institutions in the Chinese Jiao Tong rankings, no Chinese institutions were
included. In interviews, Chinese academics have offered contradictory explanations for downplaying the
quality of Chinese higher education institutions. Some
have stated that it is a budget game, permitting administrators to demand more funds to raise the quality of
Chinese institutions. Others say that it is a combination of modesty and a desire to show results over a
longer period of time: if in 5-10 years their institutions
begin to rise in the Chinese global rankings, this will
be evidence of their good performance.41
Another measure of internationalization is the
number of foreign-trained faculty teaching at universities and institutes. Chinese higher education institutions welcome both Chinese and foreigners with postgraduate degrees from foreign institutions. In Russia,
it has been difficult to overcome a legacy of not recognizing foreign degrees. Russian rules prohibited
anyone from teaching for more than 3 years unless the
person earned a Russian credential (Kandidat or Doktor
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Nauk-DR. of Sciences). These rules have been relaxed
for scholars chosen in the two recent competitions for
“mega grants” at Russian universities, but resistance
to recognizing foreign degrees remains strong. It is
one of the intensely debated issues in Russia’s participation in the Bologna process.
A large number of students from both China and
Russia go abroad. Deng insisted that China had to allow students to go abroad, even if some of them would
never return. Despite consistently over-estimating the
proportion that would return, he did not waver from
the policy. Estimates of the number of Chinese who
went abroad for higher education vary, since many
paid their own way and were not involved in official
Chinese study abroad programs. Beginning around
2005, there was a shift from the dominant group being graduate students to a larger number of undergraduates, reflecting interest in foreign training and
the greater capacity of Chinese families to fund the
education.42
The majority of Chinese students who have studied abroad have not returned. Estimates suggest that
perhaps 20-30 percent have opted to work in China.
Even that relative small proportion of returnees had
exerted a significant impact on the Chinese education and research systems. The process has not been
free of problems. China has encountered conflicts between the “sea turtles” who go abroad and the “land
turtles” who remain in China.43 Yet a growing body
of evidence suggests that the returnees have exerted
a significant positive effect on Chinese institutional
development, standards, and internationalization.
Koen Jonkers describes a “virtuous circle” in the life
sciences,44 and Dan Brenitz and Michael Murphree
note positive contributions in the information technol-
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ogy (IT) sector (even if this has not yet generated new
product innovation).45
In Russia, the returnees have thus far exerted
little impact. A new program to offer mega grants to
about 200 leading Russian and international scholars
has conducted two rounds of competition and a third
round in 2012. Thus far, the program has made fewer
than 100 awards. For the first time, Russian higher
education institutions (VUZy) are allowing leading specialists to copy the model of China’s “swallows,” spending 4 months in Russia and the rest of
their time in their home countries. How much impact
these 200 scholars will be able to have remains an important open question. Once again, a large amount
of money is being spent with little guarantee of
measurable results.
Foreign student enrollments are another indication
of the degree of educational internationalization. Russia enrolls about 100,000 foreign students. About 40
percent come from former Soviet republics (half from
Kazakhstan), and another 40 percent from Asia (the
majority from China). China enrolls more than three
times as many foreign students, with the top sending
countries being South Korea, Japan, the United States,
Vietnam, and Thailand.
China is not only sending more students abroad,
but is also reaping greater benefits from those who
return. In 2001, neither Russia nor China ranked as a
major donor nation in the number of students studying abroad (defined by the Institute for International
Education as those on official programs that implied
eventual return to the home country). By 2006, China
was ranked 6th in the world in the number of students
studying abroad, with 6 percent of the total global
flow, behind Australia with 7 percent and Germany
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with 8 percent but ahead of Canada and Japan (both
with 4 percent). Russia continued to be absent from
the list of top sending nations. A growing number of
Russian young people studying abroad enroll directly
in foreign institutions, rather than participating in
official exchange programs.
The shift to mass tertiary education in Russia has
placed a growing burden on students. About twothirds of the students enrolled at state institutions now
pay tuition.46 Competition for the “budget” places that
offer free tuition and a stipend has become so thoroughly corrupted at some VUZy that parents question
whether it might be less expensive for their children
to enroll in the “commercial” division and pay the
tuition rather than spending even more money on tutors and side payments to gain a “budget” place (personal communications). While educational services
have become marketized, there is not yet much price
competition among VUZy.47 This may change in the
coming decade, as the number of potential applicants
continues to decline. The cost of tuition is increasing, due to inflation and also due to a formula that
ties the amount a VUZ may charge for tuition to the
amount spent on budget students. As the government
has increased the funding for state VUZy, this raises
the amount of spending per student and therefore the
price for those paying tuition. Greater monetization
inevitably generates more corruption and fraudulent
behavior. Data indicate that Russian families spend
even more on side payments for education than for
medical care.48
The new economics of higher education in Russia
is not sustainable. The demographic situation means
that VUZy will increasingly need to compete for students. Weaker institutions will have difficulty as the
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applicant pool shrinks. The key question is whether
all institutions will try to survive with a smaller enrollment, which means less funding from tuition, or
whether the number of institutions will contract.49
Decline in the education system, despite (or because of) the greater number of students presages continuing difficulties in science and technology (S&T),
and in R&D. These challenges, in turn, will make it
difficult for Russia to play a role in global systems of
production and innovation.
Science and Technology.
One of the most stunning changes of the past
2 decades has been the rapid and unexpected loss
of scientific capacity in Russia.50 The Soviet Union’s
achievements in science and technology may have
been overstated, but there is no question that, in some
fields, the USSR made major contributions to world
science.51 This has changed markedly since the 1980s.
In part, it reflects the disruptions and lack of funding
in the 1990s—the explanations that leaders of Russia’s
scientific community prefer to emphasize. But it also
stems from significant losses of personnel and a failure
to reorient the Soviet system to function in the global
knowledge economy competition that dominates education and S&T in the 21st century. The two factors
are related: an exodus of many of the best younger
scholars in the 1990s removed people who were both
the rising stars of Russian science and a major force for
greater international integration. Those who remained
in Russia were those who were less able to compete
in the global market for science talent or those who
genuinely preferred the Soviet system. Certainly not
all the talented scientists emigrated. But enough of
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the “best and the brightest” did depart to cede control
over science to researchers and administrators with
less interest in changing the system.
In the global competition in education and S&T,
Russia confronts many challenges that are similar to
other nations: these include the costs of mass tertiary
education, demands of the knowledge economy, and
constraints on available resources to fund competing
priorities. But Russia is also an outlier in important
ways: the demographic crisis; the continuing role of
the Academy of Sciences; bureaucratic obstacles; failure to confront fraud and corruption; and, most striking, resisting internationalization. In many of these areas, and particularly in resisting international norms,
epistemic communities play a crucial and often detrimental role. The combination of the Soviet knowledge base and self-interest (institutional, career, and
financial) induces many Russian scientists and science
administrators to resist a Russian version of “reform
and openness.”
Other former socialist countries have encountered
similar dilemmas. In Hungary, Poland, and other
Eastern members of the European Union (EU), the
Academies of Science continue to play a major and
sometimes disruptive role. But each of these countries
has managed to move toward a greater role in global
innovation processes.52 In China, the battle has been
long and difficult. But in most of the other former
communist countries, a combination of government
policy, professional self-interest, and international
influences have produced a shift to competition and
internationalization. In Russia, the process has been
halted and, in many places, reversed.
The data on Russian decline is overwhelming.
Whether in terms of peer-reviewed scientific publi-
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cations, number of researchers, number of advanced
degrees, patent filings, or the related realms of utility model and industrial design applications, Russia’s
performance has stagnated or declined since 1990.
China’s rankings have shot up to the point where China now ranks second to the United States in scientific
publications in international peer-reviewed journals.53
When presented with these data, the president of Russia’s Academy of Sciences responded by stating that
Russia publishes many good journals and suggested
foreign researchers should learn Russian so that they
could read this valuable literature (personal communication). In early 2012, Russian science officials announced that they were developing their own version
of a science citation index that would include the inhouse publications favored by Russian institutes and
the summaries of reports given at professional meetings (tezisy dokladov—Thesis Report).
Peer review, which increased in prevalence in the
1990s, has become less used and is not a factor in the
new index. (In 1993, when the author directed George
Soros’s International Science Foundation, several
rounds of grant competition based on peer review
were conducted. At the time, Boris Saltykov, Minister
of Science of the Russian Federation, mandated that
peer review would be the way to distribute any new
funds that became available to his Ministry. The Academy of Science has resisted the switch from administrative allocation to competition, and in the 2000s has
been successful at cutting back on peer-reviewed competitions as a way to award research support.)
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Innovation.
The weakening Russian capacity in education and
research is exacerbating a serious innovation deficit
inherited from the Soviet era. Despite incessant invocation of vnedrenie (innovation), the Soviet system
performed poorly in developing new technology. The
widely heralded success in launching Sputnik was,
we now know, neither a major technological breakthrough nor a result of a long-term state.54 Accounts
of Soviet technology demonstrate two important lessons. First, the military did perform better, but it accomplished this due to priority rather than overseeing a separate, more advanced R&D complex.55 Some
highly talented individuals did seek the rewards of
working for the Soviet military industrial complex;
other highly talented individuals consciously sought
to avoid the security restrictions and constraints military work involved, knowing that secrecy would cut
them off from their international colleagues. Second,
the Soviet Union did export technology, but what it
exported consisted overwhelmingly of basic instruments. In machine tools, for example, the USSR exported a much larger number of units than it imported, but the value of the imports far exceeded that of
the exports. Exports consisted of first and second generation basic metal cutting and grinding equipment;
imports were expensive, sophisticated, numericallycontrolled tools (e.g., the famous case of the Toshiba
machines and submarine propellers that allowed the
Soviets to manufacture quiet propellers).
Many now assert that Russia has switched from being one gigantic military industrial complex to being
a petrostate. Innovation in resource-producing countries is most successful when it begins in the natural
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resource sectors.56 While there is some evidence that
this is beginning to happen in a few Russian regions,
the government’s emphasis has been overwhelmingly
on the high-technology realms that Putin mistakenly
believes were the Soviet Union’s crown jewels.57 To
focus on IT, high technology, and nanotechnology in
a country that never achieved serial production of a
personal computer is a tall order.
The Soviet Union had three separate systems of
R&D: the Academy of Sciences, higher education,
and industrial facilities. There was little integration
among them. The industrial R&D system has largely vanished, as most enterprises either do not make
a profit or earn too little to be able to support R&D
activities. In data regarding spending on science, Russia does not rank badly in terms of government support (29th in world in share of gross domestic product
[GDP]), but Russian industry lags seriously in what
it contributes. In Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, about twothirds of R&D is funded by industry; in Russia, the
figure is just 27 percent.58 One relative bright spot has
been a significant increase in support for research at
higher educational institutions, but the new equipment and grant programs have not yet produced
significant returns.
The Academy of Sciences remains in a serious
crisis. In the Soviet Union, science is viewed as “a
system for generating knowledge,” rather than as a
realm with serious real-world applications. The purview of “science policy” did not include technology
or innovation.59
Personnel have become a significant problem in the
Academy and in academia, with a rapidly aging scientific community. Due to emigration, scientists in the
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40-59 age group are a far smaller cohort than would
normally be expected (one-half the proportion in the
United States, while those over 60 are three times the
share among American scientists). The extensive and
continuing brain drain, both internal and external,
remains a serious problem. Stifling bureaucracy and
rampant corruption are major reasons for this exodus
and have a significant impact on those who remain
in Russia. Here again, the processes are mutually reinforcing: the scientists most likely to demand better
management, competition, and honesty in attributing
work to authors are often the ones most inclined to
leave the country.
Russia is hardly the only country to experience a
significant brain drain, but it reaps far less of a “brain
gain” than most other developing or developed
economies and participates less in global “brain circulation.” The vast majority of Russian scientists who
have left the country are not inclined to return (recent
Nobels). Compared to China, the programs to attract
talent from abroad, whether returnees or foreigners,
are modest and insulated. Russia has generally resisted the “swallow” model of researchers spending
a few months each year in the country, something the
Chinese regard as unavoidable.
The new competitive grants that have been introduced are small. The funds often are paid late in the
fiscal year. Some scientists who have returned to Russia describe having had to pay their staffs out of their
own bank accounts because federal funds were held
up for half a year or more. Grant funding still has an
ambiguous legal status. The federal programs to support R&D are not transparent, and the criteria often
are vague. A plethora of administrative regulations
limit the size of awards and the purposes for which
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funds may be used. Research projects are evaluated
on the basis of their cost and length rather than the
quality of such outputs as publications and patents.60
A host of restrictions limit flexibility in carrying
out projects. Customs officials routinely delay the
delivery of equipment, including basic necessities
like petri dishes or reagents. Holding these supplies
for half a year to extort bribes for releasing them may
result in expiration of their useful life. Competitive
bidding is rarely used in acquiring equipment. (Basic
research and higher education [BRHE] did implement
this, and the reaction of university administrators and
researchers was astonishment.) The cost effectiveness
of funds spent for R&D in Russia is about 10-15 percent of what it is in Europe or the United States.61 In
part, this is because administrators emphasize travel,
equipment, and large infrastructure projects. These
categories are the ones acceptable to the Ministry of
Finance and are also the realms most susceptible to
kickbacks, side payments, and other forms of corruption. Resistance to competition is thus both a professional and financial advantage.62
One way to encourage cost efficiency is by setting clear priorities. Russia consistently has too many
priorities. One government study identified Russian
priority sectors (to 2020) as: information and telecommunications, nanotechnology, life sciences, biotechnology, transportation and space; clean energy; security and counterterrorism; and advanced weapons. In
November 2011, then President Medvedev identified
five priority sectors: medical technology, energy and
energy efficiency, information technology, space and
space science, and telecommunictions.
Nanotechnology emerged as one of Putin’s top
priority programs. The reasons for this remain some-
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thing of a mystery. In 2008, a group of physicists at
one of our BRHE conferences joked that it is an Emperor’s New Clothes analogy: when officials come to
inspect results, the nano-products will be too small
for them to see. While it is a major focus of science
worldwide, nanotechnology does not play to Russia’s
traditional strengths. Much of the work in nanotechnology is done at the intersection of different disciplines: biotechnology and physics, biochemistry and
medical devices, etc. The Soviet system “stovepiped”
scientific work in individual disciplines, with research
across disciplines being much harder to accomplish.
Not only is Russia’s effort dwarfed by U.S. spending,
but China has a significant program that was introduced with little fanfare. In 2004-06, the United States
was the clear leader in nanotechnology development,
garnering 43 percent of world nanotechnology patents. China received 1 percent of the world’s nanotech
patents, to rank 13th; Russia, with less than one-half of
1 percent, ranked 22nd.63
China has developed a strikingly successful model
of production innovation and reworking technology
for the domestic market, while thus far doing little in
new product innovation.64 Beijing has been the focal
point of the IT industry, a somewhat surprising development. In most countries, the high-technology corridor/center is not in the political capital. Adam Segal
attributes Beijing’s success to the relative weakness of
the local government in the national capital. Not having the power to dominate technology businesses, the
Beijing government adopted a relatively liberal approach to networks, while providing some financial
support. Segal describes this as “the good mother-inlaw” model.65 Lacking the power to control standard
operating environments (SOEs) or their spin-offs, the
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local officials established supportive, nonhierarchical
relationships. Over time, Beijing’s IT sector outperformed Shanghai, Xian, and Guangzhou, all regions
with stronger production sectors.
Both Segal and Brenitz and Murprhee emphasize
that China’s indigenous companies learned from multinational corporations (MNCs) but focused their efforts on China’s domestic market.66 These studies also
reinforce David Zweig’s emphasis on the key role
played by returnees. Recent analyses of MNCs in the
two countries illustrate the differences in their approaches: Chinese firms have sought to learn and integrate; Russian firms focus on reaping profits, gaining
control of enterprises in neighboring countries, and
continuing to play by Russian rules at home.67
Why has Russia performed less well than China
in reorienting a Soviet-style system from autarky to
global competition? The existing literature provides a
number of misleading answers:
•	The Soviet system was overrated. This is correct but does not help us understand why some
countries were able to overcome the obstacles
more rapidly.
•	Money. As we have seen, Russia now spends
quite a bit on research, with surprisingly poor
returns on the investment.
•	The resource curse. Hydrocarbons create dangers of Dutch disease, crowd out domestic
industry, and create excessive dependence on
world prices for oil and gas. With the development of shale gas, hydrocarbon producers
appear increasingly vulnerable to changes in
technology. However, rather than precluding
the diversification of an economy, income from
natural resources should make it possible to
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invest more in the diversification effort. When
this fails to happen, it suggests that funds were
either misallocated or misappropriated.
•	Flawed privatization. The Russian variant of
privatization was certainly a problem, but it
did not preclude R&D.
•	Poor policy advice. Russian officials generally
blame the bad advice offered by foreigners for
many of their difficulties. But countries like Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia that implemented
the foreign-designed programs more quickly
and completely have achieved results that make
it difficult to attribute Russia’s economic performance to flawed policies forced upon them
by foreign advisors. Failure to follow through
with reforms on the part of “winners” is a more
convincing explanation.
•	“Mentality” is another favorite culprit: if only
Russians thought differently, it would be possible to implement reforms more effectively.
Again, the experience of other nations renders
this argument questionable. It is hard to think
of two nations with more “unique” orientations
than Japan or China. Yet, both have managed
to retain their unique attributes (everything
seems to come with “Chinese characteristics”)
while participating in global economic and
technological systems.
•	A favorite explanation among Russian officials
is that China’s success represents the achievements of state programs implemented by an
authoritarian regime. This explanation ignores
the story of the first 2 decades of China’s economic rise, when success came in sectors outside state control (technical and vocational
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education and special economic zones with foreign investment). The SOEs were long the dead
weight holding back economic development. It
was only after major reforms in state enterprises in the late 1990s that some of them began to
perform less poorly. Some continue to attribute
their success to a continuing soft budget constraint, underwritten by state-owned banks.68
More promising answers focus on incentive structures and competition, epistemic communities, and
institutions (including corruption). This is good news
for Russia: None of these is a genetic trait or an irreversible condition. Rather, all of them can be altered
by a package of wise government policies that offer
adequate incentives, foster institutional development
and competition, and punish malfeasance.
The truly important lessons from China are that
embracing competition and globalization both reflects
and reinforces economic and social interests. When
reforms are successful, self-interested actors allied
with supporters of reform oppose retrenchment. As
Zweig emphasizes, the key is partial loss of control:
the government has to be weakened/limited enough
that it cannot be a major obstacle, while still retaining
sufficient capacity to provide basic public goods like
education, patent and Internet protocol protection,
medical care, and security.69
Epistemic communities play a crucial role, but
they must be encouraged to reform and to compete
by a combination of incentives and sanctions: rewards
for compliance, salary and career trajectory penalties
for resistance. Peer pressure can help enormously in
encouraging positive behavior patterns, with returnees in a position to play a unique role.70 When scien-
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tists and educators have the option of receiving state
subsidies and support, many find this preferable to
competition in the free market.
The relationship between Russian academics and
officials is complicated by an extreme variant of what
might be called “the Scott Thompson factor.”71 Beginning in the Soviet era, it became common practice for
government officials to receive academic credentials,
and, in some instances, to gain election to the Academy of Sciences on dubious grounds. In the Putin era,
about one-third of top Russian government officials
hold kandidat of science or doctoral degrees that were
purchased. Putin, Igor Sechin, and Viktor Zubkov all
defended kandidat dissertations at the Mining Institute
in St. Petersburg from 1997 to 1999. Some 18 pages of
Putin’s thesis, the core of his chapter on “Scientific
Planning,” were plagiarized from an economics textbook written by two University of Pittsburgh Business
School professors and subsequently issued in a Russian translation by Mir publishing house.72
Following the wave of protests against Putin’s return to the presidency and fraudulent elections, some
observers thought there might be significant changes
in the Russian political system. However, indications
in the first months of Putin’s third term as President
make it difficult to be optimistic about reform. Putin
has been weakened by the protests and the massive
wave of satirical images produced by his opponents.
Ironically, his weaker position may make it more difficult for him to introduce reforms that would be detrimental to Russian elites and epistemic communities.
The changes promised in December have been skewed
in ways that make them appear to have little impact:
governors will be elected, but the choice of candidates will involve filters that preclude real opposition
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figures from running; rules for registering political
parties have been relaxed, but in ways that are producing a plethora of competing parties that are likely
to divide the opposition vote so that none of them
reach the 5 percent threshold required for representation; nongovernmental organizations that receive
foreign support will be required to register as foreign
agents; and limits on the Internet, introduced as a
way to preclude child pornography, open the door to
censorship.
The protests have not ceased, though organizers
did announce a pause for the summer. The next major demonstrations were scheduled for September 15,
2012. The mayoral, gubernatorial, and regional legislative elections in October were quite interesting. If
plans to reduce subsidies for gas and other key commodities in July were carried through, higher heating
costs will not be noticeable during the summer. By
October, however, the higher payments would add
economic issues to the political grievances of Putin’s
self-appointed candidacy and electoral fraud.
The changes that have been adopted for the electoral system thus far appear to be largely cosmetic. Restoring elections for governors removes the Kremlin’s
responsibility for both selecting and answering for
the behavior of regional chief executives. At the same
time, the process of approving candidates promises to
guarantee that real opponents of United Russia will
have a difficult time getting on the ballot.
Scientific research and innovation are not likely to
experience a renaissance without more serious reform
of educational and research institutions. The epistemic
communities continue to resist reform, and a weakened government is not in a position to push them
harder. Without greater social demand, and especially
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demand on the part of the academic community, the
ongoing decline is likely to continue.
CONCLUSION
Return to the three questions posed by our conference organizers:
1. What must be done is diversification of the
economy, which will generate demand and financial
support for innovation. This also requires substantial
changes to the political system (incentives, term limits,
and feedback mechanisms); educational and research
institutions (internationalize and foster competition);
and epistemic communities (incentives and competition, which are preferable to sanctions).
2. What are the obstacles? Change is demonic,
and therefore never easy. But beyond the common
difficulties in altering any established system, in
Russia, the most serious obstacles to accomplishing
needed changes involve corruption and self-interest
on the part of the agents involved. The problem is
the winners, not the losers. China demonstrates that
reorienting a Soviet-style system is challenging but
not impossible. Russia demonstrates that, unless political leaders alter the incentive structures, epistemic
communities will continue to do what they are used
to doing.
3. What will be done, and with what consequences?
Without a significant change in the signals and policies from the top, little will change. However, as long
as oil rents supply adequate budget funding, a great
deal of money will be spent. The most tragic result is
that a large number of creative people will leave Russia. In terms of economic development and security issues, Russia will continue to be a declining power able
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to influence global affairs primarily through negative
rather than positive actions.
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CHAPTER 5
RUSSIA AS A POLE OF POWER:
PUTIN’S REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGENDA
Janusz Bugajski
With the return of Vladimir Putin to Russia’s
Presidency, the Kremlin is reinvigorating its regional
assertiveness, and several former Soviet republics are
under increasing pressure to participate in Moscow’s
integrationist initiatives. No longer a credible global
superpower, Russia aims to become the preeminent
Eurasian power and not simply a junior partner of
the United States or any other large state. Even before
his re-election in March 2012, Putin underscored the
Kremlin’s ambitions in Russia’s immediate neighborhood and outlined the concept of a Russian-led Eurasian Union (EurU) that will evidently remain central
in his efforts to forge a legacy as a gatherer of postSoviet lands.1
Among the top priorities that Putin set for his
third presidential term is the reintegration of the former Soviet republics, based on tighter economic links
and culminating in a political and security pact with
Russia at its center. Moscow is evidently fearful lest
the territory of the former Soviet Union permanently
divides and drifts into European and Asian “spheres
of influence.”2 Hence, Putin seeks to create a new Eurasian bloc that will balance the European Union (EU)
in the West and China in the East. Economic linkages
will create political ties and mesh with interstate security structures, thus making it less likely that Russia’s neighbors can join alternative military, economic,
and political alliances. Russia would thereby be able
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to strengthen its geopolitical position as a “pole of
power” in a multipolar world.
To achieve its grand ambitions, Moscow needs to
assemble around itself a cluster of states that are loyal
or subservient to Russian interests, and it has been
encouraged in this endeavor by several favorable
developments in recent years. First, as a by-product
of President Barack Obama’s administration “reset”
policy toward Moscow launched in early 2009, Washington has curtailed, if not completely discarded, its
campaign to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and secure the post-Soviet neighborhood within Western structures. This has left the East
European states bordering Russia more exposed and
vulnerable to Moscow’s pressures and integrationist
maneuvers. Moreover, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine
are not priority interests for the current American administration, whether in terms of democratic development, national sovereignty, or their strategic location.
Second, the financial crunch, economic downturns, and political stresses within the EU have diminished Brussels, Belgium’s outreach toward the postSoviet countries. This has decreased the momentum
of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), an initiative
launched in May 2009 and designed to harmonize the
European post-Soviet states with EU standards. Moscow has concluded that the EU is in serious disarray
and decline and will be preoccupied with its internal problems for several years, if, indeed, it does not
actually fracture.
Third, there is visible disillusionment with the
EU in many of the post-Soviet capitals. They do not
possess the roadmap, direction, or commitment to
full integration with the West, unlike the vision and
promise that was given to the Central Europeans after
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they liberated themselves from Moscow in the early
1990s or to the Western Balkan countries through
the EU’s Stabilization and Association Agreements
after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Conversely, in the
case of Belarus and Ukraine, there is tangible frustration in several EU capitals over their ongoing political regression, human rights abuses, and stilted
economic reforms.
Fourth, the return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin is re-energizing Russia’s neoimperial ambitions
through such comprehensive geostrategic objectives
as the formation of a EurU. As an added bonus, an assertive foreign policy helps distract attention from domestic opposition and the convulsions inside the Russian Federation. Putin’s renewed presidency has been
presented as vital to Russia’s national security in two
ways. It will allegedly protect Russia from internal
turmoil generated by disruptive public protests, and it
can rebuild Eurasia under Russia’s management and
remove unwanted Western influences that purportedly challenge the security of the Russian Federation.
MULTIPOLAR GOALS
A principal objective of Moscow’s foreign policy
is to restore Russia as a major regional power.3 In
this equation, the Kremlin’s overarching goal toward
the West is to reverse U.S. global predominance by
transforming “unipolarity” into “multipolarity,” in
which Russia exerts increasing international leverage through its Eurasian centrality. Kremlin officials
believe that the world should be organized around
a new global version of the 19th century “Concert of
Europe” in which great powers balance their interests
and smaller countries orbit around them, essentially
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as satellites or dependencies. Moscow favors multipolarity over multilateralism. In the latter, its voice becomes diluted in various multinational formats; in the
former, its role is raised as an important global player.
Moscow’s “multipolar” concept is based on two
geopolitical premises—the decline of the United
States and the emergence of new “poles” or centers of
international power, among which Russia becomes a
significant player. Conventional wisdom presupposes
that the world has entered the era of multipolarity, in
which regional influence is maintained by a few select powers. In reality, the future will be much more
irregular and unpredictable. There are at least three
conceptual problems with the notion of multipolarity.
First, it assumes that a large country has substantial
attractive influence to become a legitimate magnetic
force vis-à-vis its neighbors. Instead, an ambitious
government may simply cajole and pressure its neighbors to grudgingly recognize its temporary dominance. However, such a pole of power will generate
little loyalty; on the contrary, it may become inherently unstable by increasing regional resentments and
stoking interstate tensions. Russia presents a stark example of such a destabilizing pole of power aspiring
to regional dominance.
Second, the concept of multipolarity underestimates the interests and aspirations of smaller and
medium-sized countries by placing them within the
confines of the ambitions of larger regional powers.
It can thereby be used as a smokescreen and even a
justification for neoimperial dominance that places
limitations on the national independence of numerous subordinated states, including Ukraine, Belarus,
and Moldova.
Third, nonpolarity, the converse of multipolarity, does not automatically presuppose international
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chaos as the multipolar proponents claim. The idea of
chaos assumes that we would witness a life and death
struggle for survival between and within competing
states. Although this could be the case in some specific
regions, such as parts of the Middle East or Central
Africa, the self-appointed polar powers may themselves be the source of conflict, either with each other
or by following a policy of “divide and rule” toward
their numerous neighbors.
In other regions, the absence of a regional hegemon could actually encourage countries to cooperate
around common interests to avoid both chaos and
outside dominance. As a result, instead of ensuring
stability and security, the struggle for multipolarity can itself engender conflict, especially where two
or more powers compete for predominant influence,
while smaller states resist their pressures or actively
seek to embroil them in conflicts in order to gain various national advantages. More than likely, over the
coming decade, we will witness a mixed picture of polarities. The United States will remain the single strongest power but is not capable of always acting unilaterally or deploying its forces globally. Meanwhile,
several multipolar aspirants will compete for regional
influence with varying degrees of success in attracting
neighbors into their orbit.
In seeking to more rapidly diminish American
power, Russia’s leaders support the creation of a
“counter-hegemonic bloc.”4 This is a modernized version of the anti-American or anti-Western alliance
that was pursued by the Soviet Union throughout the
Cold War and ultimately failed. As the Russian case
has demonstrated, expressions of strategic opposition
to the West are driven largely by political leaders fearful of losing domestic power and international influ-
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ence. However, no constructive or all-encompassing
ideology has emerged that can unite and mobilize
disparate states, which often possess contrary ambitions in overlapping regions. Moreover, such a strategy faces three core problems: it will stimulate new
conflicts with the West, including the EU and NATO;
it is unlikely to lead to meaningful or durable cooperation between such diverse countries and competitors
as China, India, and Russia; and it will be resisted by
states and governments that either aspire to be part of
the West, look to the West for protection, or admire
the liberal democratic model.
Future geopolitical configurations will not be
neatly “multipolar,” a concept that Moscow supports
as it divides the world into regions where specific
countries dominate and their influence is considered
legitimate. Much more likely, we will witness a continuing struggle for zones of influence by larger states,
together with resistance by smaller powers against
subservience to larger and assertive neighbors. In
sum, any theory of international relations, such as the
multipolar concept, needs to account for a complex
and changeable reality; if it cannot explain that reality,
then it should be defined primarily as a tool of foreign
policy pursued by particular capitals.
INTERESTS, AMBITIONS, AND STRATEGIES
In assessing Putin’s integrationist agenda, it is useful to distinguish between Russia’s realistic national
interests and its grander state ambitions. For instance,
Moscow’s security is not challenged by the NATO accession of neighboring states. However, its ability to
control the security and foreign policy orientations of
its post-Soviet neighbors is certainly undermined by
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their accession to NATO and through allied protection of their national independence.
While its goals are imperial through its multipolar orientation, Kremlin strategies are pragmatic, and
its tactics are elastic. The authorities employ flexible
methods, including enticements, threats, incentives,
and pressures, where Russia’s national ambitions are
seen as predominating over those of neighbors. Moscow engages in asymmetric offensives by injecting
itself in neighbor’s decisionmaking, capturing important sectors of local economies, subverting vulnerable
political systems, and corrupting or discrediting national leaders. Russia’s neoimperial project no longer
relies on Soviet-era instruments, such as ideological
allegiance, military control, or the implanting of proxy
governments. Instead, the primary goal is to exert predominant influence over the foreign and security policies of immediate neighbors so they will either remain
neutral or support Russia’s international agenda.
The word “pragmatic” has been loosely applied in
describing Russia’s foreign policy by implying moderation and cooperation, and by counterposing it to
an ideologized imperial policy characteristic of the
Cold War. Paradoxically, “pragmatic imperialism” is
a useful way to describe Russia’s foreign policy, particularly in the strategies and tactics employed to realize specific state ambitions. These ambitions are twofold with regard to Russia’s neighbors: foreign policy
subservience to Russia and integration in Moscowdirected security and economic organizations. The
major multinational organizations promoted by Moscow to enhance integration and centralization include
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the
Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), the Customs
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Union (CU), the Common Economic Space (CES), and
the recently announced EurU.5
Created in December 1991, the CIS has had limited
impact, and several former republics joined primarily
to ensure Moscow’s economic assistance or, in the case
of Armenia, permanent military protection. Several
post-Soviet countries have maintained their distance
from Russia despite their CIS membership. Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are focused on
maintaining their independence and have viewed the
CIS as a potential threat. Georgia joined the CIS in
1993 and left in August 2008 after its short war with
Russia. Uzbekistan maintains a distance from Russia,
although it joined the EEC and the CSTO briefly between 2006 and 2008, while Turkmenistan has been
fully isolationist. Ukraine and Turkmenistan never
ratified the CIS statutes and consider themselves only
observers or participants.
The CSTO, a military alliance that includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is designed to counter NATO
aspirations in Eurasia. Its main charters are currently
being revised, specifically in the arena of decisionmaking, for possible deployments.6 The current charter requires unanimity to pass a decision, but under
the planned revisions, only states with an interest in a
given decision would be allowed a vote, thus curtailing any potential opposition to Kremlin policy in case
a military mission is deemed necessary by Moscow.
The EEC was created in October 2000 at a summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, from the prior CU and
is viewed in Moscow as a stepping-stone toward the
proposed EurU. It includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In July
2011, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched a CU
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to remove all trade barriers between the three states.
In practice, Belarus and Kazakhstan have been forced
to adopt the higher Russian import tariffs, and both
capitals have demanded direct payments from Russia
as compensation. Joining the Russia-focused CU may
also preclude involvement in a free trade zone with
the EU for the East European countries.
In October 2011, Putin hosted a meeting of prime
ministers from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine in St. Petersburg and announced an agreement to form a free
trade zone after years of fruitless negotiations. On
January 1, 2012, a formal agreement was signed to create the CES, an undivided common market embracing
the three CU economies, together with Ukraine and
open to other post-Soviet countries. On the eve of accession to the CES, the Presidents of Belarus, Russia,
and Kazakhstan also signed the Declaration of Eurasian Economic Integration. President Dmitry Medvedev invited all other EEC members to join the CES,
including the three EEC observer states of Armenia,
Moldova, and Ukraine.
Business entities of the three CES countries are
guaranteed freedom of movement of goods, services,
capital, and labor. Thus far, Kiev has resisted these enticements, fearful that they would subvert Ukrainian
sovereignty. All these plans called for the ultimate establishment of a euro-like single currency system. The
transition to the EurU has been described as the final
goal of economic integration. It envisaged a free trade
regime; unified customs and nontariff regulation measures; common access to internal markets; a unified
transportation system; a common energy market; and
a single currency. The Moscow summit of the EEC on
March 19, 2012, charted a detailed integration strategy,
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with a view to having the EEC reshaped into a fullyfledged economic union by 2015.7 These integrative
economic measures would also become undergirded
by a tighter political alliance.
Within the first 2 weeks of his renewed presidency in May 2012, Putin hosted an informal CIS summit with most of the former Soviet states, as well as
a CSTO extraordinary session with Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
In all these meetings, the goal of the EurU has featured
prominently. Putin’s notion of a EurU is of a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one
of the poles in the modern world and of serving as
an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic
Asia-Pacific region.8
Putin believes that the EurU should be built on the
inheritance of the Soviet Union, including: infrastructure, a developed system of regional production specialization, and a common space of language, science,
and culture.
How successful any of these integrationist projects
will prove in practice remains debatable. For instance,
some analysts believe that the EurU is likely to be costly
and unsuccessful and will result in trade disruption.9
Nevertheless, the pursuit of supranational integration
is itself damaging to the security and independence
of states neighboring the Russian Federation, as they
will be prevented from fully expressing their sovereignty by freely choosing their international alliances.
In calculating the impact of Russia’s pressure politics
revolving around its integrationist projects, it is useful
to examine in more detail Moscow’s policies toward
its immediate European targets—Ukraine, Belarus,
and Moldova—and then to assess the impact on the
broader Central-Eastern European region.
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TARGET UKRAINE
Few Russian politicians accept the permanent
independence of Ukraine, a country viewed as the
historic origin of Russian statehood.10 Russian elites
deny Ukraine a separate history and view its national
independence as a temporary aberration. Their ideal
scenario for Ukraine is a close political, economic,
and military alliance. The internal characteristics of
the Ukrainian government have been of lesser interest as long as Kiev follows Russia’s foreign and security policies and does not succeed in gaining NATO
membership.
Throughout the January 2010 presidential election campaign in Ukraine, the Kremlin did not overtly
favor any specific candidate in case the candidate
was defeated. It also calculated that growing public
frustration with political infighting would lead to
disillusionment with liberal democracy and growing
support for a more authoritarian leader close to Moscow. Indeed, Ukrainian citizens became increasingly
embittered with the results of the 2004 Orange Revolution, particularly with the political battles between
former Orange coalition partners and subsequently
elected Victor Yanukovych, the anti-Orange leader,
as President.
Although Ukraine was one of the founding members of the CIS, which was styled as a loose multinational association among the newly independent
states, it raised reservations on issues such as a single
currency, military affairs, and foreign policy in order
to prevent the new structure from becoming a Soviet
replica. Kiev proved successful in thwarting Kremlin
designs to construct a unified economic and security
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policy. However, power struggles between political
interest groups and industrial lobbies in Ukraine have
provided ample opportunities for Moscow to pursue
its agenda of reintegration.
In order to return Kiev more firmly under its control, Moscow has engaged in various forms of pressure and subterfuge. These include energy blackmail,
economic buyouts, media propaganda, the discrediting of pro-Western politicians, the manipulation of
ethnic and regional grievances, and lingering territorial claims. Russia’s new military doctrine also bestows
Moscow with the right to intervene in neighboring
states containing large Russian populations.
The Russian or Russophone minority, constituting
about a third of the Ukrainian population, has been
exploited by Moscow to apply political pressures on
Kiev. Russian officials have demanded dual citizenship for co-ethnics in Ukraine and initially used this as
a pretext to delay signing a bilateral state treaty. Kiev
rejected such proposals, as they would allow Moscow
to claim informal jurisdiction over regions where Russian-speakers predominated. Moscow also raised the
specter of creeping “Ukrainianization” allegedly directed against Russian ethnics, implying attempts by
West Ukrainian nationalists to oust the Russian language from official communications, thwart Russian
cultural influences, and limit the role of the Russian
Orthodox Church.
Moscow registered success in its external language
policy on June 5, 2012, when Ukraine’s parliament
approved, in a preliminary reading, a law that would
allow the use of Russian as a second official language
in 11 Ukrainian regions where over 10 percent of inhabitants use Russian as their first language, together
with the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol.11 The law needs
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to be approved in two more readings and signed by
President Yanukovych to take effect. The governing Party of Regions sought to consolidate its voting
base among Russian speakers before the October 2012
parliamentary elections and succumbed to persistent
pressures from Moscow. Once approved, the “regional language” law will affect schooling and citizens’
interactions with local authorities. Observers fear that
it will discourage Russian-speakers from learning the
official state language and decrease their loyalty to the
Ukrainian state. It could also increase ethnic tensions
and aggravate social and regional divisions.12
Kiev remains concerned about possible Kremlin
support for separatism on the Crimean Peninsula and
in eastern areas of the country. Until now, it has not
served Russia’s interests to provoke a full-scale separatist conflict, as this would have a destabilizing impact along Russia’s borders. However, the Crimean
issue has been manipulated by Russian nationalists
to prevent the Ukrainian government from moving in a pro-Western direction. Officials repeatedly
refer to Crimea as “ancient Russian land.” This autonomous region remains a potential flashpoint of
separatism if relations between Ukraine and Russia
seriously deteriorate.
Control over Ukraine’s internal security is also
an important component of Russia’s oversight. In
March 2012, President Yanukovych agreed to the introduction of Russian advisers in the Security Service
(SBU) and joint consultation with Moscow over future
government appointments.13 Russian influence over
Ukraine’s security forces is evident in the appointment
of Russian citizens Igor Kalinin and Dmitri Salamatin
as SBU Chairman and Minister of Defense, respectively. Kalinin maintains close ties to Russia and headed
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the Directorate on State Protection (UDO), the former
Soviet KGB 9th Directorate. His appointment will also
lead to enhanced cooperation between the SBU and
Federal Security Service (FSB).
Energy supplies have been persistently manipulated as economic tools of Russian policy. Ukraine
depends on Russia for more than 70 percent of its oil
and gas needs and is heavily indebted to Russia’s energy monopolies. Moscow’s ability to injure Ukraine’s
economy through energy blackmail, the raising of
prices, or calling in debts challenges the country’s independence. Russia has periodically engaged in “energy wars” with Ukraine, during which cuts in energy
deliveries crippled sizable parts of the economy. The
gas war of 2005-06 highlighted the use of energy to
apply political pressure on a government seeking to
move permanently out of Russia’s orbit.
Moscow has focused on acquiring Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, as this ties the country into statecontrolled Russian interests. Gazprom has sought
a majority stake in pipelines crossing Ukraine. Its
schemes were initially blocked, as the Ukrainian parliament prohibited the privatization of the oil and gas
industries. Prime Minister Putin pushed for a merger
between Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine. Naftogaz
controls the natural gas system and retail market in
Ukraine. Russia uses the pipeline network to transport
about 80 percent of its gas to the EU, or approximately
20 percent of the EU’s total gas needs. Although Kiev
may resist a full Gazprom takeover of Naftogaz pipelines and storage facilities, it could eventually accede
to a joint venture between the two companies.14
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Russia and Ukraine are also embroiled in a dispute
over the price and volume of Russian gas. Kiev insists
the current price is too high and wants to renegotiate
the 2009 gas deal, while Moscow is pushing for control of Ukraine’s gas transit system to Europe as part
of a deal to cut prices.15 Three elements of the agreement are problematic: the price Ukraine pays for gas,
the volume of Russian gas that Ukraine is obliged to
buy annually, and the fee Russia pays to use Ukraine’s
gas transit system.16 Kiev feels that the first two figures should decrease dramatically, while the third
should increase. At over $400 per thousand cubic
meters, Ukraine pays one of the highest prices for
Russian gas in Europe, while the transit fees Russia
pays to Ukraine are low in comparison to other
transit countries.
Moscow has supported and exploited political disputes in leaders, as they weaken Kiev’s Western aspirations and reinforce “Ukraine fatigue” in the West.
The election victory of Viktor Yanukovych in February
2010 signaled that Ukraine remained divided on the
question of Western integration as the new President
favored state neutrality. On July 1, 2010, Ukraine’s
parliament ratified a new law on “The Fundamentals
of Domestic and Foreign Policy” that dropped the goal
of acquiring NATO membership. This has also suited
several NATO and EU leaders who remain hesitant in
bringing Ukraine into either organization.
Moscow has induced Kiev to integrate more closely with Russia and into its multinational formats. In
April 2010, a new deal was signed by Medvedev and
Yanukovych and ratified by the two parliaments, extending the lease on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet by 25
years until 2043. The presence of the Black Sea Fleet
restricts Ukrainian sovereignty and can be used as a
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pressure point if intergovernmental relations deteriorate. Both Ukraine and Moldova are now in a similar
position of having declared their neutrality while Russian troops remain on their territories.
Since assuming the presidency, Yanukovych has
initiated policies to speed up security cooperation
with Russia, while downgrading the importance of
Kiev’s ties with NATO.17 Ukrainian-Russian security
cooperation has developed in three areas. First, Moscow and Kiev have reduced their rivalry in the international arms market. Yanukovych has established a
new arms export agency, Ukroboronprom, which increased presidential control over arms export policies
and tightened integration with the Russian militaryindustrial complex.
Second, joint ventures between Ukrainian and
Russian companies have grown, especially in aircraft
and shipbuilding. The Russian Navy’s stationing
along Ukraine’s Black Sea coast is being extended, and
Moscow plans to supply new vessels to the Black Sea
Fleet. Third, Ukraine and Russia have increased their
cooperation in countries that were traditional markets for Soviet arms, such as India, and new Russian
markets, such as Iran.
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov has
asserted that Ukraine needs to economically integrate
with Russia. The chairman of Russia’s parliamentary
Committee on Economic Policy, Yevgeny Fyodorov,
proposed that Ukraine join the Russia-Belarus Union,
and Putin himself has invited Ukraine into the Russiacentered CU. Medvedev also invited Kiev into the
CSTO, despite its declaration of nonbloc status. Kiev
has thus far ruled out CSTO membership and was not
prepared to alter its CIS status from observer to full
member. Membership in the CU or any of the other
economic initiatives has also been resisted, as it would
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curtail Kiev’s control over the country’s trade and
economic policy.
Some analysts believe that Ukraine’s choice is not
between Russia and the West, but whether Ukraine
joins the European mainstream or is relegated to the
European periphery. It may not be Ukraine’s preference to move closer to Russia, but Moscow’s choice
will prevail if Ukraine fails in its gradual integration with the EU. The ultimate choice facing Kiev is
between the “shared sovereignty” model of the EU
and the “surrendered sovereignty” model of the Eurasian bloc. Ukraine is unlikely to devise and survive
an effective “third way” through its self-declared
nonbloc status.
In the long term, the Kremlin seeks to permanently
alter Ukraine’s foreign policy, guarantee a Russiafriendly regime, stifle the country’s aspirations to join
Western institutions, and ensure Ukraine’s permanent
neutrality. Putin may be satisfied with the Belarusanization of Ukraine as long as this does not precipitate
a destabilizing social upheaval. But unlike with Belarus, in Ukraine public opinion, anti-authoritarianism
and counter-Kremlin sentiments are more visible,
and a tightening Russian corset is likely to provoke
a strong reaction against President Yanukovych and
against Moscow, whether through elections or extraparliamentary revolt.
TARGET BELARUS
The tug of war between Russia and the West over
the future of Belarus appears to be reaching a climax.
Instead of performing a balancing act between Russia and the West, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka
has been slipping from the tightrope and heading
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toward a hard landing in the Russian net. While the
West demands democracy and does not guarantee Lukashenka the levers of power, Moscow pursues control over key sectors of the economy and tolerates his
remaining in power. As EU sanctions have intensified
because of political repression, Minsk depends even
more on Russian loans and purchases.
Russia’s economic buy-out of Belarus has been accelerating during the past year. The sale of state assets
was a key condition of a bailout package that helped
Belarus avoid economic collapse after the 2011 currency crisis. In return for subsidized gas, the cheapest
in Europe ($164 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2012), Minsk
has lost full control over the country’s pipeline to Russia. Belarusian authorities have sold industrial assets
worth $2.5 billion in order to receive the third tranche
of the $3 billion stabilization loan issued by the EEC in
June 2011. Moscow and Minsk have also signed deals
for approximately $20 billion in Russian purchases,
price concessions, and credits between 2012 and 2015,
a figure that amounts to nearly half of Belarus’ gross
domestic product (GDP).
The privatization plan entails a complete or partial selling of key Belarusian companies to Russian
tycoons, even though Minsk continues to resist major
acquisitions of its prized assets.18 Nonetheless, Europe’s largest refinery, Belarus’s Naftan, may soon be
sold to Russia’s Lukoil. Minsk has been offered fullscale Russian support in the event of tighter Western
sanctions, while Lukashenka has called for intensifying military-political cooperation within the CSTO.19
Such developments may actually suit Brussels and
Washington, which prefer that Belarus become a Russian concern and no longer a Western problem.
Moscow, especially with the triumphal return of
Putin to the Kremlin and his vision of a EurU, will
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certainly not want Lukashenka replaced with an unpredictable and unruly democrat. Ideally, the Kremlin
would welcome a more amenable and less abrasive
government in Minsk that can help Putin, while providing lucrative benefits for Russia’s FSB tycoons. But
short of that, Moscow will tacitly support a Lukashenka presidency if Putin continues to keep the West at
a firm distance.
At the same time, the military union between the
two capitals is being consolidated.20 In February 2009,
Moscow and Minsk signed an agreement on the joint
protection of the Russia-Belarus Union State’s airspace
and the creation of an integrated regional air defense
network. The network is expected to comprise five air
force units, 10 air defense units, five technical service
and support units, and one electronic warfare unit.
Political planners in Moscow are fearful of Arabtype revolutions anywhere in their neighborhood, as
they could prove contagious in Russia. In claiming
an “area of responsibility” that coincides with the
defunct Soviet Union, Moscow is developing several
contingencies where military intervention would be
warranted. For instance, the organization may become
directly involved if the head of the state is cornered
by the domestic opposition and requests CSTO assistance. In such a scenario, the CSTO could intervene
to protect the “constitutional order,” in other words,
to help subdue social or ethnic unrest. The Russian
General Staff is reportedly accelerating preparations
for creating CSTO forces on standby for possible intervention, and such missions would not require approval by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
Belarus would be an obvious target of Moscow’s
plans and may welcome a brotherly CSTO intervention if President Lukashenka’s position is endangered.
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Even more troublesome, some EU members may actually favor CSTO involvement and a Russian-led
peacekeeping force to stabilize Belarus. Additionally,
the replacement of Lukashenka by a more pliable proRussian leader could be acceptable in Brussels, and
Moscow is unlikely to be ostracized for replacing the
often-described “last dictator in Europe.”
TARGET MOLDOVA
While the overriding priority of the current Moldovan government is European integration, Moscow
wants to keep the country outside both NATO and the
EU and to enroll it in its own integrationist structures.
The Kremlin uses several factors to maintain pressure
on Chisinau; above all, it manipulates the separatist
Transnistrian conflict.
International negotiations over Transnistria recently restarted after almost 6 years. However, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made it clear that
any reunification of Moldova would be conditional.21
Any “federal” setup would require Russian arbitration, agreement, and troop presence, with a guaranteed special status for Transnistria, enabling it to veto
Chisinau’s foreign and security policymaking. According to Lavrov, Moldova’s foreign policy decisions
should reflect its permanent neutrality as inscribed in
its constitution. Moldova’s EU integration is allegedly
incompatible with the country’s permanent neutrality
and its close relations with Russia. Indeed, such interpretations of neutrality are the major condition for
any resolution of Transnistrian separatism.
Yevgeny Shevchuk’s election as President of
Transnistria in December 2011 may actually strengthen Moscow’s hand during a new cycle of international
negotiations over the territory. Shevchuk believes that
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Transnistria is a separate state and favors its integration with the Russian Federation. During Russia’s
presidential elections, Shevchuk urged Transnistria’s
residents with Russian citizenship to vote for Putin
and supported his idea to create a EurU. Additionally,
Russia has issued an estimated 150,000 passports to
residents of Transnistria.
Russia seeks to legitimize Transnistria’s leadership, while Shevchuk’s track record is one of consistent loyalty to Russia, the country of his citizenship.22
Although he has been hailed in Brussels as a potential
reformer, Moscow’s approach will leave Shevchuk
with little room to maneuver. On March 21, 2012, Medvedev appointed Russia’s former envoy to NATO,
Dmitry Rogozin, as Special Representative of the Russian President for Transnistria.23 Meanwhile, Prime
Minister Putin also appointed Rogozin as chairman
of the Russian side of the Russia-Moldova intergovernmental cooperation commission. Rogozin’s assignment will cover both local issues and the international
negotiating process; he will apparently be reporting to
Putin on Transnistria and to Russia’s new Prime Minister Medvedev on Russia-Moldova issues.
Rogozin’s dual appointment seems designed to
treat the two parts of Moldova separately and contribute to legitimizing and institutionalizing the country’s division and heighten its dependence on Russia.
Rogozin has revealed that Moscow is not only planning to keep its peacekeeping forces in Transnistria,
but it also intends to rearm and upgrade them.24 It
may also deploy a radar system in Transnistria, establish a military base, and position Iskander missiles as
an alleged response to U.S. missile defense plans and
the creation of U.S. bases in Romania.25 Moldova will
thereby become more closely entwined in Russia’s
integrationist agenda.
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IMPACT ON CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE
Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Russian leaders envisaged post-communist Central-Eastern Europe
(CEE) as a string of neutral and weak states, regardless of their internal political structure and economic
makeup. A primary Kremlin objective was to prevent
these countries from moving into NATO and further
diminishing Moscow’s strategic maneuverability.
The Kremlin sought the region’s demilitarization and
neutralization so that it would form a buffer between
NATO and the CIS. Once Moscow understood that
it could not prevent NATO’s absorption of the CEE
countries, it embarked on a three-pronged approach:
containment, division, and marginalization.
First, Russia’s administration focused on building a firewall around the former Soviet republics of
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova to restrict CEE influence and undercut any aspirations among the three
capitals to join Western institutions. Second, the
Kremlin sought a role in alliance decisionmaking by
influencing governments in key states and promoting divisions to weaken NATO’s effectiveness. Third,
Russia’s leaders endeavored to marginalize the CEE
states by creating bilateral disputes and depicting
them as disruptive “Russophobes” within both NATO
and the EU.
In recent years, Moscow has courted Poland as a
regional partner, and Warsaw has reciprocated for
several reasons. For the Polish government, cordial
ties with Moscow boost Poland’s stature inside the
EU, whose major states such as Germany and France
seek closer relations with Russia regardless of its poor
human rights record, democratic reversals, and impe-
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rial approach toward post-Soviet neighbors. Poland
no longer wants to be perceived as a “Russophobic”
troublemaker, an image that reduces its influence
within the EU. Lessened U.S. involvement with NATO
enlargement and with European affairs more generally under the Obama presidency has also contributed to convincing Polish policymakers that Warsaw
needs to primarily strengthen its position within the
EU. Russia is also seen a sizable market for growing
Polish exports and a potential destination for Polish
investments.
Moscow views Poland as a rising power within
the EU and has therefore offered closer business and
energy connections to increase Russia’s influence. The
Kremlin calculates that improved contacts will prevent Warsaw from blocking EU-Russian initiatives as
it has in the past. It would also constrain Warsaw in
pushing for the incorporation of the post-Soviet states
in Western institutions. Additionally, the prospective
importance of Poland as a shale gas producer may
transform it into a potential energy competitor with
Russia. Hence, Moscow seeks to be part of the development process for new sources of energy and to more
closely tie Warsaw into its energy exporting networks.
Paradoxically, Poland’s aspirations to become a
major EU player and to develop ties with Russia have
created an appearance of detachment toward smaller
neighbors. Critics of Poland’s foreign policy perceive
the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk as intent on placating Russia, Germany, and France to the
detriment of other neighborhood relations. If Warsaw
significantly reduces its attention toward bordering
states, this could prove strategically counterproductive and would serve Moscow’s interests.26 For instance, the ongoing dispute between Warsaw and
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Vilnius over the linguistic and educational rights of
the Polish minority in Lithuania clearly benefits Moscow’s regional “divide and rule” strategy.
In addition, the EU’s EaP program toward the European post-Soviet states has lost momentum during
the past 2 years. Partnership countries complain that
the funds allocated by the EU have not been serious
and fail to focus on specific and practical projects.
The EaP is in danger of losing the attention of political elites, despite Warsaw’s attempts to raise it to the
top of the EU agenda and to involve a broad array of
EU capitals.
Unresigned to full Baltic sovereignty, Russia’s
leaders have sought to place Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in an undefined “neutral zone” between NATO
and the CIS and between Central Europe and Russia.
In this way, NATO influences would be minimized,
and Russia’s expansive national interests safeguarded. During the past 20 years, Moscow has experienced
several disappointments in its Baltic policy. It failed to
draw the three independent states into a Russian security orbit, and it proved unable to prevent them from
moving westward politically and establishing close
relations with the United States. The Kremlin was left
with a defensive policy of curtailing the influence of
the Baltic States on other former Soviet republics. The
Kremlin’s policy of marginalization and isolation continues. Numerous forms of pressure within Russia’s
foreign policy arsenal have been applied against the
three Baltic countries.
As the major energy supplier to the region, Moscow has periodically sought to disrupt the Baltic economies in order to apply direct pressure and gain political advantage. As a result, each government has tried
to limit its dependence on Russia and its susceptibility
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to blackmail. Moscow also endeavors to control energy transit routes, as this is both financially and politically profitable. Energy supplies are used as leverage
to purchase shares in local refining and transportation
systems. Periodic threats to reduce or halt supplies are
a means of extracting concessions to allow for Russian
investments in the local economies.
Moscow aims to convert overwhelming dependence on Russian energy supplies and economic
investments into long-term intergovernmental influence. This can provide Moscow with substantial
involvement in a targeted country’s financial, trade,
and investment policies. Russian enterprise officials
also gain political influence through engagement with
government officials, political parties, interest groups,
and media outlets in targeted states.
Russia’s officials periodically threaten the Baltic
countries, claiming that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were positioning themselves as alleged launching
pads for NATO aggression against Russia.27 Frequent
unauthorized military overflight over Baltic airspace
indicates that the Kremlin seeks to intimidate its
neighbors and to demonstrate that NATO will not ultimately defend their interests in an armed confrontation with Russia. However, in the past 2 years, NATO
has drawn up more concrete defense plans for Poland,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, including guarantees
of a NATO military response in case of outside attack.
The Baltic governments have also gained more regular
NATO military exercises in the region. Deliberations
have also intensified over the potential hosting of U.S.
and NATO military infrastructure, following the Polish, Romanian, and Czech acceptance of components
of the new U.S. missile defense system. Some capitals
have also proposed NATO army, air force, and naval
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bases, together with the reorientation of force structures, to cope with conventional threats.
There have been several reported cases of political
subversion in the Baltic region, in which influence has
been purchased by Russian businessmen tied to the
Kremlin’s intelligence services. This policy unseated
Lithuania’s President Rolandas Paksas in April 2004
and placed other officials under suspicion of collaboration. In Latvia’s September 2011 elections, the
Kremlin supported the Russian ethnic Harmony Party, calculating that, by entering government, it could
sway Latvia’s policies in a more pro-Moscow direction. However, although Harmony gained a majority
of votes among the Russian-speaking minority, it was
left out of the new governing coalition by a combination of ethnic Latvian parties because of fears that it
could veer Latvia away from its Western orbit. Russian organizations in Latvia also gathered enough
signatures to initiate a referendum on making Russian an official second language, but the initiative was
defeated on February 18, 2012, by over 74 percent of
Latvian voters.28
Moscow has tried to benefit from local political,
ethnic, subregional religious, and social turbulence in
order to keep each Baltic country off balance. It has
exploited the Russian minority question to depict the
Baltic governments as failing to meet European standards for minority protection and human rights. The
Kremlin claims the right to represent and defend the
interests not only of Russian ethnics, but also all “Russian speakers” in order to raise the number of alleged
victims of Baltic repression. Claims by officials that
the Baltic governments actively discriminated against
Russians, despite the conclusions of international human rights organizations, contribute to heightening
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international tensions. Moscow continues to manipulate the ethnic issue at convenient venues, including
UN Human Rights Commission sessions. This raises
concerns that a more expansionist regime in Moscow
could employ aggressive means to support secessionist movements in all three Baltic states.
CEE also provides opportunities for Russian inroads toward the pan-European and transatlantic institutions through economic, political, and intelligence
penetration. Russian officials focus on influencing political decisions in these capitals through a combination of diplomatic pressure, personal and professional
contacts, economic enticements, energy blackmail,
and outright bribery. Reports regularly surface in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and other CEE states that
“old comrade” networks continue to operate, based
on financial and friendship connections rather than
on any steadfast ideological or political convictions.
Some socialist and social democrat parties in the CEE,
where many of the ex-communists have gravitated,
have provided the most beneficial opportunities for
Russian penetration. Lucrative business contracts,
donations to political campaigns, and the purchase
of media outlets enable Moscow to exert political influence and convince key politicians to favor Russian
business investments and strategic interests.
During the unfolding Putin presidency, one can
expect that an aggressive integrationist approach by
Moscow toward the post-Soviet states will be mirrored
by a more assertive policy toward the CEE countries
based around economic entrapment and political neutralization. Any successes registered in reintegrating
the European post-Soviet countries within a Eurasian
economic, political, and security alliance will also encourage Moscow to pursue a more intrusive policy
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toward its former CEE satellites in seeking to maneuver them closer to a Russian orbit. This will, in turn,
heighten tensions and exacerbate conflicts between
Moscow and several Central European capitals.
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